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Abstract 
 
The present Working Paper collects the contributions presented at a conference co-organised by the 
European University Institute (EUI) and the Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER) in 
June 2012. The conference brought together leading academics and practitioners to explore whether 
and to what extent trade liberalisation and harmonisation can be regarded as successful ‘low-politics’ 
areas in EU foreign policy and what the challenges are that the EU is and will be facing in these areas. 
The papers look at current developments in the EU’s trade policy from three perspectives: (i) the legal 
and policy objectives that the EU applies in its preferential trade arrangements, with particular 
attention to interregional approaches, the linking of trade to development and conciliation with 
multilateral efforts in market liberalisation; (ii) the role of and applied practices in the Union’s efforts 
to promote standardisation within the WTO and with regard some particularly important trade 
partners, such as the US and China; and (iii) challenges and EU strategies for reconciliatory efforts in 
investment policy within the context of trade. 
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Introduction 
Trade Liberalisation and Standardisation – New Directions in the ‘Low Politics’ of EU 
Foreign Policy 
 
The EU’s ‘low politics’ of trade and investment negotiations and its export of standards have played 
an important role in shaping the role of the Union on the international stage. As the world’s largest 
trading bloc, the European Union has been eager to maintain its position on international markets and 
increase its competitiveness. Whereas the EU - a member of the World Trade Organization and an 
actor that (allegedly) speaks with one voice in all of its trade and investment relations – professes 
multilateralism, it has consistently pursued a policy of entering into preferential trade agreements at 
bilateral and interregional levels. In fact, globalisation’s profound impact on EU trade relations has 
resulted in a patchwork of preferential trade arrangements and a continued drive towards the 
harmonisation of laws, so as to secure market access and create regulatory convergence and 
interoperability. To boost global competitiveness of European industries, regulatory convergence as a 
policy objective has been revived in EU-led trade talks by aiming for increased standardisation and/or 
mutual recognition.  
The present Working Paper collects the contributions presented at a conference co-organised by the 
European University Institute (EUI) and the Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER) in 
June 2012. The conference brought together leading academics and practitioners to explore whether 
and to what extent trade liberalisation and harmonisation can be regarded as successful ‘low-politics’ 
areas in EU foreign policy and what the challenges are that the EU is and will be facing in these areas. 
The papers look at current developments in the EU’s trade policy from three perspectives: (i) the legal 
and policy objectives that the EU applies in its preferential trade arrangements, with particular 
attention to interregional approaches, the linking of trade to development and conciliation with 
multilateral efforts in market liberalisation; (ii) the role of and applied practices in the Union’s efforts 
to promote standardisation within the WTO and with regard some particularly important trade 
partners, such as the US and China; and (iii) challenges and EU strategies for reconciliatory efforts in 
investment policy within the context of trade. 
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The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements of the European Union 
– Concept and Challenges – 
 
Frank Hoffmeister1 
 
1.  Introduction 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union’s trade policy shall pursue a number of economic 
objectives, among which is ‘the progressive abolition of restrictions to international trade’ (Article 206 
TFEU). Does this constitutional aim2 still make political sense today? Has the EU not reached an 
unprecedented level of open markets already, by, inter alia, concluding the Uruguay Round in 1994 at 
the WTO and concluding a number of bilateral free trade deals?  
The answer is that a lot can still be gained from further trade opening. Indeed, an astonishing 90% of 
future economic growth will be generated outside Europe. Thus, the only reliable source for growth in 
Europe is robust external demand. The EU is well advised to strengthen its links to those parts of the 
world where growth is much stronger than in the old continent. Increased trade will also increase 
competition, innovation and labour productivity. It may hence underpin structural reforms, and 
participating in global value chains is only possible if the EU industry can rely on cheaper imports. 
True, some EU production sectors with structural weaknesses fear such increased competition, but as 
their relative loss is compensated by gains in other sectors a positive macro-economic balance would 
be achieved.  
Moreover, the Treaty puts trade policy in the wider context of the EU’s external action. Hence, also 
EU trade policy is supposed to project EU values and interests in the world (Article 207(1) 2nd 
sentence TFEU). In particular, commercial links with other parts of the world shall also support the 
development of weaker countries and regions (Article 21(1)(d) and (e) TEU). Being both the world's 
first exporter (16.7% of worldwide trade in 2010) and largest importer (17.3% in 2010), it is also clear 
that the strategic directions of Union policy in the area of sustainable development are of tremendous 
importance for global trade.  
Three different sets of instruments are available for the Union to pursue these ambitious goals: it can 
become Party to multilateral trade deals, conclude bilateral agreements, or take unilateral action. The 
first pillar centres round the World Trade Organization, where the Union is a traditional proponent of 
the Doha Development Agenda. However, as of 2012, the Doha negotiations are somewhat stalled, as 
can be seen from the meagre result of the 8th Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in December 
2011: other than deciding on the accession of Russia to the organisation and revising the plurilateral 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) ministers were not able to give the multilateral trade 
agenda a push forward.3 The third pillar is in better shape. Since Lisbon, trade policy falls under 
ordinary legislative procedure under Article 207(2) TFEU,4 and the European Parliament and the 
                                                     
1 Dr. iur., Professor of Law (Part Time) at the University of Brussels. Deputy Head of Cabinet of EU Trade Commissioner 
Karel De Gucht. The views expressed are personal.  
2 For an interesting discussion of the legal significance of these constitutional objectives see J. Larik, ‘Shaping the 
international order as a Union objective and the dynamic internationalisation of constitutional law’, CLEER Working Paper 
2011/5, p. 34ff.  
3 See F. Hoffmeister, ‘Institutional Aspects of Global Trade Governance from an EU Perspective’, in Van Vooren et al., 
(eds.), The EU's Role in Global Governance (Oxford: OUP, 2013), p. 145.  
4 On the scope of Art. 207(2) TFEU see M. Krajewski, ‘Die neue handelspolitische Bedeutung des Europäischen 
Parlaments’, in Bungenberg and Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon 
(Nomos 2011), p. 58ff.  
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Council have already updated some pieces of the EU’s unilateral trading rules. For example, the co-
legislator modernised the Generalised System of Preferences for developing countries in a clear 
direction: while eliminating the middle- and higher income countries from the scheme, it strengthened 
the incentives for the least developing countries.5  
In the present contribution, we will have a closer look at the second pillar, i.e., bilateral trade 
agreements. In this field, the Union has come up with the concept of concluding ‘deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements’ (DCFTAs). In Section 2, the geographical scope of those 
DCFTAs will be recalled, before going into the definition of the concept in Section III. Having 
identified the characteristics of a DCFTA, Section 4 is in turn dedicated to the challenges. Some 
concepts lead to internal discussions between the EU institutions, either touching institutional or 
competence issues or being of a more political nature. Other concepts are difficult to negotiate as the 
negotiation partners may have a different view on their usefulness. Section 5 offers a conclusion.  
 
2.  Geographical Scope of Bilateral FTAs 
Initially, the EU’s trade policy focussed on reciprocal trade opening with partners of equal strength 
and emerging countries, whereas it gave trade preferences mainly for political reasons. This was done 
either because the partner countries had close historical ties as former colonies of certain Member 
States (ACP), or because of their geographic proximity.  
 
2.1.  Neighbourhood Countries 
The latter element proved important in the further integration of the EU’s neighbourhood.6 We can 
quote an early FTA with Switzerland (1973) and the ambitious European Economic Area Agreement 
with Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland (1992). The Association Agreements with the Mediterranean 
countries also contained free trade chapters (Tunisia 1998, Morocco 2000, Israel 2000, Jordan 2002, 
Lebanon 2003, Egypt 2004, Algeria 2005, Interim Agreement with the Palestine Authority 1997). The 
two exceptions are Libya and Syria, with whom it was impossible to forge closer ties for political 
reasons. Modelled strongly on the Euro-Med examples, the Union also offered preferential free trade 
chapters in the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the Western Balkan countries (Croatia 
2005, Bosnia-Hercegovina 2008, Albania 2009, Montenegro 2010, Serbia 2010).  Turkey even agreed 
to a customs union with the European Union (1995), and so did Andorra and San Marino back in 1991 
and 1992, respectively.  
 
2.2.  Emerging Economies 
Importantly, though, the Union revised this approach at the end of the 1990s. Since then, it also seeks 
a much closer trade relationship with large developed partners outside the immediate neighbourhood. 
First steps were taken with ‘old-generation’ FTAs with Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000) and Chile 
(2003). In 2006, the Commission took the ambition even further. In its communication ‘Global 
                                                     
5 See Commission proposal of 10 May 2011, COM(2011) 241 final. The text has been agreed with minor modifications by 
the legislator and is likely to be published by the end of 2012.  
6 For an excellent overview of the different neighbourhood agreements see S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski (eds.), The 
European Union and Its Neighbours – A Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2006), p. 653. 
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Europe’, it announced its intention to go both ‘deeper’ and ‘wider’ in its negotiation approach.7 Hence, 
the negotiation chapters on goods and services should liberalise more than before, and new topics such 
as procurement, intellectual property rights, competition and investment should be included. 
Moreover, an effort should be made to strengthen sustainable development through bilateral trade 
relationships, which could include co-operative provisions in the area of labour standards and the 
environment. 
This new approach was put into practice first with the Caribbean ACP countries (Cariforum Economic 
Partnership Agreement 2009) and then with Korea. The latter FTA is provisionally applied since 1 
July 2011.8 It is ‘deep’ in so far as it saves roughly 1.6 billion EUR in customs duties per year and 
creates up to 80% new trading opportunities, including for service suppliers. It is ‘comprehensive’ in 
so far as it tackles non-tariff barriers, provides better access to government procurement, protects IPRs 
and contains a chapter on competition and sustainable development. Next to this ‘model DCFTA’, the 
EU has signed ambitious bilateral deals with Central America and Peru/Colombia (2012) and initialled 
the text with the Ukraine (2012). Five more DCFTA’s are under negotiation (India, Canada, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Mercosur), while some countries of the Eastern Partnership (Moldova, Armenia) 
are pressing to open negotiations as well. Four of our Mediterranean partners are also ready to upgrade 
their trade relations with the European Union, and the Council has issued the relevant negotiating 
directives to the Commission in late 2011.  
 
2.3.  US and Japan 
Finally, the EU is nearing a ‘big bang’, as negotiations on DCFTAs with the heavyweights United 
States and Japan have begun in 2013. According to first estimates, no less than two thirds of new 
economic gains for the European Union could come from these new agreements, if they are ever 
concluded. With respect to Japan, the Council of Ministers adopted the directives in November 2012 
and an interim review will be held after the first year of negotiations in spring 2014. Based on a report 
of a joint high-level group with the United States issued in February 2013, the EU Ministers 
authorised the Commission to negotiate a comprehensive agreement during their meeting in Dublin in 
June 2013. However, due to French resistance, the Commission was not authorised to negotiate on 
audio-visual services as this could – in the French view – endanger cultural diversity in the Union and 
jeopardize specific quotas and aid schemes in that sector.  
 
3.  Concept of DCFTAs 
What are now the typical characteristics of a DCFTA? While any particular DCFTA may well contain 
slightly different provisions depending on the outcome of negotiations, the EU-Korea FTA contains 
the latest state of the art. We can thus go through it with a view of identifying typical provisions for an 
EU DCFTA. 
 
3.1.  Trade in Goods 
The liberalisation of trade in goods makes up no less than five (‘deep’) chapters in the agreement. 
Next to the traditional arrangements on national treatment and market access through the reduction or 
abolition of import duties, there is interesting language on export duties in Chapter Two. Article XI 
                                                     
7 European Commission, ‘Global Europe – Competing in the world – A contribution to the EU's Growth and Jobs Strategy’, 
COM(2006) 567, 4.10.2006, pp. 11-12.  
8 Notice on provisional application, OJ [2011] L 168/1.  
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GATT does not outlaw such duties. They may, however, lead to unfair competition in the sourcing of 
precious primary goods. Against that background, the EU usually fights the imposition of export 
duties in third countries as those duties would usually favour domestic production. Article 2.11 
translates this policy into a clear-cut prohibition of duties, taxes or other fees and charges imposed on, 
or in connection with, the exportation of goods to the other Party.  
Chapter Three concerns trade remedies. Again, with a remarkable level of detail, the partners agree on 
the restrictive conditions under which bilateral or global safeguards can be used. This is not only of 
theoretical importance, as the French request of July 2012 to trigger a system of import surveillance in 
the car sector has shown. Replying in October, the Commission did not entertain that request as it 
could not be shown that there was an increase of imports of products falling into sensitive sectors 
concentrated in a particular Member State.9  
Furthermore, the parties also go into their respective systems of imposing anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties. Articles 3.10 and 3.14 export two traditional ‘WTO plus’ instruments of the 
EU’s trade defence practice, namely the ‘Union interest’10 and the ‘lesser duty rule’.11 Under the first 
test, a party can decide not to impose measures when it is not in the public interest to do so, because a 
duty would, for example, disproportionately hurt downstream users or consumers. Under the second 
test, the amount of a duty shall not be higher than adequate to remove the injury to the domestic 
industry. In other words: if there is a high dumping margin (for example 60%), but the injury for 
domestic industry is lower (for example 20%), then the anti-dumping duty shall not be higher than 
20%, irrespective of the fact the dumping margin was higher. This stresses the remedial rather than 
punitive character of the EU’s approach to trade defence.  
Modern forms of non-tariff barriers are addressed in Chapters Four (Technical Barriers) and Five 
(Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards). Here, the basic approach is to confirm the relevant WTO rules 
(TBT agreement and SPS agreement) and to offer further detail. For example, Article 4.9 contains a 
crucial rule to minimise trade effects of marking and labelling rules, and Article 5.6 promotes the 
cooperation of both parties to develop international SPS standards, guidelines and recommendations. 
Chapter Six (Trade Facilitation) foreshadows a future WTO agreement on the issue. An important 
‘frontrunner’ rule is Article 6.10, according to which neither Party shall require the use of pre-
shipment inspection or their equivalent – a clear ‘shot’ against restrictive US practice in the field.  
 
3.2.  Services and Investment 
Chapter Seven contains an impressive list of liberalisation commitments for cross-border services and 
establishment. In particular, Article 7.11(2) outlaws a number of practices used to curtail the 
commercial presence of juridical or natural persons of the other Party. Interesting is also Article 7.15, 
according to which nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to limit investor rights stemming from a 
Member State BIT with Korea. The temporary movement of service providers is regulated as well, and 
the agreement contains an extensive Chapter on domestic regulation. This goes particularly far, as 
each party promises to entertain a system of judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures 
against administrative decisions (Article 7.23(2)). The free movement of capital chapter reflects in 
Article 8.1 and 8.2 the EU approach. 
The EU-Korea FTA also contains a number of important horizontal provisions. Under Article 7.1(4) 
‘each Party retains the right to regulate and to introduce new regulations to meet legitimate policy 
                                                     
9 See Art. 6(2) of the Safeguard Regulation No. 505/2011 relating to the EU-Korea FTA.  
10 Art. 21 of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation (Regulation No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009, OJ 2009 L343/51).  
11 Art. 9(4) 4th sentence of the same Basic Regulation.  
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objectives’. One recital in the preamble is even more specific, recognising the ‘right of Parties to take 
measures necessary to achieve legitimate public policy objectives on the basis of the level of 
protection that they deem appropriate, provided that such measures do not constitute a means of 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade’. In line with Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, this recital can be used as relevant context for the 
interpretation of the ‘right to regulate’.  
Not yet included in the EU-Korea agreement are, however, provisions on investment protection. 
However, as the commercial policy of the Union since Lisbon also enshrines ‘foreign direct 
investment’,12 upcoming DCFTAs are likely to contain provisions on this topic. Negotiation directives 
to this effect already exist for the agreements with India, Singapore and Canada. We can hence expect 
the standard clauses on investment protection used hitherto by Member States in their bilateral 
investment agreements to resurface in the relevant DCFTA chapters of the Union. Moreover, the 
Union might in principle also be ready to agree on investor-to-state dispute settlement clauses.13  
 
3.3.  Market Access in Public Procurement 
Chapter Nine on public procurement makes the point that tenders by public authorities should in 
principle be open to bidders from the other Party on a non-discriminatory basis. Normally, negotiators 
would then identify a list of ‘committed’ entities to be attached to the agreement. These commitments 
may include entities from the federal government, federated states or local authorities. In the case of 
Korea, such a list was easy to establish as the parties had already given their respective offers in the 
framework of the plurilateral GPA negotiations at the WTO. Hence, Article 9.1(4) of the agreement 
only had the purpose to put the revised GPA text into provisional application on a bilateral basis. A 
bilateral working group monitors the actual implementation of these commitments.   
In other cases, the establishment of a ‘deep’ list may prove to be much more controversial. For 
example, in the DCFTA negotiations with Canada, the EU’s insistence to receive commitments from 
the Provinces has produced a real challenge for the Canadian negotiators. As the federal government is 
extremely cautious to commit the Provinces, we have seen a ‘mixed’ delegation on the Canadian side 
during the negotiating round in Brussels in June 2012. Led by the federal negotiator, all Provinces 
were represented to advance on this crucial point.  
 
3.4.  Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
The most comprehensive chapter of the EU-Korea FTA is dedicated to intellectual property rights. 
Again the WTO rules enshrined in the TRIPS agreement serve as a blueprint, but a number of 
provisions go further. For example, the Chapter on geographic indications is much more elaborate than 
the minimum rules contained in Articles 22 and 23 TRIPS. In particular, there is agreement that 
geographical indications shall be protected through a system of registration (Article 10.18); moreover, 
the Parties exchange lists of specific GIs they wish to see protected by the other side. Importantly, GIs 
shall prevail over trademarks which are submitted after a registration of a GI (Article 10.23). In the 
sub-section on patents, we can find new article on data exclusivity (Article 10.36), and there is an 
entire new sub-section on plant varieties.  
                                                     
12 For a good interpretation of the Art. 207(1) TFEU relating to foreign direct investment see A. Reinisch, ‘The Division of 
Powers between the EU and its Member States "after Lisbon"’, in Bungenberg, Griebel, Hindelang (ed.), Internationaler 
Investitionsschutz und Europarecht (Nomos 2010), pp. 99-112.  
13 For more details see F. Hoffmeister and G. Ünüvar, ‘From BITS and Pieces to European Investment Agreements’, in M. 
Bungenberg et al., (eds.), European Investment Policy after Lisbon (forthcoming).  
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The agreement also puts emphasis on enforcement of IPRs. Next to civil enforcement there are 
provisions on criminal enforcement.  In particular, each Party shall provide for criminal procedures 
and penalties ‘in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting and copyright and related rights piracy on a 
commercial scale’ (Article 10.54(1)). Criminal liability shall also be established for legal persons, as 
may be necessary (Article 10.56) and for aiding and abetting (Article 10.57). In this sensitive area, the 
agreement also lays down new rules for online service providers (10.62-10.65), falling short of a 
general obligation to monitor (Article 10.66). Finally, enforcement is also done through border 
measures, which are extensively regulated in Article 10.67 of the agreement. 
 
3.5.  Competition Rules 
A strong competition chapter is another characteristic of a DCFTA. Chapter Eleven makes the explicit 
link between the two subjects: Parties undertake to apply their respective competition laws so as to 
prevent the benefits of the trade liberalisation process in goods, services and establishment from being 
eroded or eliminated by anti-competitive business conduct or anti-competitive transactions (Article 
11.1). Again, this point is not without political sensitivity – one may recall that absent such bilateral 
rules, the EU and Korea fought each other bitterly at the WTO over subsidies in the ship-building 
sector.14 Having settled this dispute, the parties have now laid down principles on anti-trust (Article 
11.1(3), including on public enterprises and enterprises with special or exclusive rights (Article 11.4). 
Those provisions resemble the relevant EU rules (Articles 101 TFEU et seq.) rather closely. With 
respect to subsidies, the situation is, however, different. In that regard, the WTO SCM agreement is 
the clear reference point, but again, the Parties have agreed to enact additional disciplines. Most 
interestingly, ‘prohibited subsidies’ are not only export subsidies and local content subsidies, as under 
Article 3 SCMA, but also bailout guarantees and restructuring aid which fails to show realistic 
assumptions for recovery within a reasonable period (Article 11.11).  
 
3.6.  Sustainable Development 
Chapter 13 on sustainable development deals with the difficult issue of social, labour and 
environmental standards. Article 13.5 establishes a duty of consultation (para. 1) and makes 
compliance with enumerated international agreements a bilateral commitment (para. 2). Very 
important is also the stand-still clause in Article 13.7 according to which neither Party shall lower its 
environmental or social standards in order to influence trade and investment between them. This 
recognises the idea that investment shall not be promoted at the expense of labour or environmental 
regulation. Moreover, the agreement puts in place a dialogue with social partners (Article 13.13). 
However, a hard enforcement mechanism is not foreseen. If consultations between the governments do 
not settle an issue, a committee of experts may adopt recommendations, which the parties endeavour 
to implement (Article 13.15(2)). There is no duty to follow an expert recommendation – a fortiori it 
cannot justify retaliation.  
 
3.7.  Transparency and Dispute Settlement  
A DCFTA is also quite explicit on transparency. Chapter Twelve of the EU-Korea FTA spells out the 
rudimentary rules under Article X GATT. Next to publication requirements (known under Article X:1 
GATT), there are far-reaching rules on administrative proceedings and the need to establish or 
                                                     
14 See cases EC – Commercial vessels (complainant: Korea) WTO/DS301 and Korea – Commercial vessels (complainant: 
EC) WTO/DS273.  
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maintain judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals for the purpose of prompt review and, 
where warranted, corrective action (Article 12.6). While such requirements are not spectacular for 
well-established states with an independent judiciary, they may be more demanding for countries in 
transition. Also, the tiny Article 12.8 on non-discrimination does no less than establishing equal 
treatment for all matters covered by the agreement. Such assimilation of foreign operators to domestic 
operators may have to be taken into account when applying quite a number of domestic statutes.  
With respect to dispute settlement, Chapter 14 provides for a sophisticated system. Unless excluded 
as, for example in the case of trade remedies (Article 3.15), SPS matters (Article 5.11) or sustainable 
development (Article 13.16), any dispute arising under the agreement can be subject to consultation, 
mediation or arbitration. The rules on arbitration follow the letter and the spirit of the WTO Panel 
system to a very large degree. This means that either side has the right to establish an arbitral tribunal, 
which can decide the dispute in a short time frame. To make this system operational, a list of 
arbitrators is maintained (Article 14.18) out of which the Parties may choose their nominees for a 
given dispute. If they cannot agree, a lot shall designate the individuals serving for the dispute (Article 
14.5 (3)).  
 
3.8.  Institutional, General and Final Provisions 
The oversight of the agreement is laid into the hands of a Joint Trade Committee, comprising 
representatives of both sides. It is supposed to meet once a year (Article 15.1(2)) and may establish 
specialised committees and working groups. The Committee can adopt binding decisions by 
agreement between the Parties (Article 15.4(3)).  
While this institutional set-up is all fairly standard in international agreements concluded by the EU, 
the General provisions are of more interest. Article 15.8 (balance of payments exceptions) and Article 
15.9 (security exceptions) incorporate Articles XVII and XXI GATT, respectively. But the most 
pertinent Article XX GATT on general exceptions is not included there. Rather, the respective 
reference is included in Article 2.15 in the chapter on trade in goods. This technique illustrates that the 
aforementioned reasons (balance of payments, security) may be used to justify national measures 
derogating from all commitments taken under the agreement, whereas the ordinary public policy 
purposes only come into play for goods-related measures.  
Finally, two aspects of the Final provisions are worth mentioning. First, a DCFTA is normally 
concluded for an indefinite duration (Article 15.11). In other words, the Parties envisage a stable 
relationship that should last ‘forever’ if political circumstances do not change dramatically. Second, a 
DCFTA may be concluded as a stand-alone agreement. But this does not mean that it is isolated from 
the broader contractual relations between the EU and the country concerned. Rather to the contrary: 
the agreement is ‘an integral part of the overall bilateral relations as governed by the Framework 
Agreement’ (Article 15.14(2)). This seemingly technical provision has political significance because it 
makes the human rights clause of the Framework Agreement operational also in the trade context. In 
other words: if a Party invokes the human rights clause, it may not only suspend parts of the 
Framework Agreement, but also the DCFTA.  
 
4.  Challenges 
This last point leads us directly to the challenges facing the EU’s DCFTA policy. Are they ‘political’ 
enough? Again, the changed constitutional scenery after Lisbon already starts to tell. Since 1 
December 2009 the European Parliament has the power to reject trade deals under Article 218(6)(a)(v) 
TFEU and has displayed a tendency to scrutinise EU trade agreements from a more political point of 
view. Three issues come to mind: political clauses, sustainable development and intellectual property 
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rights. Moreover, Parliament may also be concerned about the relationship between the bilateral 
option and the multilateral framework.  
 
4.1.  Political Clauses 
After having endorsed the EU-Korea DCFTA with a huge majority in spring 2011, the European 
Parliament took a closer look at the relevant texts for Peru and Colombia. In the latter case, the 
situation of trade unionists was of concern to the MEPs, given that a number of trade union leaders 
had been killed by paramilitary groups. The crucial question was thus whether the conclusion of the 
DCFTA would not send a wrong signal to Colombia that the EU does not really care about the human 
rights situation in the country.  
Already during his hearing in January 2010, the Commissioner designated for Trade, Karel De Gucht, 
promised to the EP’s Trade Committee that he would consult with MEPs before signing the 
agreement. And indeed, regular exchanges took place before the agreement was signed on 26 June 
2012. In the debate on ratification, the Commission responded favourably to the idea of the EP’s 
rapporteur, Mr. Lange, to request from the Colombian government a specific action plan to improve 
public safety in the country and improve the human rights situation of activists, in particular.  
Another related issue is looming on the horizon in the DCFTA negotiations with Canada. Here, the 
challenge is the opposite. As a long-established democracy based on the rule of law, Canada may have 
reservations to accept the full tool-kit of the EU’s human rights clauses. In particular, the non-
execution clause, which directly links the non-implementation of an essential element in the agreement 
(including human rights) with suspension, could raise questions. So negotiators have the task to find 
appropriate formulations which, on the one hand, do not lead to undue finger-pointing and, on the 
other hand, leave the credibility of the EU’s human rights policy intact.  
 
4.2.  Sustainable Development 
A similar conflict transpires occasionally with respect to the sustainable development chapter. As 
described above, the current formulation consciously avoids establishing a hard enforcement 
mechanism. While labour or environmental standards constitute substantive treaty law, they are not 
‘essential elements’ whose violation would justify the suspension of the agreement by the other side. 
This constitutes a remarkable difference to the human rights clauses, which are expressly designated 
as essential. In the European Parliament, this difference gave rise to some controversy, and in its 
thematic resolution on the matter, the Parliament expresses the hope to strengthen the enforcement 
mechanism of the clause.15 However, on the other side of the equation stands the Union's treaty 
partner. Recent negotiations have demonstrated that a further elevation of the sustainable development 
enforcement mechanism is hardly feasible.  
 
4.3.  The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Freedom of the Internet 
A very visible clash between the European Parliament, on the one hand, and the Commission and the 
Council, on the other hand, occurred with respect to the protection of intellectual property rights and 
its relation to the freedom of the internet. The EU had backed an US-Japanese initiative to negotiate an 
                                                     
15 EP resolution of 25 November 2010 on ‘Human rights, social and environmental standards in international trade 
agreements’, para 13, reaffirmed by EP resolution of 27 September 2011 on a ‘New trade policy for Europe under the EU 
2020 strategy’, para 6.  
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Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) back in 2006. Official negotiations started in 2008 
together with Switzerland, Mexico, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Korea. The participants 
promised to step up enforcement action against counterfeit goods, generic medicines and copyright 
infringements on the internet.  
In June 2011, the Commission adopted two proposals: one on the signing16 and one on the 
conclusion17 of ACTA. It proposed that the Union should not exercise its shared competence on 
criminal enforcement so as to underline that the Member States had negotiated that part of the 
agreement under their national responsibility. Hence, it would also be for both the Union and all 
Member States to sign and conclude the text. On 16 December 2011, the Council adopted by 
unanimity the decision to sign ACTA on behalf of the Union,18 and indeed, a Union representative 
actually signed ACTA on 26 January 2012 in Tokyo. At the same time, representatives from all 
Member States with the exception of Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia also 
put their signature under the text.  
The fact that a number of Member States did not sign the agreement although they had voted in favour 
of EU signature just a month ahead already demonstrates that significant developments had occurred 
in the meantime. In fact, an unprecedented wave of internet protests and demonstrations in Eastern 
European and German cities expressed huge discontent of activists with the agreement. In particular, 
the interaction of the agreement with the freedom of the internet was questioned, as was the lack of 
clarity of a number of provisions. A critical academic opinion of January 201119 further fuelled the 
debate, as did an opinion of the EU data protection supervisor raising doubts about the compatibility 
of the agreement with the EU’s data protection principles.20 Against that background, the Commission 
decided in February 2012 to request an opinion of the European Court of Justice on the question 
whether the agreement is compatible with the Treaties and in particular with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The legal brief was submitted to the Court on 10 May 
2012. Irrespective of this request and despite a call from Trade Commissioner De Gucht to await the 
Court's opinion, the European Parliament continued with the consent procedure. In fact, also pointing 
to a petition of over 2.8 million online petitioners arguing against ACTA and the negative advice of 
INTA rapporteur David Martin, an overwhelming majority of MEPs voted against the agreement in 
the plenary on 9 July 2012. As a consequence, most Member States terminated their ratification 
procedure as well.  
The consequences of this debacle could then be felt directly in the DCFTA negotiation agenda. 
Internet activists reproached the Commission with using ‘ACTA clauses’ in the bilateral context with 
Canada, and thus with preparing to introduce ACTA ‘through the backdoor’. In order to avoid such 
appearances the Commission reviewed the entire IPR chapter in its ongoing negotiations. However, 
the most sensitive sub-chapter on criminal enforcement is in the hands of the Presidency, and it is up 
to Member States to decide on the future approach to be taken. The entire discussion may even lead to 
a complete disappearance of this topic from future DCFTAs. This, in turn, might eliminate another 
                                                     
16 COM(2011) 379 final. 
17 COM(2011) 380 final.  
18 See Press Release 18708/11 of the 3137th  Council meeting on 15-16 December 2011, at p. 43. 
19 Opinion of European Academics on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement available at 
<http://www.iri.unihannover.de/tl_files/pdf/ACTA_opinion_200111_2.pdf>.  
20 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, 24 April 2012, available at  
<http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/201 
2/12-04-24_ACTA_EN.pdf>.  
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reason for concluding a DCFTA as a ‘mixed agreement’,21 which is in any case an oddity in the trade 
field.  
 
4.4.  Relation to the Multilateral Framework 
Finally, MEPs are regularly concerned about the relation of the EU’s DCFTAs with the multilateral 
framework. In this respect, a legal and a political dimension need to be distinguished. From a purely 
legal point of view, none of the DCFTAs poses any serious question. They cover ‘substantially all 
trade’ within the meaning of Article XXIV GATT and V GATS, and are thus compatible with the 
relevant WTO rules. As the WTO committee entrusted with the supervision of bilateral or regional 
free trade agreements of WTO members still works on consensus, a sweeping statement of self-
empowerment is sufficient. This can be witnessed by Article 1.1(2)(a) and (b) of the EU-Korea FTA. 
According to those provisions, the objectives of the Agreement are to liberalise and facilitate trade in 
goods and services ‘in conformity with Article XXIV GATT (...) and Article V GATS’.  
The more pertinent question is whether a continued push for such ‘compatible’ agreements would not 
nevertheless undermine the political foundation of the WTO. Would not the interest to conclude a 
multilateral agreement vanish completely if all the big players, such as the EU, the US, India, China 
and Brazil were linked through bilateral agreements? The political reply is probably not 
straightforward. The EU applied a sort of ‘moratorium’ on new FTAs when the Doha Round was 
launched in 2001, but lifted it in 2006 in the above-mentioned new trade strategy. In my view, this did 
not contribute to a slowing down of the Doha negotiations. Having assumed office in 2010, EU Trade 
Commissioner De Gucht tried in parallel to revitalise the round by putting an EU proposal on market 
access for non-agricultural goods on the table in June 2011. The rejection of this proposal by the 
United States and China was in no way linked to the EU’s bilateral agenda with other countries. 
Rather, it can be hoped that an ambitious set of free trade agreements can set the pace and demonstrate 
that trade liberalisation is still workable. Similarly, with respect to services, the EU remained faithful 
to the multilateral anchor by demanding that any plurilateral initiative in the field should build on the 
GATS definitions and structure. Hence, even if only a few WTO members would be ready to further 
liberalise trade in services, such step ahead would be open to the other WTO members joining at a 
moment which is more appropriate for them.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade agreements of the European Union can by now be regarded 
as an established practice. They have gone a long way from focusing on pure tariff elimination on the 
import of goods to covering vast regulatory areas. In that sense, they enter the realm of ‘law-making 
treaties’ in a specialised area of international law. While most of the topics have already been covered 
by multilateral (GATT, GATS, TBTA, SPSA, SCMA) or plurilateral (GPA) agreements in the WTO, 
the bilateral practice further refines these international rules. Moreover, some parts of a DCFTA 
address new subjects that may influence the development of special branches of international law – 
e.g., sustainable development clauses may strengthen in particular international environmental law.22 
On the other hand, as the recent attempt to agree additional rules to the TRIPS agreement through 
ACTA has failed, comparable rule-making via bilateral DCFTAs seems to be excluded. This reminds 
                                                     
21 On the legal questions surrounding such ‘mixed agreements’ more generally, see C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed 
Agreements Revisited (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2010).  
22 F. Hoffmeister, ‘Der Beitrag der Europäischen Union zur Entwicklung des besonderen Völkerrechts’, in Obwexer (ed.), 
‘Die Europäische Union im Völkerrecht’, Europarecht, Beiheft 2/2012, p. 227 (242).  
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us of one important internal parameter of the EU’s DCFTA policy: it can push the envelope only so far 
as the European Parliament is willing to use trade policy as a political tool. 
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Linking Trade Liberalisation, Standardisation and Development: Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures in the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU And 
ACP States 
 
Gracia Marín Durán∗  
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore the linkages between trade liberalisation, standardisation and 
development through treatment of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures in the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that have been concluded, or are being negotiated, between the 
European Union (EU) and seven regional groupings of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States 
under the framework of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.1 The chapter begins by introducing the 
key regulatory linkages, and inherent tensions, between SPS regulation and trade liberalisation, 
highlighting the need to strike a delicate balance between at times conflicting policy goals, as well as 
the specific challenges faced when countries at different levels of development are involved, such as 
the EU and the ACP States. It then turns to analysing the SPS provisions in the EPAs, focusing on that 
concluded with the CARIFORUM States in October 20082 as the only final EPA provisionally applied 
at the time of writing, while comparisons will be made with interim EPAs (iEPAs) signed with other 
ACP regions or individual countries therein.3 The EPAs will be assessed against multilateral rules on 
SPS matters in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and notably the Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures4 concluded as part of the Uruguay Round ‘single 
undertaking’. A key question that arises is what is the added-value of EPAs in dealing with the 
interface between SPS regulation, trade liberalisation and development: are they, in fact, a success or a 
                                                     
∗ Lecturer in International Economic Law and Director of LLM Programme in International Economic Law, School of Law, 
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assistance.  
1 Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part and the 
European Community and its Member States of the other OJ [2000] L317/3 (Cotonou Agreement), Arts. 36-37. This marks 
the latest, but significantly novel, stepping-stone in a cooperation process spanning several decades between the EU and the 
ACP while its immediate predecessor is the Lomé IV-bis Convention (OJ [1998] L156/3), the very origins of this long-
standing contractual cooperation are to be traced back to the Yaoundé I (OJ [1964] L93/1431) and Yaoundé II (OJ [1970] L 
282/2) Conventions. On the evolution of EU-ACP trade relations, see K. Arts and A. K. Dickson (eds.), EU Development 
Cooperation – From Model to Symbol? (Manchester University Press 2004); O. Babarinde and G. Faber (eds.), The 
European Union and Developing Countries: the Cotonou Agreement (Martinus Nijhoff 2005); JA McMahon, The 
Development Cooperation of the EC (Kluwer, 1998), ch. 2; B. Martenzuck, ‘From Lomé to Cotonou: The ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement in a Legal Perspective’ 5(4) European Foreign Affairs Review 2000, p. 461.  
2 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its 
Member States, of the other [2008] OJ L289/3 (CARIFORUM EPA); ‘Notice concerning the provisional application of the 
CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement’ OJ  [2008] L352/62. 
3 Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Pacific States, of the other part, 
[2009] OJ L272/2 (Pacific iEPA); Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Central Africa Party, of the other part OJ [2009] L57/2 
(Central Africa iEPA); Stepping stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Côte d'Ivoire, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part OJ [2009] L59/2 (Western Africa iEPA); Interim Agreement 
with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other (SADC iEPA), available at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-partnerships/negotiations-and-agreements/#_sadc>.  
4 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Annex 1.A to the Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), signed in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994. 
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missed opportunity in building upon existing WTO disciplines? In addressing this question, emphasis 
is placed on two areas where complementary action at the bilateral/regional level is specifically 
envisaged in the SPS Agreement itself, namely: equivalence recognition (as a means to limit the trade 
restrictive effects of diverging SPS measures) and provision of financial/technical assistance to 
developing and least-developed countries (as a means to address supply-side constraints in meeting 
SPS requirements). In this regard, comparisons will be made with another free trade agreement (FTA) 
concluded between the EU and another (more advanced) developing country: the Association with 
Chile,5 which contains comprehensive SPS provisions that are quiet unique in EU FTA outside the 
enlargement context.6 
 
2. SPS provisions in EPAs: Striking a Delicate Balance 
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards and their associated conformity assessment procedures are 
generally considered a specific category of technical barriers to trade (TBT) in light of their purpose –
that is, the protection of human, animal or plant life or health from food-borne risks and risks from 
pests and diseases – and are often addressed separately in trade agreements, including in the WTO 
Agreement.7 As a special category of non-traditional market access barrier, SPS measures have 
become an increasingly important, and controversial, issue in international trade relations, notably due 
to their close link with trade in agricultural and food products which has been notoriously difficult to 
liberalise. As of 30 September 2011, over 10,000 SPS measures have been notified to the WTO, of 
which 370 regular notifications (4.2% of the total) and 49 emergency notifications (3.7% of the total) 
were submitted by the EU.8  
This proliferation of SPS measures can be seen as the natural outcome of the exercise of the sovereign 
right of States to protect public health within their territories which is universally recognised, 
including under WTO law,9 as is their discretion in setting the level of protection against SPS risks 
that they deem appropriate to ensure within their territories.10 And yet, there are inherent tensions 
between this vitally important objective of public health protection and that of promoting trade 
liberalisation. At the most basic level, a risk exists that SPS measures are misused as tools of 
‘disguised protectionism’, which has gained importance as traditional barriers to agricultural trade 
(e.g., tariffs, quotas) shielding domestic producers from foreign competition have been progressively 
reduced or eliminated under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.11 But even when adopted for 
entirely legitimate, non-protectionist, health protection purposes, SPS measures can significantly, and 
at times unnecessarily, restrict international trade. This is due to the large differences that exist in SPS 
                                                     
5 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Chile, on the other part OJ [2002]  L352/3 (Chile AA). 
6 Ibid., Annex IV ‘Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Applicable to Trade in Animals and Animal Products, 
Plant Products and other Goods and Animal Welfare’. 
7 A more general Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) is also annexed to the WTO Agreement, 
Annex I A.  
8 WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ‘Overview of the Implementation of the Transparency 
Provisions of the SPS Agreement – Note by the Secretariat’ (G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.4), 13 October 2011 (2011 Transparency 
Note), pp. 3 and 6. 
9 WTO SPS Agreement, Art. 2.1. 
10 See, e.g., European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para. 172; European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-containing Products, Appellate Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 168. 
11 WTO Agreement, Annex I A. See further, J. McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture – A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press 2006).  
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regulatory systems from one country to another, which are a reflection of the different factors that 
regulators take into account (e.g., consumer preferences, industry interests, geographic and climatic 
conditions, financial and technical resources, etc.) when enacting SPS measures. Nonetheless, this 
regulatory divergence can act as a formidable barrier on market access as producers are required to 
adjust their products to the different SPS requirements on their export markets.  
SPS disciplines in trade agreements thus act on the interface between the two important but at times 
conflicting policy objectives of public health protection and trade liberalisation, and attempt to strike a 
delicate balance between them. Indeed, the basic purpose of the WTO SPS Agreement is to maintain 
the sovereign right of any WTO member to provide the level of health protection it deems appropriate, 
while ensuring that the exercise of this right is not misused for protectionist purposes and does not 
result in ‘unnecessary’ barriers to the trade with other members.12 Promoting regulatory convergence 
among trading partners appears in turn as an important device to reduce the trade barriers posed by 
legitimate (non-protectionist) SPS measures. But how exactly can this be achieved without 
compromising the right of each party to choose and enforce its desired level of protection within its 
territory? 
The most ambitious approach is, of course, harmonisation which implies the adoption of uniform 
standards and conformity assessment procedures among trading partners. However, regulatory 
uniformity in the area of SPS measures is often difficult to achieve, or even undesirable, in light of the 
differences that exist across countries in terms of health policy priorities and regulatory capacities.13 
Alternatively, the trade restrictive effects of divergent SPS requirements can be limited through the 
technique of equivalence, whereby SPS regulations of other countries are recognised as equivalent to 
domestic ones even if they differ in content, provided that they achieve the same level of protection. 
Therefore, under this second approach, regulatory convergence among trading partners is only sought 
in terms of the results (protection levels), while regulatory diversity is in principle accepted in relation 
to the means used (standards and procedures). 
The balancing of trade liberalisation and health protection goals is further complicated by the fact that 
the market access effects of SPS regulations are not equally felt by all countries: this will depend, first 
of all, on the relative importance of the agricultural sector for export revenue earnings in a particular 
country, but also and crucially, on its capacity (and that of its producers) to comply with the SPS 
measures of its trading partners. SPS compliance capacity is largely dependent on the human, 
technical and financial resources available at the level of both the public sector and the private 
industry, and thus varies for countries at different levels of development. It is widely recognised, 
including in the WTO SPS Agreement,14 that developing and least-developed countries face special 
constraints and additional costs in building the necessary regulatory infrastructure to meet SPS 
requirements on their export markets. At the same time, it is equally accepted that these supply-side 
constraints of developing countries should not jeopardise the right of an importing country to enact 
and enforce regulations that are necessary to protect public health within its territory. Yet, the gap in 
compliance capacity between developed and developing countries, does add a new development 
dimension to our balancing exercise: the need to assist developing countries in building capacity to 
meet the legitimate (non-protectionist) SPS requirements of their trading partners.  
Against this background, the EPAs between the EU and the ACP States provide an obvious case study 
for exploring the balance between trade liberalisation, SPS standardisation and development for 
                                                     
12 SPS Agreement, Art. 2, see further section 3.2 below. 
13 See with specific reference to developing countries, G. Mayeda, ‘Developing Disharmony? The SPS and TBT Agreements 
and the Impact of Harmonization on Developing Countries’ 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law 2004, p. 737. 
14 SPS Agreement, Arts. 9 and 10 providing for special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed WTO 
members; see further section 4 below. 
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several reasons. First of all, these agreements represent the first attempt at regional trade integration 
between countries at diametrically different levels of development, with the two extremes being the 
EU on the one side, and some of the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world on the ACP 
side.15 Secondly, exports of agricultural commodities and agri-food products are of great importance 
to many ACP countries16 which, with the exception of South Africa,17 already benefit from generous 
preferences granted by the EU on a non-reciprocal basis under the Cotonou Agreement and previous 
conventions.18 Consequently, the potential for significant market access improvements under the EPAs 
lies mostly in addressing non-traditional barriers to trade, including SPS measures. Third, the EU and 
the ACP,19 as well as international organisations,20 have highlighted the increasing scope and 
complexity of SPS measures as a key obstacle to ACP exports of agricultural commodities and agri-
food products in accessing the EU market.21  
To be sure, the EU cannot be challenged on its right to protect public health within its territory just 
because ACP countries lack the capacity to meet its SPS requirements, but a question arises 
nonetheless as to whether the EU is willing to enable and facilitate compliance by its trading partners. 
Indeed, to what extent have EPAs fulfilled their promise as ‘development instruments’22 in the field of 
SPS measures? Do they seek to improve market access opportunities for the ACP countries vis-à-vis 
existing WTO disciplines by effectively addressing their supply-side constraints and limiting the trade 
restrictive effects of EU SPS measures? As a first step towards answering these questions, the next 
section turns to examining SPS provisions in the EPAs. 
 
                                                     
15 Forty-two out of the 48 countries classified by the UN as least-developed countries belong to the ACP Group of States 
(which currently has 79 members), and many ACP countries also fall within the UN-based categories of ‘small island 
developing States’ and ‘land-locked States’. Similarly, an important number of ACP countries are found within the UNDP 
category of ‘low human development’ in terms of the 2011 Human Development Index, see: UNDP, Human Development 
Report 2011 (November 2011), pp. 129-130, available at 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/human_developmentreport2011.html>.   
16 According to EU statistics, EU agricultural imports from all ACP countries (including South Africa) amounted to €13.2 
billion in 2011 (15.4% of total), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/regions/africa-caribbean-pacific/>. On the socio-economic importance of agriculture for the ACP countries and for 
their trade relations with the EU, see A. Alpha and V. Fautrel, ‘Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements: Agriculture’ 
ECDPM InBrief No13C (Centre for Development Policy Management, April 2007). 
17 The participation of South Africa in the Cotonou Agreement is subject qualifications, including the non-application of its 
trade and development finance provisions (Annex VI, Protocol 3). EU-South Africa trade and economic cooperation is 
governed by the pre-exiting bilateral Agreement Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community 
and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part OJ [1999] L311/3. 
18 It has been estimated that about 97% of ACP exports already entered the EU market duty and quota free in 2006, see C. 
Stevens, M. Meyn and J. Kennan, ‘EU Duty – And – Quota Free Market Access: What is it Worth for the ACP Countries?’ 
Overseas Development Institute February 2008, p. vii. 
19 EU-ACP Group of States, ‘Intra-ACP Strategy Paper and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2008-2013’, 13 March 2009 
(Intra-ACP Strategy Paper 2008-2013), p. 3, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/strategy_paper_intra_acp_edf10_en.pdf>. 
20 With specific reference to African countries, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Economic 
Development in Africa 2008 – Export Performance Following Trade Liberalisation: Some Patterns and Policy Perspectives 
(UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2008), 15 September 2008, pp. 49-50; World Bank, ‘Economic Partnership Agreements and the 
Export Competitiveness of Africa’ 4627 Policy Research Working Paper May 2008, p. 3. 
21 In this regard, the heterogeneity of ACP countries must certainly be remembered, as it impacts on the individual capacity 
of these countries to adapt to, and overcome the trade restrictive effects of, such requirements. However, such a 
circumstance-specific analysis is not plausible within the scope of this paper.  
22 Council of the European Union, ‘Conclusions on the Economic Partnership Agreements’ 19-20 November 2007, para. 1.  
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3. SPS Provisions in EPAs: Content and Key Implications 
 
3.1. Scope and Objectives 
Most of the EPAs concluded thus far between the EU and ACP regions or individual countries deal 
with SPS measures,23 but only two (the CARIFORUM EPA and the SADC iEPA) do so in a separate 
chapter under the title on trade in goods,24 while the others contain a joint chapter covering also 
technical barriers to trade more generally.25 In all cases, however, SPS measures are treated as a 
subcategory of technical regulations and subject to specific rules. All EPAs26 under consideration 
borrow the WTO definition of SPS measures distinguishing them from the broader category of TBT 
measures according to their purpose, namely those aimed at: (i) the protection of human, animal, or 
plant life or health against risks in food or feed as well as risks from pests and diseases; (ii) the 
prevention and limitation of other damage from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.27 Some 
EPAs limit the scope of application of their SPS rules to measures ‘in so far as they affect trade 
between the Parties,’28 which seem to be a stricter requirement than that found in the WTO SPS 
Agreement encompassing SPS measures that ‘may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade.’29   
The objectives of these SPS chapters reflect the need to strike a careful balance between the 
recognition of the Parties’ right to protect health within their territories, on the one hand, and the 
liberalisation and promotion of trade in agricultural and food products between them, on the other. For 
instance, the SPS chapter of the CARIFORUM EPA aims to: (i) ‘facilitate trade between the Parties 
while maintaining and increasing the capacity of the Parties to protect plant, animal and public health’ 
and (ii) ‘improve the capacity of the Parties to identify, prevent and minimise unintended disruptions 
or barriers to trade’ between them ‘as a result of the measures necessary to protect plant, animal and 
public health’ within their territories.30 In addition, three of the EPAs explicitly recognise that the EU 
and the ACP partners differ in their development levels and thus ability to comply with SPS 
requirements, and include among their objectives assistance to the ACP regions in building (public 
and private) capacity in relation to SPS measures.31 The CARIFORUM EPA, in particular, places an 
                                                     
23 Note that the iEPAs with EAC and ESA countries refer to SPS measures in a rendez-vous clause, in which the Parties agree 
to continue negotiations in this area: EAC iEPA, Art. 37(c); ESA iEPA, Art. 53(c).  
24 CARIFORUM EPA, Chapter 7, Title I, Part II; SADC iEPA, Chapter 9, Title I, Part II. 
25 E.g., Pacific iEPA, Chapter 5, Part II; Central Africa iEPA, Chapter 4, Title III, Part II; West iEPA, Chapter 4, Title III, 
Part II.  
26 CARIFORUM EPA, art. 54; Pacific iEPA; Art. 33; SADC iEPA, Art. 58; Central Africa iEPA, Art. 42; West Africa Coast, 
Art. 38.  
27 SPS Agreement, Annex A, para. 1. Note that the definitions refer to the protection of health or prevention of other damage 
‘within the territory of the [WTO] member’, thus excluding measures aimed at extraterritorial health protection from the 
scope of the agreement. WTO Panels have favoured a broad interpretation of these definitions, see P. van den Bossche, The 
Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2008), pp. 835-6.  
28 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 54(1); Pacific iEPA, Art. 33(1); Western Africa iEPA, Art. 38(1).  
29 This requirement appears easy to fulfil, as any SPS measure that applies to imports can be said to ‘potentially’ affect 
international trade, and it is not necessary to demonstrate that it has an ‘actual’ effect on trade: see European Communities – 
Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel Report WT/DS291/R, adopted 21 November 
2006, para. 7.435.  
30 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 53(a) and (b). Similar provisions are found in: SADC iEPA, Art. 57(1), with stronger 
undertaking to ensure that SPS measures ‘shall apply only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant health or 
life in accordance with the SPS Agreement’; Pacific iEPA, Art. 34(1) and (3); Central Africa iEPA, Art. 40; West Africa 
iEPA,Art. 37. 
31 SADC iEPA, Art. 57(4); Pacific iEPA, Art. 34(3) and (4). Note that no reference is made to assistance for ACP capacity-
building among the objectives of the Central Africa iEPA (Art. 40) and West Africa iEPA (Art. 37).  
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emphasis on ‘ensuring compliance with SPS measures of the [EU] Party.’32 A commitment is also 
made to assist strengthening regional cooperation on SPS matters at ACP level,33 with the 
CARIFORUM EPA going further in supporting intra-CARIFORUM harmonisation of SPS measures 
with a view to ‘facilitating recognition of equivalence of such measures with those existing in the [EU] 
Party.’34  
 
3.2. Reaffirmation of WTO Disciplines 
As in most other free trade agreements concluded by the EU outside the enlargement context,35 WTO 
rules provide the basis of the SPS provisions in the EPAs under examination. In line with the Cotonou 
Agreement,36 the EPA Parties ‘reaffirm their rights and obligations’ under the WTO SPS Agreement.37 
What are then these WTO ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’ reiterated in the EPA context? And in particular, 
what do these entail for regulatory convergence between the EU and the ACP EPA Parties in the field 
of SPS measures? 
With regards to ‘rights’, we find most significantly in the SPS Agreement, unlike in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),38 an express recognition of the sovereign right of WTO 
members ‘to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal, 
or plant life or health’,39 and to choose the level of protection they wish to guarantee within their 
territories once the existence of a risk has been established in accordance with the SPS Agreement.40 
In principle therefore, the SPS Agreement does not set minimum standards of protection,41 but allows 
WTO members to determine their own SPS standards as well as the methods for assessing compliance 
with such standards. The exercise of this right is not, however, unlimited but subject to a series of 
substantive and procedural disciplines. In essence, the basic limitations on WTO members’ right to 
take SPS measures are:42 
 
                                                     
32 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 53(d). 
33 SADC iEPA, Art. 57(2); Pacific iEPA, Art. 34(2). Note that no reference is made to the promotion of regional cooperation 
on SPS matters at ACP level among the objectives of the Central Africa iEPA (Art. 40) and West Africa iEPA (Art. 37).  
34 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 53(c).  
35 For an overview, see B. Rudloff and J. Simons, ‘Comparing EU Free Trade Agreements – Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards’ ECDPM InBrief No 6B (European Centre for Development Policy Management, July 2004). This is also the case 
in FTAs concluded by the EU more recently, see, e.g., Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, signed on 6 October 2010,  OJ [2011] L 127/6 (EU-Korea 
FTA), Art. 5.4.  
36 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 48. 
37 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 52; SADC iEPA, Art. 56(1), with less strict reaffirmation of the ‘principles and objectives’ of the 
SPS Agreement; Pacific iEPA, Art. 36, with stronger commitment to ‘apply’ the SPS Agreement; Central Africa iEPA, Art. 
41; West Africa iEPA, Art. 36.  
38 Under the GATT, references to ‘measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health’ are only found under 
the ‘General Exceptions’ clause (Article XX(b)), and the regulating WTO member thus bears the burden of proof of 
justifying such measures if these are found inconsistent with other GATT rules (e.g., Articles I, III and XI). On this point see, 
van den Bossche,  supra note 27, p. 842.  
39 SPS Agreement, Art. 2.1.  
40 Ibid., Annex A, para. 5. 
41 This contrasts with the approach of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) –
another WTO agreement equally venturing into ‘behind-the-border’ regulatory matters– which does lay down mandatory 
minimum standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement.  
42 For a more extensive examination, see van den Bossche, supra note 27, pp. 842-870; J. Scott, The WTO Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (OUP 2007), chapters 3-4.  
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- Necessity requirement: SPS measures shall be applied ‘only to the extent necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health.’43 This necessity requirement is further fleshed out in the 
obligation on WTO members to ensure that their SPS measures ‘are not more trade restrictive 
than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, taking 
into account technical and economic feasibility.’44  - Scientific requirement: SPS measures shall be based on ‘scientific principles’ and not 
maintained ‘without sufficient scientific evidence’.45 This scientific requirement is further 
reinforced by the obligation on WTO members to ensure that their SPS measures are based on 
an appropriate risk assessment.46 Proof of an actual risk, not merely a theoretical risk, to human, 
animal, or plant life or health must therefore be shown scientifically in order to secure the 
legality of SPS measures under WTO law. Yet, the SPS Agreement is also cognisant of the fact 
that science does not always have clear and unambiguous answers to all health regulatory 
questions, and thus provides for the possibility to take –under certain conditions– provisional 
SPS measures where scientific evidence is insufficient.47  - Non-discrimination requirement: SPS measures shall not be applied in a manner that 
‘unjustifiably discriminates between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, 
including between their own territory and that of other Members,’ nor in a manner which would 
constitute ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’.48 
In addition, the SPS Agreement establishes detailed rules on control, inspection and approval 
procedures that are put in place by WTO members to assess compliance with their SPS requirements, 
with a view to ensuring that these procedures are not more lengthy and burdensome than is reasonable 
and necessary and do not discriminate against imports.49 Furthermore, the SPS Agreement addresses 
transparency and exchange of information in relation to SPS measures through three broad categories 
of obligations. First, WTO members are required to promptly publish all adopted SPS regulations and 
allow for a reasonable period for adaptation by producers in exporting countries to the new measure 
(except in urgent circumstances), as well as to notify in advance draft regulations which depart from 
internationally agreed SPS standards so as to allow time for comments from other WTO members.50 
Second, they are obliged to provide information, upon request, regarding the reasons for their SPS 
measures where such measures are not based upon international standards or no relevant international 
standards exist.51 Third, WTO members need to create the necessary infrastructure to carry out their 
transparency obligations, including in the form of establishing a National Notification Authority 
                                                     
43 SPS Agreement, Art. 2.2.  
44 Ibid., Art. 5.6. 
45 Ibid., Art. 2.2. 
46 Ibid., Arts. 5.1-5.3 and Annex A, para. 4.  
47 Ibid., Art. 5.7.  
48 SPS Agreement, Art. 2.3. This basic discipline reflects the GATT non-discrimination obligations of most-favoured-
treatment and national treatment, and is complemented by a more specific prohibition on arbitrary or unjustifiable 
distinctions in the levels of SPS protection chosen by a WTO member in different situations, where such distinctions lead to 
discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade (Art. 5.5 SPS Agreement).  
49 SPS Agreement, art. 8 and Annex C. It is not the place here to examine these WTO rules in detail, see among others van 
den Bossche, supra note 27, pp. 873-875; Scott, supra note 42, chapter 5.  
50 Ibid., Art. 7 and Annex B, paras. 1-2 and 5. See also: WTO SPS Committee ‘Recommended Procedures for Implementing 
the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7)’ (G/SPS/7/Rev.2), 20 June 2002, which replaced those 
adopted in 2002; and for an overview of implementation performance and outstanding issues, see 2011 Transparency Note 
(supra note 8).  
51 SPS Agreement, Art. 5.8. 
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(responsible for implementing the notification requirements)52 and an Enquiry Point (responsible for 
answering all reasonable questions and providing relevant documents upon request).53   
Some EPAs contain individual provisions specifically confirming the Parties’ commitment to 
implement the transparency obligations set out in the SPS Agreement,54 albeit greater availability of 
information may not necessarily translate into a better understanding by ACP partners and their 
exporters of the SPS requirements that their products must meet on the EU market.55The 
CARIFORUM EPA and the SADC iEPA go further in encouraging prior notification of all proposed 
SPS measures (whether or not based on relevant international standards) that may affect inter-regional 
trade,56 but it remains to be seen whether this would enable adjustments to be made to legislative 
proposals in response to concerns raised by trading partners.  
As to regulatory convergence, the SPS Agreement promotes, but does not oblige, harmonisation of 
SPS measures around existing international standards (guidelines or recommendations),57 and in 
particular those developed by the following three international standard-setting bodies: (i) the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC) with respect to food safety; (ii) the World Organisation for Animal 
Health (formerly International Office for Epizootics, OIE) and (iii) the Secretariat of the International 
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in the area of plant health.58 Most notably, WTO members are 
encouraged to ‘conform’ their SPS measures to relevant international standards by means of a 
presumption of WTO-consistency, which is a significant advantage in case of a measure being 
challenged in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.59 Yet importantly, WTO members remain free to 
take SPS measures that deviate from existing international standards and result in a higher level of 
protection, in so far as these measures comply with the scientific justification and other requirements 
of the SPS Agreement.60 This reflects the aforementioned recognition of the right of WTO members to 
choose the level of SPS protection they deem appropriate within their territories.  
None of the EPAs under consideration lays down stricter harmonisation obligations than those jut seen 
in the SPS Agreement. While specific reference is also made to the three main international standard-
setting bodies in most EPAs,61 nothing prevents the Parties to choose a higher level of health 
protection than that achieve by existing international standards provided that they can justify their 
deviating SPS measures by means of an appropriate risk assessment. There is therefore no drive 
towards harmonisation in the EPAs as a means to create regulatory convergence between the EU and 
                                                     
52 Ibid., Annex B, para. 10. A list may be found on the SPS Information Management System, launched in October 2007 to 
assist WTO members in the formidable task of keeping track of all notified SPS measures at <http://spsims.wto.org/>.  
53 SPS Agreement, Annex B, para. 3. A list may be found as supra note 52.  
54 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 57; SADC iEPA, Art. 60(1)-(2); Pacific iEPA, Art. 40(1).  
55 For a critical discussion of EU practice, see C. Downes, ‘The Impact of WTO Transparency Rules: Is the 10,000th SPS 
Notification a Cause for Celebration? – A Case Study of EU Practice’ 15(2) 1 Journal of International Economic Law 2012. 
More generally, see D. Prévost, ‘Sanitary, Phytosanitary and Technical Barriers to Trade in the Economic Partnership 
Agreements between the European Union and the ACP Countries’ 6 ICTSD Issue Paper (International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development) August 2010, pp. 43-45.  
56 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 57; and SADC iEPA, Art. 61(1) on the agreement to create an ‘early-warning system’ to ensure 
that the SADC iEPA States are informed in advance of new SPS measures that may affect their exports to the EU.    
57 SPS Agreement, Art. 3.1.  
58 Ibid., Annex A, para. 3(a)-(c).  
59 Ibid., Art. 3.2. In essence, this results in a heavier burden of proof on the complaining party to demonstrate a violation of 
the SPS Agreement, see Appellate Body Report in EC – Hormones, paras 102 and 170; van den Bossche, supra note 27, pp. 
850-1. 
60 SPS Agreement, Art. 3.3.  
61 That is, the CAC, OIE and IPPC: CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 52; SADC iEPA, Art. 56(1); Central Africa, Art. 42(2); West 
Africa, Art. 38(2). 
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the ACP in the field of SPS legislation, and any restrictive effects of divergent SPS requirements on 
inter-regional trade would need to be dealt with by other means.  
In the absence of harmonisation, recognition of equivalence of different SPS measures is ‘key to 
permitting the maintenance of regulatory diversity, while at the same time promoting market 
integration.’62 For this reason, the SPS Agreement sets out certain obligations for WTO Members with 
regard to the recognition of equivalence, which form part of those reaffirmed in the EPA context. In 
particular, WTO members are required to accept different SPS measures as equivalent to their own if 
the exporting Member ‘objectively demonstrates’ to the importing Member that its measures achieve 
the latter’s chosen level of protection.63 Notwithstanding its legally-binding character, the 
implementation of this provision to date leaves much to be desired, partly due to the lack of detail 
regarding the substantive criteria and procedure on the basis of which equivalence of SPS measures 
ought to be ‘objectively demonstrated’ (by the exporting Member) and assessed (by the importing 
Member). To remedy this lacuna and of relevance to our discussion, the SPS Agreement encourages 
the conclusion of formal agreements on equivalence recognition, by requiring WTO members to enter 
into consultations, upon request, to this end but there is no obligation to actually conclude such an 
agreement.64  
An obligation of effort, rather than result, is explicitly reiterated in the CARIFORUM EPA, whereby 
the Parties ‘agree to consult with the aim of achieving bilateral arrangements on the recognition of the 
equivalence of specified SPS measures.’65 The bilateral character of such arrangements seems, 
however, to undermine the overall objective of promoting regional harmonisation of SPS measures at 
CARIFORUM level.66 The Pacific iEPA goes slightly further: after reiterating ‘the importance of 
making operational’ the equivalence provisions of the SPS Agreement,67 the EU ‘agrees to give due 
consideration to reasonable requests’ from the Pacific States to examine the equivalence of their SPS 
measures in areas of particular export interest to them.68 Yet, what form such consideration may take 
is left unspecified. All in all, there is no concerted effort in the EPAs towards enabling the recognition 
of equivalence of divergent SPS measures between the EU and ACP States, beyond what is already 
provided for within the WTO framework.69  
 
3.3. Additional Provisions: Intra-ACP Harmonisation and EU-ACP Cooperation 
The SPS provisions in the EPAs go further than a simple reaffirmation of WTO disciplines in two 
notable respects. The first relates to the promotion of intra-regional harmonisation of SPS measures. 
As noted earlier, there is no further attempt in the EPAs vis-à-vis the SPS Agreement to encourage 
harmonisation of SPS requirements between the EU and the ACP. Yet, some of the EPAs do support 
harmonisation of SPS standards and procedures within the ACP regions concerned. For instance, in the 
CARIFORUM EPA, the Parties ‘agree on the importance of establishing harmonised SPS measures’70 
both in the EU and between the CARIFORUM States themselves, and there is an undertaking by the 
                                                     
62 Scott, supra note 42, p. 164.  
63 SPS Agreement, Art. 4(1).   
64 SPS Agreement, Art. 4(2).  
65 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 56(2).  
66 See sections 3.1 above and 3.3 below.  
67 Pacific iEPA, Art. 37, including the 2004 Equivalence Decision (infra note 86).  
68 Ibid., Art. 37(2) and Appendix IIIA listing priority products for export from Pacific Party to EU. 
69 The SADC iEPA is even more vague in noting the Parties agreement ‘to promote bi-regional collaboration aiming at 
recognition of appropriate levels of protection in SPS measures’ (Art. 57(3)).  
70 CARIFORUM iEPA, Art. 56(2).  
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EU to assist its CARIFORUM partners in achieving such regulatory harmonisation.71 In a similar vein, 
the SADC iEPA notes the agreement of the Parties to ‘cooperate in facilitating regional harmonisation 
of [SPS] measures and the development of appropriate regulatory frameworks and policies within and 
between the SADC EPA States, thereby enhancing intra-regional trade and investment,’72 and contains 
a list of priority products and sectors for regional harmonisation.73 Stronger provisions on regional 
harmonisation are found in the Central Africa iEPA. First, there is a time limit to intra-regional 
harmonisation: the Central African Party undertakes to harmonise SPS (and TBT) measures intra-
regionally within four years of the entry into force of the agreement, and lists priority products for 
such harmonisation.74 In addition, the Central African Party ‘agree on the need to harmonise import 
conditions applicable to [EU] products’, and pending such regional harmonisation, ‘a [EU] product 
legally placed on the market of a signatory Central African State may also be legally placed on the 
market of all other signatory Central African States without any further restrictions or administrative 
requirements’75 – an attempt to export the EU internal market principle of assimilation76 to the Central 
African region but limited to products of EU (and not all third-countries) origin. Thus, while intra-
regional harmonisation of SPS measures may well serve the EPA overarching objective of promoting 
regional trade and economic integration among the ACP States concerned, it would also benefit the 
EU’s commercial interests by lowering market access costs for its own exporters to each of the ACP 
regions through compliance with a common set of SPS requirements.  
A second aspect where EPAs seek to expand upon WTO rules is the promotion of cooperation 
between the EU and ACP Parties on SPS matters, involving the provision of EU financial and 
technical assistance in recognition of the gaps that exist between their respective capacity to comply 
with, and benefit from, SPS rules. Four of the five EPAs under examination,77 recognise the 
importance of inter-regional cooperation on SPS (and TBT) issues,78 and identify specific priorities for 
cooperation. Among those commonly listed are: (i) establishing a framework for the exchange of 
information and sharing of expertise between the Parties;79 (ii) reinforcing intra-ACP regional 
integration, including through the promotion of harmonised SPS regulatory systems within each 
region;80 (iii) capacity-building in the public and private sectors of ACP partners to comply with 
international SPS standards and procedures,81 and in the case of the Western Africa iEPA with EU 
                                                     
71 Ibid., Art. 53(c).  
72 SADC iEPA, Art. 64(2). See also West Africa iEPA, Art. 43(2)(c), setting among the areas for cooperation the promotion 
of harmonised SPS measures intra-regionally on the basis of the relevant international standards.  
73 SADC iEPA, Appendix IA.  
74 Central Africa iEPA, Art. 46(1) and Appendix IA.  
75 Ibid., Art. 46(2).  
76 Art. 28(2) TFEU; Case C-41/76 Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la République [1976] ECR I-1921 (referring to former 
Art. 9(2) Treaty of Rome).  
77 The Pacific iEPA only refers to the Parties’ agreement to apply ‘where necessary and possible’ the special and differential 
treatment provisions of the SPS Agreement (infra note 106), including to the Pacific States that are not WTO members (Art. 
36(4)). 
78 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 59(1); SADC iEPA, Art. 64(1); Western African iEPA, Art. 43(1). The Central African iEPA 
(Art. 47) only lists priority areas for cooperation, namely: (i) the promotion of regional harmonisation for priority products in 
Appendix IA and (ii) improvement of quality and competitiveness of priority products in Appendix IB for export to EU.  
79 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 59(2)(b); Western Africa iEPA, Art. 43(2)(a). 
80 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 59(2)(a); SADC iEPA, Art. 64(2) and Appendix IA listing priority products; Western Africa, Art. 
43(2)(b).  
81 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 8(v) and 59(2)(c); SADC iEPA, Art. 64(3)(d)-(f) 
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SPS requirements;82 (iv) supporting the participation of ACP partners in international standard-setting 
bodies.83  
It follows from the above examination that the added-value of EPAs in creating supplementary 
disciplines to those already existing at WTO level is rather limited in scope, and these additional 
provisions often take the form of statements of objectives and ‘best-endeavour’ commitments. But is 
this necessarily something to regret? In which ways, if any, can EPAs be considered a missed 
opportunity for improving existing multilateral disciplines? The next section discusses a number of 
instances where EPAs could have been more ambitious at addressing the deficiencies of the SPS 
Agreement that are of particular interest to the ACP countries, and indeed where the SPS Agreement 
itself encourages further action to facilitate implementation at the bilateral/regional level. 
 
4. SPS Provisions in EPAs: A Missed Opportunity? 
A first area where EPAs can be considered a missed opportunity,84 and of most relevance to our 
discussion, is in addressing (some) of the obstacles faced in the implementation of the equivalence 
provisions of the SPS Agreement discussed earlier, which were also recognised at the launch of the 
current multilateral trade negotiations at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001.85 Since then, efforts 
have been made in the WTO SPS Committee to operationalise these provisions with the adoption of 
the 2004 Equivalence Decision,86 particularly in response to the concerns raised by developing-
country Members regarding their difficulties in having the equivalence of their SPS measures accepted 
by importing developed-country Members often demanding ‘sameness’ rather than ‘equivalence’ of 
SPS standards and conformity assessment procedures.87 The Equivalence Decision provides detailed 
guidelines for both exporting Members requesting the recognition of equivalence and for the 
importing Members to whom such request is addressed, but mostly framed in hortatory terms. There 
was therefore potential for the EPAs to build and improve upon these guidelines, particularly in light 
of the long-standing trading relationship between the EU and the ACP88 which provides the basis for 
developing the necessary level of familiarity and trust in each other’s SPS regulatory systems. This 
point is indeed stressed in the 2004 Equivalence Decision, which encourages the importing WTO 
Members to adopt an accelerated procedure for equivalence recognition in cases of ‘historic’ trade 
                                                     
82 Western iEPA, Art. 43(2)(c)-(d). 
83 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 59(2)(d); SADC iEPA, Art. 64(3)(g); Western Africa iEPA, Art. 42. This is in line with the SPS 
Agreement (Art. 10(4)), and seeks to address current imbalances in membership and participation between developed and 
developing countries in these bodies, see Mayeda, supra note 13, pp. 751-52. 
84 Another area where the EPAs have been considered a missed opportunity is the issue of ‘regionalisation’ or ‘zoning and 
compartmentalisation’, which is particularly important for large developing countries as it allows for adaptation of SPS 
measures to differing regional conditions in the exporting country (Art. 6 SPS Agreement). See further, Prévost, supra note 
55, pp. 37-40. 
85 WTO Ministerial Conference (Fourth Session), ‘Decision on Implementation Issues and Concerns’ (WT/MIN(01)/17) 
adopted in Doha on 14 November 2001 (Doha Decision on Implementation), para. 3.3. 
86 WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ‘Decision on the Implementation of Art. 4 of the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ (G/SPS/19/Rev.2), 23 July 2004 (2004 Equivalence Decision), 
which revised that adopted in October 2001; see also ‘Notification of Determination of the Recognition of Equivalence of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ (G/SPS/7/Rev.2/Add.1), 25 July 2002, which recommends procedures for notification. 
87 2004 Equivalence Decision, preamble, paras 5 and 8. 
88 Supra note 1. 
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relations.89 And yet, as previously noted, the EPAs fail to establish concrete criteria and procedures 
and for recognising equivalence of different SPS measures between the EU and the ACP partners.  
Interestingly, a more ambitious effort at promoting equivalence recognition is exemplified by the 
Association Agreement between the EU and Chile, 90 which sets out in detail a consultation process 
with a view to ensuring an ‘objective demonstration’ of equivalence by the exporting Party as well as 
an ‘objective assessment’ of this demonstration by the importing Party.91 In particular, the agreement 
establishes time limits for consideration of equivalence requests by the importing Party,92 clarifies 
how equivalence of SPS measures can be ‘objectively demonstrated’ and ‘objectively assessed’,93 
identifies priority products and sectors for equivalence recognition,94 and requires the importing Party 
to provide a reasoned explanation in cases of non-recognition.95 The agreement further emphasises the 
provision of technical assistance by the importing Party where necessary to enable the exporting Party 
to identify and implement SPS measures which could be recognised as equivalent – albeit this is 
expressed in soft-law terms (‘may provide’) and as a mutual (rather than EU versus Chile) 
undertaking.96 
While there may be valid reasons why the EU has difficulties to enter into similar equivalency 
arrangements as of yet with the ACP countries, whose SPS regulatory systems may not in most cases 
be comparable to that of Chile,97 a more concerted effort could have been made, in the least, to 
institutionalise regulatory cooperation on SPS matters within EPAs. Indeed, it is recognised that the 
complexity of ‘deep integration’ provisions in trade agreements, such as SPS issues, requires the 
creation of strong institutional mechanisms that can manage the dynamics of the implementation 
process and address identified challenges in a flexible manner over time. The EPAs do require the 
Parties to designate ‘Competent Authorities’ responsible for the implementation of the SPS chapters at 
the national/regional level,98 but no joint EU-ACP body is created to deal exclusively with SPS 
matters at the EPA level,99 unlike the SPS Committee established within the WTO.100 Instead, the 
                                                     
89 SPS Equivalence Decision, para. 5. The importance of experience and trust based on historic trade has also been 
recognised in the FAO/WHO Joint Codex Alimentarius Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Judgement of Equivalence of 
Sanitary Measures Associated with Food Inspection and Certification Systems’ (CAC/GL 53–2003), Section 4, 7(j). 
90 Supra note 5. 
91 Chile AA, Annex IV, Art. 7(2).  
92 Ibid., Arts. 7(3)-(4). As a general rule, the importing Party shall finalise the assessment of equivalence within six months 
after receiving the request from the exporting Party, which follows the time period recommended in the 2004 SPS 
Equivalence Decision (preamble, para. 3).    
93 Chile AA, Annex IV, Appendix VI, para. 4. 
94 Ibid., Annex IV, Appendix V.A. 
95 Ibid., Annex IV, Art. 7(7) and Appendix VI, para. 5. 
96 Ibid., Annex IV, Art. 7(7). 
97 M. Doherty, ‘Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements – Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ ECDPM InBrief 
No13A (European Centre for Development Policy Management, June 2006), p. 5.  
98 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 55; SADC iEPA, Art 59; Pacific iEPA, 38; Central Africa iEPA, Art. 43; Western Africa iEPA, 
Art. 39.  
99 This contrasts with the institutional approach taken towards environmental and social provisions, whereby a specialised 
committee is established to oversee their implementation and a specific procedure provided for settling disputes on these 
matters: see, e.g., CARIFORUM EPA, Arts. 189 and 195, and discussion in G. Marín Durán and E. Morgera, Environmental 
Integration in the EU’s External Relations – Beyond Multilateral Dimensions (Hart 2012), pp. 106-108. 
100 The SPS Committee was established as a regular forum for consultations, with the mandate to carry out the functions 
necessary for the implementation of the SPS Agreement and the furtherance of its objectives, in particular with respect to 
harmonisation (SPS Agreement, Art. 12.1). In terms of this mandate, the SPS Committee has adopted various decisions and 
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committee with general competence for trade matters under the EPAs is also entrusted with the tasks 
of monitoring and reviewing the implementation of the relevant SPS provisions.101 The possibility of 
establishing a specialised SPS committee, composed of regulatory officials from each side with 
appropriate technical expertise is, nonetheless, provided for in some of the EPAs.102  
A move in this direction would seem important in supporting efforts towards achieving recognition of 
equivalence of SPS measure between the EU and the ACP, which is highly dependent on the existence 
of an institutional mechanism that facilitates regular dialogue, exchange of information, mutual 
learning and confidence-building among SPS regulatory authorities from each side.103 It would also 
seem beneficial in promoting an amicable and cooperative resolution of SPS-related trade concerns 
that may arise between EPA Parties. Once again, the EU Association with Chile provides a case in 
point: a specialised ‘Joint Management Committee for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Matters’ is 
established as a forum for regular consultations and information exchange between representatives of 
the Parties with specific responsibility for SPS measures, and is mandated to the monitor and review 
the implementation of SPS provisions, including those on equivalence recognition,104 and where 
necessary to make recommendations for modifications to the Association Council.105 
From a development perspective, a final but critical benchmark for evaluating the added-value of 
EPAs is, of course, the extent to which they entail stricter commitments on the part of the EU towards 
supporting ACP capacity-building in the area of SPS regulation, vis-à-vis those already undertaken 
under the WTO SPS Agreement. Under that agreement, WTO members ‘agree to facilitate’ the 
provision of technical and financial assistance to developing-country members, either bilaterally or 
through international organisations, which can be aimed, inter alia, at helping these countries to 
comply with SPS requirements on their export markets.106 However, this ‘best-endeavour’ obligation 
is not easily enforceable in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and has led to poor implementation 
in practice.107 Indeed, this and other WTO provisions on special and differential treatment for 
developing-country members that are similarly couched in hortatory language are being reviewed 
under the Doha negotiations, with a view to ‘strengthening them and making them more precise, 
effective and operational.’108 In addition, a concern that has been raised in the WTO SPS Committee is 
that, even when provided, such assistance is often donor-driven rather than needs-driven: ‘[as] 
(Contd.)                                                                  
other documents (including the 2004 Equivalence Decision), available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/decisions06_e.htm>.  
On the SPS Committee, see further Scott, supra note 42, chapter 2. 
101 That is, the Trade and Development Committee in the CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 230; the Trade and Development 
Committee in the SADC iEPA, Art. 62; the Trade Committee in the Pacific iEPA, Art. 41; the EPA Committee in the Central 
Africa iEPA, Art. 92; and the EPA Committee in the Western Africa iEPA, Art. 73.  
102 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 230.4(a); SADC iEPA, Art. 96.4; Pacific iEPA, Art. 68.4(a).  
103 This is, for instance, recognised in the 2004 Equivalence Decision, preamble para. 10. 
104 Chile AA, Annex IV, Arts. 7(3)-(4). 
105 Ibid., Art. 89(3) and Annex IV, Art. 16.  
106 SPS Agreement, Art. 9(1). In addition, in a situation where a WTO Member’s SPS measure requires substantial 
investments from an exporting developing-country Member, the former ‘shall consider providing’ technical assistance to 
allow the developing country concerned to maintain or increase its market opportunities for the product concerned (Art. 
9(2)). Other forms of special and differential treatment for developing countries are provided for in Article 10, but again 
couched in hortatory language and interpreted in WTO case law as not prescribing a particular result: see van den Bossche, 
supra note 27, pp. 880-884.  
107 Prévost, supra note 55, pp. 50-51.  
108 WTO Ministerial Conference (Fourth Session) ‘Ministerial Declaration’ (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1) adopted in Doha on 14 
November 2001 (Doha Declaration), para. 44; and Doha Decision on Implementation, para. 3.6. See also WTO Committee 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ‘Report on Proposals for Special and Differential Treatment’ (G/SPS/35), 7 July 
2005.   
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development objectives of developed countries (as donors) overlap with their commercial interest (as 
trading partners) they may be prone to decide what type of assistance to provide according to their 
own interests rather than those of the recipient countries.’109 Against this background, are the EPAs 
any more promising in terms of securing predictable and demand-driven technical assistance from the 
EU? 
As we have seen, most of the EPAs emphasise the importance of interregional cooperation on SPS 
matters and specify priority areas for cooperation that have been jointly agreed by the Parties. None of 
the EPAs, however, creates a specific mechanism for financing such cooperation or monitoring its 
effectiveness. Instead, the implementation of EPA cooperation activities is to be primarily conducted 
under the general development cooperation framework established by the Cotonou Agreement,110 and 
particularly the European Development Fund (EDF),111 which is the major financing instrument 
underpinning EU-ACP (except for South Africa) cooperation.112 Unlike other EU budget-based 
financing instruments,113 the allocation and disbursement of EDF resources is implemented within the 
framework of an international agreement and subject to procedures that provide for an active 
involvement and consensus of ACP stakeholders.114 These procedural guarantees can thus contribute 
to rendering EU technical and financial assistance more responsive to the specific SPS needs of the 
ACP regions concerned. In terms of predictability, the Cotonou Agreement is exceptional in providing 
for contractual commitments on the overall budget available for EU-ACP cooperation,115 but funding 
allocations among the various cooperation activities, including SPS matters, are not fully specified. 
Nevertheless, the EU has been supporting ACP capacity-building to address supply-side constraints in 
meeting its SPS requirements. 
Before EPAs were concluded, a number of programmes were financed under the 9th EDF (2000-2007), 
including notably:116 the Pesticide Initiative, launched in 2001 in response to problems of compliance 
of ACP exporters with EU rules on maximum residue levels for pesticides in horticultural products 
(€33.5 million); the Fisheries Programme, launched in 2003 in order to address ACP exports’ 
difficulties in complying with the EU sanitary rules in this sector (€42 million); the TradeCom 
Facility, launched in 2005 and aimed, inter alia, at building institutional capacity to address SPS (and 
                                                     
109 WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ‘Background Document from the Standard and Trade 
Development Facility for the Global Review of Aid for Trade: Note by the Secretariat’ (G/SPS/GEN/812), 22 November 
2007, paras 18 and 20.  
110 Cotonou Agreement, Part IV ‘Development Finance Cooperation’ and Annexes I-IV.  
111 The EDF is the oldest geographic instrument of EU external assistance and not part of the EU budget, but funded through 
direct contributions from the EU Member States.  
112 EU assistance to South Africa is channelled through (another) Regulation (EC) 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation [2006] OJ L348/41. 
113 For an examination of the different EU development cooperation instruments, see G. Marín Durán, ‘Environmental 
Integration in the EU Development Cooperation: Responding to International Commitments or Its Own Policy Priorities?’ in 
E. Morgera (ed.), The External Environmental Policy of the European Union: EU and International Law Perspectives (CUP, 
October 2012).  
114 Cotonou Agreement, Annex IV. Programming of EDF resources is carried out on the basis of ‘country-strategy papers’ (or 
‘regional strategy papers’) and national (or regional) indicative programmes that are jointly drawn up by the EU and the ACP 
State(s) concerned and ‘shall be adopted by common agreement’ (Arts. 2, 4(2), 8 and 10(2)). Projects and other cooperation 
programmes are then implemented through joint appraisal within the EU-ACP Development Finance Committee 
Cooperation, and are subject to a ‘financing agreement’ between the EU Commission and the ACP State(s) concerned (Arts. 
15 and 17).  
115 Cotonou Agreement, Annex I ‘Financial Protocol’, stipulating a total budget of €13.5 billion for the 9th EDF.  
116 These are programmes available at an all-ACP level, and are complemented by programmes directed at a specific ACP 
region or country. For more information <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/aid-for-trade/programmes/>. 
Note also that individual EU Member States have extensive capacity-building programmes in ACP countries. 
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TBT) barriers to trade (€50 million) and the Strengthening Food Safety Systems, launched in 2007 to 
support the establishment of risk-based food and feed safety systems for exports products in ACP 
countries in line with international and EU regulatory requirements (€30 million).117  
The current 10th EDF (2008-2013) has been endowed with increased resources to support, inter alia, 
the ACP signatories in implementing the EPAs,118 but again no particular budgetary commitment is 
made in the area of SPS cooperation. As a result, the EPAs fall short of making implementation of 
SPS commitments conditional upon the provision of timely and appropriate assistance by the EU – 
this will ultimately depend on the negotiating dynamics within the Cotonou development cooperation 
framework. The EPAs have not therefore fully redressed the imbalance found in the SPS Agreement 
between the ‘bound commitments to implement’ SPS disciplines taken by developing-country WTO 
members in exchange of ‘unbound commitments for assistance’ in capacity-building on the part of 
developed members.119  
 
5. Conclusions  
As we have seen, SPS provisions in the EPAs seek, as does the SPS Agreement, to strike a delicate 
balance between the objectives of public health protection, trade liberalisation and development 
considerations. And yet, they fall short of achieving a better balance than that currently found under 
WTO law, particularly from a development perspective. In their current form, EPAs do little to 
address the inadequacies in existing WTO rules in areas that are of utmost importance to ACP 
countries, even where complementary action at the bilateral/interregional level is explicitly 
encouraged in the SPS Agreement. In the few steps taken to go beyond WTO disciplines, EPAs 
provisions remain limited in scope and generally vague in content. In particular, no concrete attempt 
was made at operationalising equivalence recognition as a means to bring about regulatory 
convergence and facilitate interregional trade between the EU and its ACP partners, nor to set up the 
necessary cooperation and institutional mechanisms to achieve this goal over the longer term. On this 
background, two questions appear pertinent as concluding remarks. 
First of all, what is, if any, the legal significance of introducing SPS provisions in EPAs, or in any 
other regional trade agreement, if not to add to and fill gaps in existing WTO rules? In most cases, the 
reaffirmation of WTO disciplines in EPAs is limited to underscoring the Parties’ intentions to comply 
with their existing multilateral obligations. Yet importantly, an enforcement of such obligations 
through the EPA arbitration procedures is in principle excluded.120 Nonetheless, some EPAs could 
also extend the application of the SPS Agreement to a number of ACP countries that are not currently 
                                                     
117Intra-ACP Strategy Paper 2008-2013, supra note 19, pp. 16-17; see also, C. Chemnitz and D. Günther, ‘Ensuring 
Development Friendly Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs): Recognition of SPS Measures within Negotiation 
Procedures’ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammennarbeit, 2006), pp. 11-13. 
118 EU-ACP Council of Ministers, ‘Decision 1/2006 specifying the multiannual financial framework for the period 2008 to 
2013 and modifying the revised ACP-EC Partnership Agreement’ [2006] OJ L247/22, stipulating a total budget of almost 
€22 billion for the 10th EDF.  
119 Prévost, supra note 55, p. 10. 
120 CARIFORUM EPA, Art. 222(1) providing that arbitration bodies shall not adjudicate disputes on each Party’s rights and 
obligations under the WTO covered agreements. Arguably, the situation is different when the ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’ under 
the WTO covered agreements are taken upon and form part of the EPAs, which would explain the additional provision (art. 
222(2)) excluding parallel initiation of dispute settlement proceedings in relation to the same measure under the both forums. 
Similar provisions are found in: SADC iEPA, Art. 88; Pacific iEPA, Art. 66; Central Africa iEPA, Art. 86; West Africa 
iEPA, Art. 65. 
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members of the WTO, and would thus not otherwise be bound by these WTO rules.121  Notably in case 
of the Pacific iEPA, such an extension of WTO disciplines to non-members is subject to the 
recognition by the EU of the capacity constraints that the ACP countries concerned may face with 
regard to compliance in the short-term.122 
 
There is a second, and arguably most fundamental question: aside from the specific EPA context, is 
regulatory convergence in the area of SPS measures, in fact, a policy objective of the EU? While the 
development constraints and other complexities that have surrounded the EPA negotiations may have 
prevented the elaboration of more ambitious SPS chapters thus far,123 this is by no means an isolated 
example in EU preferential trade agreements. Indeed, only very rarely do such EU agreements contain 
individual provisions that go beyond WTO rules in the sphere of SPS measures, including in relation 
to harmonisation and equivalence recognition. As discussed, the Association Agreement with Chile is 
rather an exception in EU practice outside the EU enlargement context (and perhaps in a near future, 
the EU Neighbourhood Policy context),124 including under more recent agreements such as the 2010 
EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement.125 In fact, achieving regulatory convergence in the field of SPS 
measures does not figure as a priority in key policy documents outlining the directions of the EU’s 
external trade policy, including most notably the 2006 Global Europe Strategy,126 unlike for other 
‘behind-the-border’ regulatory matters presently falling within (e.g., intellectual property rights) or 
outside (e.g., environmental and labour protection) the scope of WTO law.127 This can be explained by 
several regulatory factors including, as we have seen, the universally-recognised sovereign right to 
protect public health at the level each State considers appropriate to ensure within its territory, coupled 
with the long-recognised difficulties in establishing SPS requirements that are appropriate for 
countries with different health priorities and regulatory capacities. However, the Union’s ambivalent 
commercial interests may certainly also account for the lack of a more ambitious approach to 
regulatory convergence in this policy field: as a leading exporter of agricultural products, the EU may 
well have a stake in promoting regulatory convergence of SPS measures in order to facilitate access 
for its own exporters on third-country markets, whereas as the world’s largest importer of these 
                                                     
121 This is notably the case of the Pacific iEPA (Art. 36(2)) if signed by Cook Islands, Kiribati, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, 
Palau, Samoa and Tuvalu. The situation of the Bahamas (a WTO observer) under the CARIFORUM EPA is less clear.  
122 Pacific iEPA, Art. 36(3).  
123 See, however, Prévost, supra note 55, p. 56, referring to a more promising proposal submitted by the ESA countries that 
borrows from the SPS provisions of the EU-Chile AA, including on the issue of equivalence recognition. 
124 This policy envisages the forging of a ‘special relationship’ with at present 16 of the EU’s closest neighbours, ‘founded on 
the values of the Union’ and seeking an alignment of third-country legislation with the EU acquis. See Commission, 
‘Communication on Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours’ COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels 11 March 2003, endorsed by the Council, ‘Conclusions on Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood’ (10369/03), Luxembourg, 16 June 2003; see also Art. 8 TEU. 
125 See supra note 35. 
126 Commission, ‘Communication on Global Europe – Competing in the World. A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs 
Strategy’ COM (2006) 567 final, Brussels 4 October 2006, endorsed by the Council, ‘Conclusions on Global Europe – 
Competing in the World’ (14799/06) 13 November 2006, see discussion by Hoffmeister; see also the more recent, 
Commission, ‘Communication on Trade, Growth and World Affairs – Trade Policy as a Coherent Component of the EU’s 
2020 Strategy’ COM (2010) 612, Brussels 9 November 2010. 
127 For a discussion of the ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapter of the EU-Korea FTA, dealing with environmental 
and labour standards, see G. Marín Durán, ‘Innovations and Implications of the Trade and Sustainable Chapter in the EU-
Korea Free Trade Agreement’ in J. Harrison (ed.), Legal Framework for strengthening Trade and Economic Relations 
(Edinburgh University Press 2013), chapter 8. 
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products, it may equally have an interest to keep its own SPS requirements higher and different from 
those of its trading partner suppliers.128 
 
                                                     
128 On EU external trade in agricultural products, see Commission, ‘Agricultural Trade in 2011: the EU and the World’, 1/12 
MAP Newsletter May 2012. 
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EU Regulatory Policy and the WTO 
 
Tamara Perišin 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union's (EU) regulatory policy has significant external trade effects. This is true both of 
market deregulation occurring through the Treaty rules on fundamental freedoms as applied by the 
courts, and of market re-regulation performed by EU legislative institutions. It is well known that 
some types of internal market rules (e.g., mutual recognition and minimum harmonisation) have a 
positive effect both on the EU’s internal and external trade, while others (e.g., strict harmonisation) 
create obstacles to external trade.1 
Taking account of these external trade effects of internal measures is a part of good decision-making, 
for creating both domestic and global efficiency.2 This does not suggest that the EU should always try 
to satisfy the interests of its trading partners or that it should fear challenges. The EU can, in pressing 
matters, even deliberately use its market power to promote certain non-trade interests outside its 
territory by blocking the access of goods and services to its market that do not meet its standards.3 
However, the EU’s unilateral action can always lead to the unilateral action of other countries as well 
as to disputes, primarily within the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper focuses on the 
external trade effects of measures that might be considered by other WTO members as being WTO-
illegal. This paper looks at the extent to which EU institutions take account of WTO compliance and 
the possibility of a WTO challenge in the process of regulating and deregulating. 
 
2. Taking Account of the External Effects and WTO Compliance of Regulation 
There are numerous ways in which the EU could gain information about the external effects of its 
measure, particularly about other WTO members’ attitudes, even before the adoption of a measure. 
One way of doing this is through the EU's own process of preparing legislation when its legislature 
can consult various interest groups, the public, etc. It is important to include at this stage all relevant 
actors, including other countries. The jurisprudence of the Appellate Body even suggests that a lack of 
consultation in the pre-legislation stage with certain WTO members on a non-discriminatory basis 
may in itself represent a violation of WTO obligations.4 Another way of gaining information about 
other WTO members’ positions is through institutionalised procedures in the WTO. For example, this 
kind of information exchange about the effects of the measure happens in the SPS committee. When a 
                                                     
∗ Special thanks to Marise Cremona for inviting me to present this paper at the EUI-CLEER joint conference ‘Trade 
liberalisation and standardisation’, Florence, and to the participants of this conference. This working paper is part of a larger 
research project that will be published in H. de Waele and J.-J. Kuipers, The Emergence of the European Union’s 
International Identity – Views from the Global Arena, (Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 2013). 
1 See S. Weatherill, ‘Maximum versus Minimum Harmonization: Choosing between Unity and Diversity in the Search for the 
Soul of the Internal Market’, in N. Nic Shuibhne and L. Gormley (eds.), From Single Market to Economic Union: Essays in 
Memory of John A Usher (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012); T. Perišin, Free Movement of Goods and Limits of 
Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and WTO (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2008). 
2 See D.H. Regan, ‘What Are Trade Agreements For? – Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, with a Lesson for 
Lawyers’, 9(4) Journal of International Economic Law December 2006, pp. 951-988. 
3 See M. Cremona, ‘The Single Market as a Global Export Brand’, European Business Law Review 2010, pp. 663-680.  
4 United States – Import Prohibitions on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, paras 167-176; United States – Import Prohibitions on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/RW, 22 October 
2001, paras 122, 134. 
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WTO member plans to adopt an SPS measure, then other WTO members can express their views and 
concerns within the SPS committee. 5 All this contributes to EU legislation being drafted in a WTO-
consistent manner. 
There is indeed a significant number of examples where EU decision-makers have analysed a 
proposed or an existing measure to check its WTO compliance in order to avoid litigation with another 
WTO member. Quite recently, for example, some steps were taken for the adoption of an EU ban on 
food products derived from cloned animals’ offspring,6 but this ban was never proposed. It seems that 
the Commission and the Council had concerns about its WTO compatibility,7 although there were 
even disagreements between the EU institutions (which leaked).8  
The question arises whether the tendency of taking external effects and WTO law into account is on 
the rise or declining. This paper does not attempt to offer a complete analysis of all the EU measures 
affecting trade, checking whether WTO compliance was taken into account in the legislative or 
judicial process. However, the paper includes case studies in two fields – animal welfare and the 
environmental effects of air transport. These build upon studies conducted by de Búrca and Scott in 
2000.9 De Búrca and Scott used two examples, one from each of these fields, to show the WTO’s 
effects on the EU’s legislative and judicial decision-making (respectively). This paper builds on these 
authors’ two examples, and contrasts each of them with a newer example in the same substantive field 
and at the same stage of decision-making (legislative or judicial). 
 
2.1.  Case Study – Animal Welfare 
The EU does not have competence to regulate on the basis of animal welfare. However, if the EU 
regulates an area on the basis of another competence, it has to take into account animal welfare 
protection.10 Most frequently, measures adopted in the field of the internal market are the ones used to 
achieve a high level of protection of other interests, including animal welfare. The high level of 
protection of non-trade interests turns these internal market measures into de facto obstacles to the 
importation of goods from outside the EU that do not meet the EU’s high standards. If such a measure 
is challenged within the WTO, the EU has to explain what the aim of the measure is (either at the 
stage of determining the prima facie breach or at the stage of justification). The aim which will be 
relevant for the WTO is not the one which was predominantly relevant for the legal basis in the EU 
(establishment and functioning of the internal market), but rather the incidental aim of the measure, 
such as public health, environment, animal welfare, etc.  
                                                     
5 J. Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), pp. 57-58. 
6 European Commision, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Animal Cloning for 
Food Production’, Brussels, 19.10.2010, COM(2010) 585 final. 
7 Euractiv, ‘EU cloning ban dispute turns to trade, consumers’, 12 May 2011 available at <http://www.euractiv.com/cap/eu-
cloning-ban-dispute-turns-tra-news-504753>; B. Casassus, ‘Europe fails to reach deal on cloned meat’, Nature 29 March 
2011, available at <http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110329/full/news.2011.192.html>; Ch. Dunmore, ‘EU talks on food 
from cloned animals collapse’, Reuters, 29 March 2011, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/29/us-eu-food-
clones-idUSTRE72S1SL20110329>.  
8 European Parliament News, ‘Parliament issues urgent call to regulate cloned foods’, 11 May 2011, available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20110506IPR18894/html/Parliament-issues-urgent-call-to-
regulate-cloned-foods>; EUbusiness, ‘Leaked EU Council paper reveals cloned food restrictions were possible’, 11 May 
2011, available at <http://www.eubusiness.com/Members/BEUC/cloned-food-2>. 
9 G. de Búrca and J. Scott, ‘The Impact of the WTO on EU Decision-making’, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), The EU and 
the WTO – Legal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford: Hart 2003), pp. 1-30, also available as Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 06/00, at <http://ftp.infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/database/000036001-000037000/000036584.pdf> . 
10 Arts. 13 and 114(3) TFEU. 
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Two pieces of legislation will be analysed to assess whether the EU takes into account WTO 
compliance when adopting marketing bans which seek to achieve a high level of animal welfare. 
These are the Cosmetics Directive11/Regulation12 as the older example (discussed by de Búrca, 
Scott13) and the Seal Products Regulation14 as the newer example. Both of these measures were 
adopted on the basis of internal market competence,15 but have significant (and in the latter case 
dominant) external trade effects. 
The older example, the Cosmetics Directive, was originally adopted in 1976 and regulated the 
composition, labelling and packaging of cosmetic products. Since then, the Directive has been 
amended several times and has recently been recast by the Cosmetics Regulation which will come into 
force in 2013. One of the important amendments was adopted in 1993.16 This amendment added to the 
list of prohibited cosmetic products ‘ingredients or combinations of ingredients tested on animals’.17 
The entry into force of this provision was originally set for 1 January 1998, but it was postponed 
several times. In 2000, de Búrca and Scott’s case study on the amendments of the Cosmetics Directive 
identified that one of the reasons for the EU legislature to be postponing the entry into force of the 
marketing ban of products derived from animal testing was the EU regulator’s desire to make the 
measure WTO compliant.18 This was not the official reason mentioned in the Directive’s amendments, 
but it was expressed in the Commission’s answers to the European Parliament.19 The Commission 
stated the following: 
 
It is the Commission’s view that it cannot unilaterally impose the Community’s welfare-
based production standards on third countries. For example, WTO rules do not permit the 
Community to prohibit imports of cosmetic products on the sole ground that they have 
been tested on animals, even if the Community imposes such an animal-testing ban for 
marketing of Community products. Rather than proceeding to an import ban of such 
products, the Community should focus on the creation of multilateral standards for 
animal welfare. The Community should first try to convince its trading partners to modify 
their policies in the direction it thinks appropriate. Consumers in Europe should, 
moreover, be in a position to make an informed choice about the animal welfare aspects 
of the products they buy, for example through labelling schemes. Given that animal 
welfare is becoming increasingly relevant in terms of international trade, this issue may in 
                                                     
11 Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic 
products, OJ [1976] L 262/169. 
12 Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on Cosmetic 
Products, OJ [2009] L 342/59. Certain parts of the Regulation will enter into force before 2013. 
13 De Búrca and Scott, supra note 9, pp. 6-12. 
14 Council Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal 
products OJ [2009] L 286/36. 
15 The original Cosmetics Directive was adopted on the basis of then Art. 100 EC (now 115 TFEU). At the time of the 
adoption of the original Cosmetics Directive, the Article which is now 114 TFEU (ex 95 EC post-Amsterdam, ex 100a pre-
Amsterdam) did not yet exist, but the Directive’s amendment on animal testing discussed below was adopted precisely on 
that legal basis. The Seal Products Regulation was also adopted on the basis of Art. 114 TFEU. 
16 Council Directive 93/35/EEC of 14 June 1993 amending for the sixth time Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products, OJ [1993], L 151/32. 
17 The provision then became Art. 4(1)(i) Cosmetics Directive. 
18 De Búrca and Scott, supra note 9, pp. 6-12. 
19 E-0949/98 Written Question to the Commission ‘Impact on animal protection of the GATT/WTO’ by Mark Watts (PSE), 30 
March 1998; and Answer to Written Question E-0949/98 given by Sir Leon Brittan on behalf of the Commission, 7 May 1998. 
See on this de Búrca and Scott, supra note 9, p. 8. 
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the future be raised in the WTO context. The possibility of amending WTO rules to 
address welfare concerns more generally will be addressed in the context of the 
determination of the Community’s negotiating objectives for the next stage of the WTO 
negotiations.20  
 
As de Búrca and Scott explained at the time,21 this was a very cautious move of the EU legislature. It 
was certainly not clear at that time (nor is it now) that a trade ban on products not complying with 
animal welfare standards would be contrary to WTO rules. There was and is plenty of room to argue 
that such a measure is in accordance with WTO law. It is thus unclear whether WTO compliance was 
indeed a reason for postponing the entry into force of the provision, or whether there was another 
interest involved. De Búrca and Scott mentioned then (in subtle terms) that this might be comparable 
to the Member State action known as ‘blame it on Brussels’, where Member States ‘point to the 
constraints of EC membership to justify an unpopular measure adopted at home’, but that in this case 
it was the EU itself which was hiding behind the alleged constraints of WTO membership.22 However, 
what is relevant for the present purposes is that WTO compliance formed part of the political debate 
and it was taken into account in the legislative process.  
The newer example, the Seal Products Regulation, tells a somewhat different story. In 2007, two years 
before the EU rules on this matter were adopted, Belgium and the Netherlands adopted legislation 
banning trade in seal products. This led to Europe-wide discussion on seal hunting to see whether an 
EU ban was needed.23 Canada reacted promptly to the Belgian and Dutch measures and the same year 
requested consultations with the EC, which constituted the first step in a WTO challenge.24 At the 
time, one might have reasonably assumed that the WTO challenge would make the EU legislature 
reluctant to adopt a piece of EU legislation on the matter. However, this assumption would soon be 
proven wrong. In 2009, Regulation 1007/2009 was adopted banning the placing of seal products on 
the market (with narrow exceptions for indigenous communities, marine management and importation 
for personal use).25 This total ban is currently being challenged both within the EU by interested 
individuals on the grounds that it breaches the principles of conferred competences, subsidiarity, 
proportionality and fundamental rights, and also within the WTO by Canada and Norway given that it 
raises concerns about possible protectionism and other types of irrationalities, permissible 
justifications, necessity, etc. (about which this paper cannot go into a detailed analysis, and concerning 
which I have written elsewhere).26 European parliamentarians did not ask much about WTO 
                                                     
20 Answer to E-0949/98, ibid. 
21 De Búrca and Scott, supra note 9, pp. 9-12. 
22 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
23 See European Food Safety Authority, Scientific Opinion on Animal Welfare Aspects of the Killing and Skinning of Seals 
available at <http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178671319178.htm>; European Parliamentary 
Questions, available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sidesSearch/sipadeMapUrl.do?PROG=QP&SORT_ORDER=DA&S_REF_QP=%25&S_RA
NK=%25&F_MI_TEXT=seal&MI_TEXT=seal&LEG_ID=6&L=EN>; H. Spongenberg, ‘Canada Starts Trade Dispute with 
the EU Over Seals’,  EUobserver, 27 September 2007, available at  <http://euobserver.com/9/24853>. 
24 European Communities — Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (Complainant: 
Canada), DS369 25 September 2007. 
25 Seal Products Regulation, supra note 14.  
26 Currently pending EU cases are: C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. Parliament and Council, OJ [2012] C 
58/3; T-526/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. Commission, action brought on 9 November 2010 OJ [2011] C 13/34. 
Currently pending WTO disputes are: European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (Complainant: Canada), DS400 2 November 2009; European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (Complainant: Norway), DS401 5 November 2009.  
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compliance before the adoption of the Regulation.27 Following the adoption of the Regulations and the 
challenges, the Commission was asked some questions concerning WTO compliance, but it merely 
replied that it would defend the measure.28 It is true that, once a measure is challenged, no answer of 
the Commission recognizing WTO-compliance problems is politically feasible.  
What one can see from the legislative history of the Cosmetics Directive and the Seal Products 
Regulation is a stark difference in the attitude of the EU legislature towards WTO compliance. On the 
one hand, the entry into force of the marketing ban of cosmetic products and ingredients tested on 
animals was postponed on the ground that the measure might not be WTO compliant. In that case, the 
EU was excessively cautious as there was and still is plenty of room to defend that measure against 
any WTO challenges. On the other hand, the EU adopted the seal products ban for which there are 
more compelling arguments that it might not be WTO compatible.29 Furthermore, at the time the EU 
seal products ban was being adopted, Canada had already submitted a WTO complaint against the EC, 
challenging the comparable measures of Belgium and the Netherlands.  
This limited comparison of the older and newer example cannot lead to a general conclusion that the 
EU legislature is becoming more indifferent to WTO compliance, but it does show an interesting shift 
in attitude. The study also suggests that the attitude towards WTO compliance differs between EU 
institutions. In both instances, it seems that the Commission was aware of WTO obligations. In the 
case of the Cosmetics Directive, problems with WTO compliance were explicitly mentioned by the 
Commission in its answers to the European Parliament. In the case of the Seal Products Regulation, 
WTO compliance might not have been explicitly mentioned in the public documents, but the 
Commission’s proposal for the Regulation, which one could argue was easily WTO-compliant, was 
very different from the finally adopted Regulation. The original Proposal for the Regulation30 shows 
that the intention of the Commission was not to introduce a ‘total’ ban, but a conditional one. Seal 
products obtained through hunting and skinning which observed certain animal welfare standards and 
which were properly certified and labelled would have been permissible in the EU. The conditional 
(Contd.)                                                                  
For an analysis of these disputes and the issues raised, see T. Perišin, ‘Is the EU Seal Products Regulation a Sealed Deal? – 
EU and WTO Challenges’, (forthcoming).; R. Howse and J. Langille, ‘Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and 
Why the WTO Should Permit Trade Restrictions Justified by Non-Instrumental Moral Values’, 37 Yale Journal of 
International Law 2, 2012, pp. 367-432; and P. L. Fitzgerald, ‘“Morality” May Not Be Enough to Justify the EU Seal 
Products Ban: Animal Welfare Meets International Trade Law’, 14 Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 2011, pp. 
85–136; F. De Ville, ‘Explaining the Genesis of a Trade Dispute: The European Union’s Seal Trade Ban’, 34 Journal of 
European Integration 2012, pp. 37-53; L. Ankersmit, J. Lawrence and G. Davies, ‘Diverging EU and WTO Perspectives on 
Extraterritorial Process Regulation’, Minnesota Journal of International Law Online spring 2012, available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007098>; X.  Luan and J. Chaisse, ‘Preliminary Comments on the WTO Seals Products Dispute: 
Traditional Hunting, Public Morals and Technical Barriers to Trade’, 22 Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy 2, winter 2011, pp. 79-121. 
27 Two MEPs posed a question on the WTO dispute to the Commission E-0373/08 Written Question to the Commission ‘The 
challenge of seal bans in the WTO’ by Jens Holm (GUE/NGL) and Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), 4 February 2008. 
28 For a full list of parliamentary questions on seals and WTO compliance in the 7th parliamentary term, see 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sidesSearch/sipadeMapUrl.do?L=EN&PROG=QP&SORT_ORDER=DA&S_REF_QP=%&
S_RANK=%&MI_TEXT=seal+and+wto&F_MI_TEXT=seal+and+wto&LEG_ID=7>; and in particular see E-002592/2011 
Question for written answer to the Commission ‘Measures against the annual commercial seal hunt in Canada’ by Bart Staes 
(Verts/ALE), 17 March 2011; E-003975/11 Question for written answer to the Commission ‘Seal culling in Canada’ by 
Oreste Rossi (EFD), 29 April 2011; Joint answer to written questions E-002592/11, E-003975/11 given by Mr Potočnik on 
behalf of the Commission, 29 June 2011; E-003088/2012 Question for written answer to the Commission ‘CETA Agreement’ 
by Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), 21 March 2012; Answer given to written question E-003088/2012 by Mr De Gucht on behalf 
of the Commission, 3 May 2012. 
29 Perišin, supra note 26. 
30 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning trade in seals products, 2008/0160 
(COD). 
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ban proposed by the Commission was probably in accordance with WTO rules and would probably 
not have even led to a WTO challenge. However, this originally planned conditional ban was never 
adopted, as amendments to the proposal were added by various committees within the European 
Parliament.31 In contrast to the conditional ban, the total ban (with narrow exceptions for indigenous 
communities, marine management and individual imports) has many weaknesses (about which I have 
written elsewhere32). This would suggest that the Commission is more aware of or that it cares more 
about the EU’s WTO obligations than does the European Parliament. This might change given the 
European Parliament's new role in the CCP envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty. It remains to be seen 
whether the European Parliament will become more sensitised to external trade and WTO law. 
 
2.2.  Case Study – Air Transport's Environmental Effects 
Transport is an area which has significant effects on both internal and external trade, and the EU has 
special competences in this field. Transport also has significant effects on the environment, so EU 
rules on transport frequently seek to achieve a high level of environmental protection as well.  
This case study looks at two pieces of legislation in the field of air transport which sought to achieve a 
high level of environmental protection, but they presented obstacles to the business activities of 
airlines and thus led to challenges. These are the Regulation on Civil Subsonic Jet Planes,33 as the 
older example used by de Búrca and Scott,34 and the Aviation Emissions Directive as the newer 
example.35 The study of both the older and the newer piece of legislation focuses not on the legislative 
histories (as in the previous section on animal welfare), but on the disputes. 
The older dispute concerned the Regulation on Civil Subsonic Jet Planes which raised the noise 
standard for civil subsonic jet planes so that only planes complying with the strict rules of Chapter 3 of 
the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (CCICA) could register and operate in the EU 
(where previously compliance with CCICA Chapter 2 was sufficient).36 The Regulation also imposed 
an additional technical requirement that re-engined planes needed to have ‘engines with a by-pass ratio 
of less than 3’.37 The Regulation was challenged by the company Omega Air before UK and Irish 
courts.38 Omega Air claimed that its re-engined planes met the CCICA Chapter 3 noise standards and 
that they should be allowed to register and operate in the EU without meeting the additional technical 
requirement concerning the by-pass ratio.39 In Omega Air’s view, this additional technical requirement 
                                                     
31 For a detailed analysis of the Regulation's legislative history, see de Ville, supra note 26. 
32 Perišin, supra note 26. 
33 Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 of 29 April 1999 on the registration and operation within the Community of certain 
types of civil subsonic jet aeroplanes which have been modified and recertificated as meeting the standards of volume I, Part 
II, Chapter 3 of Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, third edition (July 1993), OJ [1999] L 115/1. 
The Regulation was subsequently superseded by Directive 2002/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
March 2002 on the establishment of rules and procedures with regard to the introduction of noise-related operating 
restrictions at Community airports, OJ [2002] L 085/40. 
34 De Búrca and J. Scott, supra note 9, pp. 12-16. 
35 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, OJ [2009] L 8/3. 
36 Art. 2(2) Regulation 925/1999 defines ‘recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplane’, and Art. 3 Regulation 925/1999 
prescribes that such planes cannot be registered in EU Member States. 
37 Art. 2(2) Regulation 925/1999. 
38 Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00, Omega Air and Others, [2002] ECR I-2569. 
39 Ibid., paras 37, 38. 
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going beyond the international standard was disproportionate and was based on inadequate reasons.40 
The national courts referred questions to the ECJ concerning the validity of the Regulation, inquiring 
whether the mentioned provision of the Regulation breached the duty to provide reasons and the 
principle of proportionality, all in the light of possible rights that individuals might have under the 
GATT and TBT.41 By that time, it had already been settled that WTO law does not have a direct effect 
in the EU.42 However, the issue arose whether WTO obligations were relevant for determining a 
breach of the duty to provide reasons and the principle of proportionality. The ECJ, however, restated 
that WTO rules cannot be used to assess the legality of EU legislation, except in cases where the 
challenged piece of legislation is ‘intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context 
of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to precise provisions of the WTO 
agreements’.43 What is relevant in this case is that WTO compliance was invoked before the ECJ. 
A more recent dispute concerning air transport’s environmental effects deals with the Aviation 
Emissions Directive. The Directive sets up a system according to which airlines are required to 
purchase allowances for all their emissions on flights into or from the EU (including emissions caused 
above open seas, another country, or at an airport in another country). Unlike the mentioned 
Regulation on civil subsonic jet planes, this Directive does not directly regulate planes. However, it 
does affect the provision of air transport services and indirectly affects the type of planes which 
companies will use (trying to adjust engines, plane weight, etc., in order to lower their fuel 
consumption and emissions). The Directive was challenged before the ECJ by a number of US airlines 
on the grounds of being contrary to customary international law and certain international agreements, 
but the Court found the Directive to be valid.44 What is interesting for this paper is that WTO law is 
not mentioned anywhere in the case – either by the parties, by the AG45 or by the Court itself. It is true 
that the GATS explicitly excludes air transport services from its scope,46 but there might be parts of 
WTO law which would still be applicable to the case. For example, studies by Bartels and Howse 
show that there might be parts of the GATT which would apply because the Directive limits trade in 
goods, and that the GATS could apply to the extent that the Directive restricts services other than air 
transport, e.g., tourism.47 In addition, some WTO officials have mentioned that it would be difficult, 
                                                     
40 Ibid., paras 39-45, 54-61. 
41 Ibid., paras 40, 41. 
42 Within the WTO, the idea that WTO law should have a direct effect was rejected during the Uruguay round, and this was 
also held by the Panel in United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 WT/DS152/R par. 7.72. Before the 
Omega Air case, many cases on the effect of WTO law in the EU had already been decided, e.g., Case C-21-24/72, 
International Fruit Company v. Produktschaap voor Groenten and Fruit, [1972] ECR 1219; Case 70/87, Fediol v. 
Commission, [1989] ECR 1781; Case C-69/89, Nakajima v. Council, [1991] ECR I-2069; Case 280/93, Germany v. 
Commission, [1994] ECR 4873; Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, [1999] ECR I-8395. 
43 Omega Air, supra note 38, paras 93, 94. 
44 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 
judgment of 21 December 2011. 
45 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State 
for Energy and Climate Change, delivered on 6 October 2011. AG Kokott mentions WTO law incidentally when explaining 
the effects of international law in the EU legal order (paras 70, 71, 100). 
46 GATS Annex on Air Transport Services. 
47 L. Bartels, 'The Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS: WTO Law Considerations; Trade and Sustainable Energy Series', 
with a Commentary by Professor R. Howse, NYU School of Law, Issue Paper No. 6, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (Geneva 2012). See also M. Gehring, ‘Air Transport Association of America v. Energy Secretary 
before the European Court of Justice: Clarifying Direct Effect and Guidance for Future Instrument Design for a Green 
Economy in the EU’, 12 University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series 2012, available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2063254>. For an analysis of the EU aviation emissions scheme and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, see J. Scott and L. Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism 
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but not impossible, to bring a successful case before the WTO on this measure.48 However, this point 
was not even mentioned in the EU’s judicial procedure.  
A conclusion which one might draw from a comparison of these two cases is that since the ECJ had 
ignored WTO law arguments in previous disputes, it is reasonable behaviour of the parties not to 
invoke such arguments in a later case. However, one wonders whether the ECJ’s indifference to the 
compliance of measures with WTO rules is prudent. Parties having lost a dispute in the EU could now 
turn to other available fora. Obtainable information suggests that interested companies are persuading 
their governments to initiate disputes within the WTO.49 Regardless of whether it ever comes to a 
WTO dispute and whether the EU would be successful in such a case, the question remains whether 
the ECJ should in some way take WTO compliance into account so as not to force parties to seek a 
remedy in other fora.   
 
3. Conclusion 
The EU's official documents frequently emphasise that it is committed to international trade, 
especially to the WTO’s multilateral trading system.50 However, while this might be one of the 
features of the EU's external policy, its internal measures can often be adopted and upheld without 
much consideration for this external policy. This paper has involved two case studies - one on 
legislative regulatory policy in the field of internal market measures with a high level of animal 
welfare protection, and the other on judicial policy in the field of air transport measures with a high 
level of environmental protection. While these studies are not broad enough to offer general 
conclusions, it is interesting that both show that in recent examples less account has been taken of 
WTO law and of the effects of measures on other WTO members. The studies also indicate a 
difference between the EU institutions in their sensitivity towards WTO compliance and the effects of 
measures on other WTO members. The Commission, which, through its external activities, especially 
the common commercial policy, is most exposed to contacts with third countries and the WTO, has 
also revealed most sensitivity to the external effects of measures and to WTO compliance when 
proposing internal regulation. The regulatory and deregulatory actions of other institutions have shown 
less interest for the WTO compliance of measures and for their external effects. 
The consequence of not taking into account other WTO members’ views on a measure’s external 
effects and WTO compliance may include the unilateral action of another WTO member or a WTO 
dispute. A WTO dispute gives the EU the possibility of persuading a Panel or an AB of its position 
and in this way influencing the development of WTO law.51 The EU has on many occasions been 
(Contd.)                                                                  
International Aviation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme’, available at 
<http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/EU%20Climate%20Change%20Unilateralism.pdf>. 
48 Reuters, ‘EU Aviation Carbon Spat Seen Unlikely to Reach WTO’, available at 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/01/us-wto-aviation-carbon-idUSBRE8500WQ20120601>. 
49 B. Beary, ‘Climate Change - Aviation Emissions Spat May End Up at WTO, Says Expert’, Europolitics, 25 May 2012, 
available at <http://www.europolitics.info/external-policies/aviation-emissions-spat-may-end-up-at-wto-says-expert-
art335116-46.html>; ‘EU Aviation Emissions Levy Ruled Lawful by European Court as Measure Enters into Force’,16/1 
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 11 January 2012, available at <http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/123063/>. 
50 See, e.g., Trade Policy Review - Report by the European Union - Revision, WT/TPR/G/248/Rev.1, 28 July 2011; Speech of 
Commissioner De Gucht at the Plenary Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference, December 2011, webcasting at 
<http://gaia.world-television.com/wto/2011/min11_webcast_e.htm#eec>. 
51 See F. Hoffmeister, ‘The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law’, in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU 
External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), pp. 37-127. 
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successful in advocating regulator-friendly strategies in the WTO (e.g., in EC – Asbestos52). However, 
there are also other instances where the EU had not entirely convinced the Panel or the AB of its 
position and ultimately lost WTO disputes. For the EU internally, it is particularly problematic if it 
loses a case on a measure which has a legitimate aim, but which was not drafted in a WTO-consistent 
way (e.g., in EC – Hormones53). In these situations, it may be possible to amend the legislation in a 
WTO-consistent way, but this is not always feasible. The EU can then find itself in a situation where it 
is exposed to retaliation or where it has to offer alternative concessions to its trading partners (as 
indeed happened in the hormones saga). These are the kind of disputes which can be avoided if WTO 
law and the views of third countries are more seriously taken into account during internal decision-
making processes. 
 
                                                     
52 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS135/R, 18 September 2000; European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001. 
53 European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA, 18 August 1997; European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, Report of the Panel, WT/DS48/R/CAN, 18 August 1997; European 
Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998. 
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The EU’s International Regulatory Policy, Democratic Accountability and the ACTA: a 
Cautionary Tale 
 
Marise Cremona 
 
1.  Introduction1 
This paper offers a short and inevitably limited comment on the difficult question of the legitimacy 
and accountability of international regulatory law-making by examining the debate surrounding the 
negotiation by the EU of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), and in particular the role 
played by the European Parliament, one of the legislators in the EU’s multilevel system. 
The EU is mandated, in its external relations, to ‘promote multilateral solutions to common problems’ 
and to ‘work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … 
promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance’.2 Its ambition is to play a central role in global standard-setting. The Commission’s 2006 
Global Europe strategy set as an objective of EU trade policy ‘to play a leading role in sharing best 
practice and developing global rules and standards’.3 This objective has two dimensions: on the one 
hand, the EU must take account of global ‘best practice’ when developing regulatory and other 
standards. On the other hand, the EU should engage in cooperation at multilateral as well as bilateral 
level to ensure that European norms are a reference for global standards. The Commission has argued 
that EU regulatory standards are well-placed to become a reference point for global standards.4 But 
EU regulatory leadership cannot be taken for granted outside its neighbourhood.5 Regulatory 
partnerships with respect to specific sectors and key partners are increasingly important to the EU’s 
involvement in international regulatory initiatives.  
In assessing the EU’s ability to fulfil its mandate to promote multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance, the literature has generally and understandably focused on the EU’s capacity to influence 
international norm-setting vis-à-vis the other major international players, its effectiveness as an 
international actor compared to other powers, and the impact of policy (in)coherence resulting from 
policy differences between Member States.6 But the success of EU external regulatory policy depends 
not only on its ability to influence the outcome of international negotiations, but also on the reaction to 
                                                     
1 This is a revised and updated version of ‘International Regulatory Policy and Democratic Accountability: the EU and the 
ACTA’ in M Cremona et al., (eds.) Reflections on the constitutionalization of international economic law - Liber 
amicorum, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, , (Brill, forthcoming 2013). Parts of the analysis are taken from M. Cremona, 
‘Expanding the Internal Market: an external regulatory policy for the EU?’ in S. Blockmans et al., (eds.) The EU and Global 
Governance (OUP 2013). 
2 Art. 21(1) and 21(2)(h) TEU. 
3 Commission Communication ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’, COM(2006) 567, 4 October 2006, p. 7. 
4 ‘The external dimension of the single market review’, SEC(2007) 1519 (Commission staff working document 
accompanying the Commission’s Communication on ‘A single market for 21st century Europe’ COM(2007) 724 final). 
5 ‘Trade as a Driver of Prosperity’, SEC(2010) 1269 (Commission staff working document accompanying the Commission’s 
Communication ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs - Trade Policy as a core component of the EU's 2020 strategy’, 
COM(2010) 612, 9 Nov. 2010), p. 40. 
6 See for some recent examples, M. Poiares Maduro (ed.) ‘An EU Agenda for Global Governance’, RSCAS Policy Papers 
2011/01; A. Ripoll Servent and A. MacKenzie, ‘The European Parliament as a “Norm Taker’’? EU-US Relations after the 
SWIFT Agreement’, 17 European Foreign Affairs Rev. 2012, p. 71; S. De Jong and S. Schunz, ‘Coherence in European 
Union External Policy before and after the Lisbon Treaty: The Cases of Energy Security and Climate Change’, 17 European 
Foreign Affairs Rev 2012, p. 165; M. Dee, ‘Standing Together or Doing the Splits? Evaluating European Union Performance 
in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Negotiations’, 17 European Foreign Affairs Rev. 2012, p. 189. 
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those outcomes of its own domestic constituencies, and in particular the European Parliament. In 
creating a degree of parallelism between internal legislative procedures and external treaty-making, 
the Treaty of Lisbon moved decisively away from the classic balance of power in EU international 
treaty negotiation between the Commission as negotiator and the Council as the institution which 
concludes the treaty. Under Article 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU the conclusion of a treaty by the Council 
requires the consent of the European Parliament, inter alia, where the agreement covers fields to 
which the ordinary legislative procedure applies. These fields range from regulation within the internal 
market to trade policy. In order to deliver on its policy priorities, the Commission has to convince not 
only its negotiating partners, not only the Member States in the Council, but also the European 
Parliament, and this in turn brings to the fore the role of public opinion. In fact, the conclusion – and 
not only the implementation – of an international treaty which is legislative in nature becomes subject 
to a legislative process. At the same time its negotiation at the international level, especially in the 
case of multilateral treaties, is still subject to the conventions of classic treaty-making – especially 
confidentiality and intergovernmental bargaining.  
In the case of the ACTA the EU bargained hard and got a result that the Commission viewed as a 
success – a treaty that apparently reflected the EU’s approach and its concerns – but it was unable to 
sell this result back home to the European Parliament, nor to the publics who influenced both the 
European Parliament and the Member States, partly because of the sense of secrecy and hidden 
negotiation, and what was perceived as a lack of public debate (until too late). Even the inclusion of 
the Member States as parties (the decision to conclude the ACTA as a mixed agreement) did not 
defuse the problem. The EU negotiators were on the defensive, not with respect to their negotiating 
partners, but with respect to the domestic audience, and this audience, through the European 
Parliament, now has the power to reject the outcome.  
This is not the place for a detailed assessment of ACTA in terms of either its contribution to 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) or the protection of fundamental rights.7 But what 
does its negotiation tell us about the EU as a player in global governance? What does it tell us about 
the ability of the EU to develop and then prosecute effectively an external regulatory policy and the 
relationship between that policy and its internal regulatory strategies? 
 
2.  The EU and the Negotiation of the ACTA 
Enforcement of IPR has been identified as a priority for EU trade policy at least since 2004 and the 
EU’s external policy on IPR enforcement illustrates clearly the link between its current trade policy 
objectives and the competitiveness of EU industry.8 In a Communication on IPR of May 2011 the 
Commission declared: 
‘The increase in international trade has put the spotlight on the international dimension of IPR. 
Globalisation provides Europe with immense opportunities to export and trade in its IP intensive 
products, services and know-how to third-countries. At the same time, the growth in IP infringements 
creates the need to focus on a robust global enforcement strategy, in accordance with fundamental 
rights.’ Thus ‘[t]he consolidation and streamlining of the governance of IPR should go hand in hand 
with strengthening enforcement tools both on the EU and international levels.’9  
                                                     
7 See for example K. Weatherall, ‘ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Law-Making’, 12 PIJIP Research Paper 2010, 
American University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC; A. X. Fellmeth, ‘The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement in the Public Eye’, 24/8 Insights American Society of International Law, 24 June 2011.  
8 See for example COM(2010) 612 final, supra note 5, p. 14. 
9 Commission Communication, ‘A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights’, 24 May 2011, COM (2011) 287 final. 
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The Commission's approach to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries was 
first elaborated in its 2004 Strategy for the Enforcement of IPR in Third Countries,10 followed by the 
2006 Global Europe Communication,11 and the Communication on Trade, Growth and World Affairs 
in November 2010.12 EU policy has operated – as with regulatory policy more generally – at a number 
of levels:  
- working with accession countries and neighbourhood states to include enforcement of IPR in 
accession partnerships and Action Plans;13  
- seeking to include chapters on IPR enforcement in bilateral trade agreements;14  
- reinforcing cooperation and dialogue on IPR enforcement;15  
- dialogue with key countries (e.g., China,16 Thailand,17 Russia,18 Brazil19);  
- regulatory cooperation with the USA20 and Japan;21  
- capacity building within the context of development policy,22 and allocating technical 
assistance resources to enforcement.   
The Strategy incorporates both multilateral and bilateral dimensions, while declaring that it is not 
intended to impose the EU’s approach on third countries, nor to propose a one-size-fits-all approach to 
IPR enforcement.23  
Among these initiatives, the EU has taken part in the negotiations for an international Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) which aims, according to its preamble, ‘to provide effective 
and appropriate means, complementing the TRIPS Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights’. The ACTA negotiations were launched in June 2008 and concluded in November 
2010, the EU and its Member States participating with 10 other countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States.24 The Council 
                                                     
10 Strategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries, OJ 2005 C 129/3. 
11 COM(2006) 567 final, supra note 3. 
12 COM(2010) 612 final, supra note 5. 
13 See for example Council Decision 2008/157/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained 
in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, OJ 2008 L 51/4. Joint Staff Working Document ‘Eastern 
Partnership Roadmap 2012-13: the bilateral dimension’, SWD (2012) 109 final, 15 May 2012, accompanying the Joint 
Communication from the Commission and the High Representative, ‘Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 
Summit’ JOIN (2012) 13 final. 
14 See for example Free Trade Agreement between the EU and its Member States and the Republic of Korea OJ 2011 L 
127/6, Art. 1.1(2)(e) and Arts. 10.1-10.69. 
15 Ibid., Art. 10.69. 
16 Action plan on customs cooperation regarding IPR enforcement signed with China in 2009.  
17 Report on the First EU-Thailand IPR Dialogue, Bangkok, Thailand, 25 February 2011, tradoc. 147855; the second IPR 
dialogue meeting was held on 24 February 2012. 
18 Within the framework of the EU-Russia Common Economic Space and more recently the Partnership for Modernisation 
launched at the EU-Russia Summit in June 2010. 
19 Report on 4th EU-Brazil IPR Dialogue, 6 December 2011, tradoc. 149473. 
20 See for example the Transatlantic IPR Portal, available at  <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/initiatives/ipr/index_en.htm>. 
21 For example, Agreement between the EC and Japan on cooperation and mutual administrative assistance in customs 
matters OJ L 62, 6.3.2008, p. 24;  EU-Japan Action Plan on IPR Protection and Enforcement 2004. 
22 Global Europe, supra note 3, p. 13; see also COM(2010) 612, supra note 5, p. 14. 
23 DG Trade ‘Report on Evaluation of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Strategy in Third Countries’, November 
2010. Tradoc. 147053. 
24 In what follows, references to provisions of the ACTA will be to the finalised text: Council doc. 12196/11, 23 August 
2011, available at 
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adopted a decision on the signing of the ACTA on 15-16 December 2011,25 and the Agreement was 
signed by the EU and 22 of its Member States on 26 January 2012.26 It was proposed that the 
Agreement would be concluded by the EU and its Member States as a mixed agreement,27 so that in 
addition to conclusion by the EU it would need to be ratified by each Member State. In addition, the 
consent of the Parliament is required under Article 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU before the Council may 
conclude the ACTA. That consent was withheld in July 2012 leaving the future of the agreement (at 
least for the EU) in considerable doubt.28 It seems now to be accepted that the EU will not conclude 
the ACTA and that it is unlikely to come into force. 
The ACTA has been controversial, both in the USA and in the EU; in the EU the controversy has 
related to both substance and procedure. It has centred on the European Parliament, with five 
committees involved,29 and two opinions from the Parliament’s Legal Service, unusually made 
public.30  The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has issued two own-initiative Opinions on 
the ACTA.31 It has also involved civil society: a group of European academics issued an opinion on 
the draft agreement in February 2011, calling upon the EU institutions, and in particular the European 
Parliament, to consider a number of issues relating to fundamental rights and to trade in generic drugs; 
the Commission published a response.32 The Parliament received a petition signed by 2.4 million 
people calling for the ACTA’s rejection on the ground that it threatens the freedom of the internet.33 
The Commission defended the ACTA, publishing its replies to the many questions it received from 
MEPs,34 and in February 2012 decided to refer the ACTA to the Court of Justice (CJEU) under Article 
(Contd.)                                                                  
< http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st12/st12196.en11.pdf>.  
25 Council doc. 12192/1/11, REV 1. 
26 The ACTA was not signed by Germany, Cyprus, Estonia, the Netherlands and Slovakia. In total 31 states plus the EU have 
signed the ACTA. 
27 Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the ACTA, COM(2011) 380 final. 
28 European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 July 2012 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 12195/2011 – C7-0027/2012 – 2011/0167(NLE)) P7_TA-PROV(2012)0287. So far only 
Japan has ratified the ACTA; it will come into force once ratified by six countries. 
29 The international trade (INTA) committee as lead committee, together with the legal affairs, civil liberties, industry, and 
development committees; the EP also commissioned a report on the ACTA: ‘The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA): An Assessment’, EXPO/B/INTA/FWC/2009-01/Lot7/12, published June 2011.  
30 In July 2011 the EP’s Legal Affairs Committee asked the EP Legal Service for an opinion on the compatibility of the 
ACTA with the Treaties, general principles of EU law and the existing acquis, including the ECHR and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights; a further request was made on 4 October 2011. The two opinions of October and December 2011 were 
later made public by the Legal Affairs Committee: SJ-0501/11 of 5 October 2011 and SJ-0661/11 of 8 December 2011, 
available at 
<http://lists.act-on-acta.eu/pipermail/hub/attachments/20111219/59f3ebe6/attachment-0010.pdf>. 
31 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the current negotiations by the European Union of an Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 22 February 2010,  OJ 2010 C 147/1; Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 24 April 
2012 (Summary) OJ 2012 C 215/7. 
32 The academics’ opinion is available here  
 <http://www.iri.uni-hannover.de/tl_files/pdf/ACTA_opinion_110211_DH2.pdf>. 
For the Commission’s response, see tradoc. 147853, 27 April 2011. 
33 The petition’s text read, ‘To all Members of the EU Parliament: As concerned global citizens, we call on you to stand for a 
free and open Internet and reject the ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which would destroy 
it. The Internet is a crucial tool for people around the world to exchange ideas and promote democracy. We urge you to show 
true global leadership and protect our rights.’ See 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20120220FCS38611/>. 
34 Tradoc. 149102, covering the period January 2010 – January 2012. 
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218(11) TFEU, for an opinion on its compatibility with the EU Treaties and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. In announcing the Commission’s legal submissions to the CJEU, Trade 
Commissioner De Gucht said  
‘Considering that tens of thousands of people have voiced their concerns about ACTA, it is 
appropriate to give our highest independent judicial body the time to deliver its legal opinion on this 
agreement. This is an important input to European public and democratic debate’.35 
However in December 2012 the Commission announced that it was withdrawing the request for an 
opinion, thereby signalling that there was no political will to seek Parliament’s approval a second time. 
 
3.  Competence and Legal Basis  
The ACTA calls itself a trade agreement, and as far as the EU is concerned it was negotiated and 
signed under Article 207 TFEU, the external trade policy competence. Not only does this external 
competence now require the consent of the European Parliament to international agreements, since 
internal legislation on trade policy is adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure; it is also an 
exclusive competence of the EU.36 Nevertheless, the ACTA was negotiated, and was to have been 
concluded by the Member States alongside the EU, as a mixed agreement. The reason for this is the 
part of the agreement that deals with criminal enforcement. These provisions, which form a specific 
section and are not merely incidental to the rest of the agreement, would fall under Article 83(2) 
TFEU, a matter of shared competence.37 However the Commission decided not to propose that the EU 
should exercise this competence: 
‘[T]he Commission has opted not to propose that the European Union exercise its potential 
competence in the area of criminal enforcement pursuant to Article 83(2) TFEU. The Commission 
considers this appropriate because it has never been the intention, as regards the negotiation of ACTA, 
to modify the EU acquis or to harmonise EU legislation as regards criminal enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. For this reason, the Commission proposes that ACTA be signed and concluded both 
by the EU and by all the Member States’.38  
                                                     
35 The request for an opinion was officially made on 10 May 2012; unusually, the Commission published a summary of its 
request and its arguments: tradoc. 149464.  
36 Article 3(1)(e) TFEU. 
37 Article 83(2) TFEU provides in part: ‘If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves 
essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation 
measures, directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area 
concerned’. Note however the view of AG Kokott that provisions on criminal enforcement in an international Convention on 
the protection of providers of certain audio-visual and information society services do not require, or justify, a specific legal 
basis where the agreement as a whole falls within the CCP: ‘In isolation, confiscation measures and the related international 
cooperation may indeed be classified under the policy area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. However, as 
has already been mentioned, the confiscation measures and the related international cooperation here are not the primary 
object of the Convention. Because the focus of the Convention is in the area of commercial policy, the signing of the 
Convention as a whole must be based solely on Article 207 TFEU. Recourse to other legal bases, such as Article 83(2) 
TFEU, is not permitted.’ (opinion of AG Kokott in case C-137/12 European Commission v. Council, case pending, opinion 
of 27 June 2013, para. 82, footnotes omitted). Even were this view to be accepted, and the agreement concluded by the EU 
alone under Article 207 as its sole legal basis, implementation of the clauses on criminal enforcement could be undertaken by 
the Member States.  
38 COM(2011) 380 final, supra note 27. See F. Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union’s common commercial policy a year after 
Lisbon – Sea change or business as usual?’ in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The European Union’s external relations a year after 
Lisbon, CLEER Working Paper 2011/3, p. 84. 
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The Commission’s reasons were no doubt related to the recent history of a legislative proposal for 
criminal enforcement of IPR, which was eventually abandoned.39 There were hints that the conclusion 
of the ACTA by the EU alone would appear to lead to harmonisation by stealth, or so-called ‘policy 
laundering’; in other words that the EU would commit itself externally to introducing criminal 
sanctions which had not been agreed internally at EU level. In the terms of an EP Resolution of 2010, 
‘the on-going EU efforts to harmonise IPR enforcement measures should not be circumvented by trade 
negotiations which are outside the scope of normal EU decision-making processes’.40 In its defence of 
ACTA the Commission argued that this competence balance will not change: ‘There is not yet an EU 
acquis in terms of penal sanctions for IPR infringements, but instead 27 national laws and this will not 
be modified by ACTA’.41 The criminal provisions were thus negotiated not by the Commission but by 
the Presidency on the basis of common positions of the Member States adopted unanimously in the 
Council, and they would be implemented by the Member States unless and until EU legislation in the 
field were to be adopted. 
None of this precludes, of course, a future decision within the EU to revive the criminal enforcement 
directive. The Commission has argued that ‘further harmonising IP rules within the EU would enhance 
the Commission's capacity to negotiate on behalf of the EU stronger IP commitments with our key 
trading partners’.42 It may be felt to be necessary to align national legislation, especially if ACTA-
based provisions on criminal enforcement are included in FTAs, and third countries expect a uniform 
approach to implementation from the EU side. Thus, while the extent of existing EU internal 
regulation influences its ability to negotiate externally, regulatory norms agreed at an international 
level will of course impact on internal EU regulatory policy. 
 
4.  Ambiguity and Flexibility: The ACTA and the EU acquis  
The ACTA builds upon TRIPS, and its focus is on enforcement of IPR. It contains provisions on 
customs and border controls, civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms, and the internet. It is not 
supposed to be concerned with defining (or creating) IPR,43 although the distinction between defining 
IPR and defining the scope of protection may not be easy to draw: if a particular action is declared 
under specific circumstances not to be an infringement, is this a restriction of the right, or of the 
remedy?44 This distinction may be important in relation to the liability of internet service providers;45 
                                                     
39 COM(2006) 168 final. For the withdrawal of the proposal, see OJ 2010 C 252/7. 
40 EP resolution of 10 March 2010 on the transparency and state of play of the ACTA negotiations, P7_TA(2010)0058. 
41 P. Velasco Martins, DG Trade, Civil Society Meeting on the ACTA, 25 March 2011, tradoc. 147947. 
42 COM(2010) 612 final, supra note 5, p. 14. 
43 Art. 3 ACTA provides ‘1. This Agreement shall be without prejudice to provisions in a Party’s law governing the 
availability, acquisition, scope, and maintenance of intellectual property rights. 2. This Agreement does not create any 
obligation on a Party to apply measures where a right in intellectual property is not protected under its laws and regulations.’ 
44 B.T Yeh, Memorandum to Senator Wyden, 29 October 2010, p. 3. See also P. Velasco Martins, supra note 41, ‘Exceptions 
and derogations consist in lawful uses and not infringements to IPR. They can hence not be affected by the agreement’. 
45 Directive 2000/31/EC (E-Commerce Directive) OJ 2000 L 178/1, Arts. 12-15; Directive 2001/29/EC (Copyright in the 
Information Society Directive) OJ 2001 L 167/10, Art. 8. See also Art. 27.2 and note 13 ACTA. 
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in relation to trade in generic drugs, where domestic laws and/or TRIPS provide specific exemptions;46 
and also in the context of ‘fair usage’ exceptions.47 
There has been debate over the extent to which the ACTA may require modification of the current EU 
acquis.48 The ambiguity results from what ACTA does not contain as much as what it does: it is 
argued that the ACTA is not precise enough on issues which concern the balance between the 
protection of intellectual property rights and fundamental rights such as due process, freedom of 
expression and privacy in relation to enforcement in the digital environment, giving rise to the risk of 
‘unintended consequences’.49 The Commission argues that, on the contrary, ACTA’s flexibility allows 
the EU to implement it with due regard to its existing enforcement structures and fundamental rights 
protection.   
As the Legal Service of the Parliament has pointed out, in examining the relationship between the 
ACTA and EU law we need to distinguish between compatibility with the Treaties and EU primary 
law on the one hand, and impact on the EU secondary law acquis on the other hand. The difference 
reflects the position of international agreements concluded by the EU. Such agreements may not 
derogate from the Treaties or other primary law such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights,50 but there 
is no legal bar to concluding an international agreement which requires amendment of existing 
secondary law or the introduction of new internal rules – indeed Article 216(2) TFEU provides that the 
institutions are bound by such agreements. Whether the EU should enter into an agreement which does 
require an amendment of existing EU secondary law is a political decision to be taken by the 
institutions involved in establishing the negotiating mandate, conducting the negotiation, and 
ultimately concluding the agreement.  
The Commission is adamant that the ACTA would not require any amendment of the acquis: the 
agreement will not need implementation at EU level since IPR enforcement standards in the EU are 
higher than (or at least equal to) those in the ACTA and, as we have seen, the provisions on criminal 
                                                     
46 Where TRIPS provides exceptions: Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 14 Nov. 2001; Decision of 30 August 
2003 on the implementation of para. 6 of the Doha Declaration. Here the ACTA allows some flexibility since parties are not 
required to introduce customs controls or criminal sanctions for patent infringements: Art. 13, note 6 and Art. 23. In addition, 
Art. 1 of ACTA is a ‘non-derogate’ clause with respect to TRIPS obligations, and Art. 2.3 provides that the objectives and 
principles of Part I of TRIPS, especially Arts. 7 and 8, will apply to the ACTA. 
47 Fair usage has been an issue in the context of the provision for criminal enforcement in cases of an IPR infringement ‘on a 
commercial scale’. In response to criticism that this is not specific enough in excluding fair usage, it is argued by the 
Commission that fair usage activities are encompassed in the definition of an infringement: they are considered ‘legitimate 
“exceptions” and therefore do not fall under the scope of the criminal enforcement provisions of ACTA, since this applies 
only to certain illegal activities (piracy and counterfeiting), practiced wilfully and on a commercial scale. In fact, these 
exceptions are totally outside the scope of ACTA, which, as an enforcement agreement, only applies to infringing activities, 
not to legal ones’; Commission response to Academics’ Opinion, supra note 32. 
48 In particular, Regulation 1383/2003 on customs action against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property 
rights OJ 2003 L 196/7, and Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ 2004 L 195/16. 
Other relevant directives are Directive 2001/29 and Directive 2000/31/EC (supra note 45). See also Council Resolution of 
25 September 2008 on a comprehensive European anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy plan OJ 2008 C 253/1; Council 
Resolution of 16 March 2009 on the EU Customs Action Plan to combat IPR infringements for the years 2009 to 2012 OJ 
2009 C 71/1. 
49 D. Martin, ‘Explanatory Statement to draft recommendation to the Parliament’s International Trade Committee’, doc. 
2011/0167(NLE), PE486.174v02-00, 12 April 2012, p. 6. Martin concludes: ‘Given the vagueness of certain aspects of the 
text and the uncertainty over its interpretation, the European Parliament cannot guarantee adequate protection for citizens' 
rights in the future under ACTA.’ 
50 See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council 
and Commission, [2008] ECR I-06351, paras 285 and 306-9. C.f. also Art. 218(11) TFEU. 
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enforcement will be implemented by the Member States.51 The European Parliament’s Legal Service 
also took the view that there is no inconsistency between the ACTA and the EU’s existing acquis.52 
Two issues in particular were discussed. First, the provision on effective border enforcement in Article 
13 ACTA is expressly subject to domestic law and to TRIPS;53 thus it can be argued that its 
application to the EU would at present only concern pirated and counterfeit goods since EU legislation 
currently only encompasses border measures for these IPR infringements.54 Second, Article 27(4) 
ACTA refers to the possibility of granting the competent authorities the power to order an online 
service provider to disclose to a right-holder information sufficient to identify a subscriber whose 
account was allegedly used for an infringement. Since this is a voluntary provision (a Party ‘may 
provide’), as it operates in accordance with the Party’s laws and regulations, and since it must be 
implemented ‘in a manner that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate activity, including 
electronic commerce, and, consistent with that Party’s law, preserves fundamental principles such as 
freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy’, the Parliament’s Legal Service took the view that 
there is no conflict with EU data protection law. In addition, other obligations established by Article 
27 ACTA in relation to IPR enforcement in the digital environment are, by virtue of Article 27(8), 
‘without prejudice to the rights, limitations, exceptions, or defences to copyright or related rights 
infringement under a Party’s law’. 
On the other hand, the EDPS Opinion on the ACTA addresses ‘possible undue and unacceptable side 
effects’ in the implementation of the ACTA.55 The EDPS, while recognising the voluntary nature of 
some of the provisions on IPR in the digital environment – especially those in Article 27(3) and (4) 
that concern the provision of information by internet service providers on their subscribers and on 
cooperation between service providers and right holders, which might involve monitoring of internet 
usage – argues that they may have an effect on the future development of the law at EU and Member 
State level, especially if they are implemented by third country parties to ACTA.56  The EDPS also 
sees a risk of fragmented implementation by Member States as a result of the imprecision of these 
provisions, ‘which in turn will run the high risk of inappropriate or insufficient respect of data 
protection requirements within the EU’.57  
Imprecision and the possibility of different interpretations raise the question: could the ACTA, on the 
basis of Article 216(2) TFEU, over-ride provisions in EU secondary legislation (e.g., on data 
protection)? The Commission, in its reference to the CJEU, takes the view that the ACTA would not 
be directly effective; it would thus not be directly applied by courts in the EU and control over its 
interpretation will lie with the legislatures (EU and national) implementing the agreement. Ultimately, 
it is for the Court of Justice to determine the direct effect or not of specific provisions of any 
international agreement. 
                                                     
51 P. Velasco Martins, supra note 41. See also COM(2011) 380, supra note 27, ‘ACTA does not modify the EU acquis, 
because EU law is already considerably more advanced than the current international standards’. 
52 See supra note 30. 
53 According to Article 13 ACTA, each party must provide ‘as appropriate, and consistent with its domestic system of 
intellectual property rights protection and without prejudice to the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, for effective border 
enforcement of intellectual property rights’. 
54 Regulation 1383/2003, supra note 48. For a proposal to amend this Regulation and widen its scope see COM(2011) 285 
final. 
55 Opinion of the EDPS, 24 April 2012, supra note 31, para. 11; C.f. the ‘unintended consequences’ referred to by D. Martin, 
the INTA Committee rapporteur, supra note 49.   
56 Opinion of the EDPS, 24 April 2012, supra note 31, paras 32-36. 
57 Ibid., para. 35. 
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What of compliance with the EU Treaties and primary law? This was the question posed by the 
Commission to the CJEU: ‘Is the envisaged Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
compatible with the Treaties and in particular with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union?’ The Commission argued that the flexibility of ACTA is helpful here, rather than problematic: 
‘ACTA provides flexibility, for example through voluntary (‘may’) provisions, sufficiently broad 
language and frequent clauses requiring an implementation only "in accordance with [the] law and 
regulations" of the ACTA parties. Wherever ACTA leaves the Union such flexibility, the Union must 
choose the implementation which is compatible with the Treaties and in particular the Charter’.58 
The Parliament’s Legal Service opinion agreed with this assessment, finding that ACTA does not 
impose any obligations that are incompatible with EU fundamental rights. Some of the more 
controversial draft clauses in this respect (e.g., the so-called ‘three strikes’ rule) were abandoned 
during negotiations. The criminal enforcement provisions will be implemented by the Member States 
and in so doing they are bound by their own constitutional laws and fundamental rights.  
Certainly there is nothing to prevent the EU from inserting (as it does) due process requirements into 
its own legislation and ensuring that it complies with fundamental rights, but the point made by the 
critics is that these safeguards are not written into ACTA itself, and although there are general 
provisions on due process (Article 6.2) and proportionality (Article 6.3) neither they nor the 
‘fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy’ referred to in Article 
27(2) are fully defined. So, the ACTA may permit such ‘good practice’ but does not require it; it 
requires the adoption of enforcement provisions while failing to specify clearly the concomitant 
safeguards.  
This permissive rather than prescriptive approach to fundamental rights may not be so problematic for 
parties with solid fundamental rights protection in their own domestic constitutional laws, and courts 
who would not hesitate to accord priority to those rights when assessing the implementation of an 
international obligation.59 But not all states have such protection and this raises broader questions over 
the use of international treaties to regulate at a global level, especially where the regulation concerns 
the liability of individuals.  
 
5.  The ACTA and Global Governance of IPR  
How is the ACTA related to the EU’s policy on international IPR enforcement? The argument that 
bilateral agreements have paved the way for the ACTA is probably more demonstrable in the case of 
recent US PTAs60 than for the EU, since it is only in the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) and the EU-South Korea FTA that substantial IPR chapters have been included (and 
the CARIFORUM states were not ACTA negotiators). Chapter 10 of the EU-South Korean FTA is 
intended to ‘complement and specify the rights and obligations between the Parties under the TRIPS 
Agreement’. It refers to a number of international conventions on IPR, and contains provisions on 
enforcement, including criminal enforcement, which reflect the ACTA. It also goes further than 
ACTA in containing substantive provisions relating to duration of authors’ rights and the scope of 
broadcasting rights, as well as provisions on geographical indications. In such a case, where an FTA 
                                                     
58 Commission summary, see supra note 35.  
59 C.f. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council 
and Commission, supra note 50; C-584/10P Kadi II, judgment of 18 July 2013. 
60 Weatherall, supra note 7, p. 10: several parties to ACTA negotiations have FTAs with the USA (Singapore, Morocco, 
Australia, Korea). Weatherall argues that in the case of Australia, the changes already made to Australian IPR enforcement as 
a result of the US-Australian FTA made it easier to accept the ACTA – and also made it easier to accept a US (as opposed to 
EU) approach to ACTA. 
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partner is a party to ACTA the Commission argued that the ACTA would ‘complement and reinforce’ 
the commitments in the FTA.61 It might also be easier to negotiate an IPR chapter in a future trade 
agreement with countries that have already committed to ACTA (e.g., Singapore). 
On the other hand, for other ACTA parties with whom the EU has an earlier generation FTA with 
limited IPR provisions, such as Morocco and Mexico, the ACTA would have represented a significant 
upgrading of commitment on IPR enforcement.  
Since both the USA and the EU have stressed that the ACTA would not require any change to their 
own domestic laws,62 this does (given the likely parties) raise issues as to its purpose. Countries that 
pose real problems of IPR infringement (such as China63) are perhaps not likely to become parties. 
The EU insists that it will not put pressure on third countries to sign up to ACTA as a condition of 
concluding a FTA (unlike membership of the WTO, which has de facto become a pre-condition for a 
FTA with the EU) nor seek to include accession to ACTA as a commitment in the FTA itself (unlike, 
for example, the WIPO Copyright Treaty or the Berne Convention64).65 However it might be possible 
to persuade countries that are not parties to the ACTA that it represents a new ‘global standard’ which 
could provide a basis for an IPR chapter in a FTA, as a more palatable alternative to using the EU 
acquis as a model. In the Commission’s view, the ACTA will help to establish an agreed minimum – 
more extensive than TRIPS and based on both US and EU regulatory approaches – on which to base 
any further international regulation: 
‘The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) aims to establish a comprehensive international 
framework – a catalogue of ‘best practices’ – that will assist its members to effectively combat the 
infringement of IPRs. When agreed and implemented, ACTA will effectively introduce a new 
international standard, building on the WTO TRIPS agreement’.66 
Thus, one view would present an IPR enforcement ratchet working through a cycle of bilateral – 
multilateral/plurilateral (TRIPS then ACTA) – bilateral agreements.67 Not only might the ACTA 
support the inclusion of IPR enforcement in new bilateral FTAs, it might also, as a plurilateral 
agreement, help progress towards a multilateral agreement that would bind more countries, including 
those that are the major sources of counterfeit goods.68 
The ACTA may be innovative in providing a framework of international rules on enforcement of IPR 
but it suffers from a number of weaknesses.  
First, its flexibility and its number of optional (‘may’ as opposed to ‘shall’) provisions. The 
Commission argued that these represent a ‘catalogue of best practices’, however as already mentioned 
                                                     
61 Answer given by De Gucht on behalf of the Commission to Question E-6187/10 by Elisabeth Köstinger, 15 Sept. 2010. 
62 As we have seen the EU argues that the ACTA is already fully implemented by current EU legislation. The US has put 
some stress on Art. 2.1 of ACTA whereby ‘Each Party shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of this Agreement within its own legal system and practice’, arguing that this allows the US to continue to apply 
existing domestic exceptions and limitations to IPR enforcement. 
63 In 2010, 85% of all IPR infringing articles detained by EU customs came from China: Opinion of the Committee on 
International Trade for the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights (COM(2011) 285 – 
C7-0139/2011 – 2011/0137(COD)), 30 January 2012. 
64 For example see EU-Albania SAA, Art. 73 and Annex V; EU-CARIFORUM EPA, Articles 143.1 and 147.1. 
65 Answer given by De Gucht on behalf of the Commission, 31 March 2011 to Question E-1654/2011 by David Martin. See 
also Commission’s reply to the Academics’ Opinion on this point relating to ‘pressure’, supra note 32. 
66 COM(2010) 612 final, supra note 5, p. 14. 
67 Weatherill, supra note 7, p. 9. 
68 Weatherall, supra note 7, p. 15. 
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they also make it possible to envisage an implementation of ACTA which does not give adequate 
protection to fundamental rights, insofar as these are not embedded in the agreement itself.  
Second, at least for the US and the EU, the ACTA does not ‘ratchet up’ IPR protection – Weatherall 
argues that the chapter of ACTA on enforcement in the digital environment, which was originally 
drafted by the US and based on its FTA model, was significantly amended to bring it closer to the EU 
model.69 And the EU, as we have seen, was keen to ensure that no change to its own acquis would be 
needed.  
Third, although the EU has proved relatively successful in helping to shape the new rules in such a 
way that they ‘fit’ already-existing EU rules, the ACTA does not really provide innovative solutions to 
the challenges IPR faces de facto from (for example) the digital environment; it does not seek to 
challenge the existing IPR paradigm and was not intended to do so.  
Finally, the ACTA was only agreed to by the EU and a limited group of like-minded states, and its 
reception by the European Parliament means that the possibility of even EU participation has almost 
vanished.   
This last point illustrates a further challenge to pursuing regulatory objectives via international treaties, 
in particular when a large-scale multilateral convention is not feasible. Despite the hope that more 
countries will finally accede to ACTA it was negotiated by a relatively small group; in practice very 
few developing countries took part in shaping an agreement which the Commission hoped would 
become a reference point for good practice and which might become a de facto standard. Plurilateral 
agreements such as the ACTA may represent a choice between (in the case of limited participation) 
preaching to the converted and (where wider participation is sought) exerting pressure on developing 
countries to adopt EU/US approaches to regulation. It is not easy to see a solution to this dilemma. 
And since the procedure for negotiating treaties is not the same as for the adoption of domestic 
legislation, the use of treaties to shape new regulatory norms may give rise to the charge of so-called 
policy laundering. Here we return to the basic procedural complaint of the European Parliament: the 
lack of transparency in the negotiation process and limited possibilities for Parliamentary input. 
  
6.  Transparency in Negotiating Legislative Treaties  
The European Parliament expressed concern during the ACTA negotiations over the lack of 
information on the negotiating text, pointing out that in due course it would need to consent to the 
agreement.70 In its 10 March 2010 Resolution on ACTA the Parliament ‘Deplore[d] the calculated 
choice of the parties not to negotiate through well-established international bodies, such as WIPO and 
WTO, which have established frameworks for public information and consultation’.71 The 
Commission argued that the negotiation of international trade agreements is generally confidential 
since the parties do not wish their negotiating positions to be made public in advance of the final 
result, but that within those constraints it had in fact kept the Parliament informed of the progress of 
negotiations.  
                                                     
69 Weatherall, supra note 7, pp. 17-18, citing Michael Geist, ‘U.S. Caves on Anti-Circumvention Rules in ACTA’, Michael 
Geist Blog (July 19, 2010), available at  
<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5210/125/>. An example would be the definition of ‘technological protection 
measure’ in the anti-circumvention provisions: Article 27.5, supra note 14, as well as the scope of the criminal provisions. 
70 EP resolution of 10 March 2010, supra note 40. See also EP declaration of 9 September 2010 on the lack of a transparent 
process for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and potentially objectionable content, P7_TA(2010)0317.  
71 EP resolution of 10 March 2010, ibid. 
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‘As is frequently the case in such plurilateral trade-related negotiations, the ACTA parties 
have agreed that negotiating documents would only be made public when an unanimous 
decision in that sense is taken by the countries participating in the negotiations. For the 
time being, certain participants to the negotiation remain opposed to disclosing the 
documents, since the text is still under negotiation. Under these circumstances, where 
compromises still have to be found between different countries, and where arbitrations 
still have to be made at country level as to the final position to be taken in the 
negotiations, it is not unusual that negotiations are kept confidential for a certain time’.72     
The Parliament’s Resolution of November 2010 does recognise the efforts that have been made by the 
Commission and the greater transparency of the later stages of negotiation.73 Access to information by 
the Parliament is currently governed by inter-institutional agreement, the Framework Agreement 
between the Parliament and the Commission of October 2010.74 According to this, Parliament is to be 
‘immediately and fully informed at all stages of the negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements’ in sufficient time for it to be able to express its views and for the Commission to take 
them into account, and the Commission and Parliament are to establish procedures and safeguards for 
the transmission of confidential information.75 In cases where Parliamentary consent is required, the 
Parliament is to be given the same information as the Council.76 This reflects Article 218(10) TFEU, 
which provides that ‘The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of 
the [treaty negotiation] procedure’.77  
Transparency affects not only the possibility of access by the Parliament to (for example) a negotiating 
mandate or a draft text, but also access by the general public, private individuals and NGOs. This is 
governed by the EU’s transparency procedures.78 Documents relating to international treaty 
negotiations sent by the Commission to the Parliament are subject to an obligation of non-disclosure 
where ‘disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards … international 
relations’,79 and the Parliament could not make such documents public without consulting the 
Commission, as their source, on the application of that exception.80 Indeed, if the document is 
classified as secret, top secret or confidential, prior consent of its originator would be required.81 
In July 2010 MEP Sophie In ‘t Veld brought an annulment action against the Commission’s refusal to 
grant her full access to the ACTA negotiating documents.82 Her action was partially successful but the 
                                                     
72 Reply by Commissioner De Gucht on behalf of the Commission to Written Question E-0147/10 by Alexander Alvaro 
(ALDE); see also ‘Transparency of ACTA Negotiations’, MEMO 12/99, 13 February 2012. 
73 EP resolution of 24 November 2010 on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), P7_TA(2010)0432. 
74 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, 20 October 2010, 
P7_TA(2010)0366; paras. 23-27 and Annex 3 deal with international negotiations; Annex 2 deals with Parliamentary access 
to classified information. 
75 Ibid., paras. 23-24. 
76 Ibid., Annex 3, para. 5. 
77 Given that the former Inter-institutional Agreement of 2001 (OJ 2001 C 121/122) also contained provision for the 
Parliament to be kept informed during negotiations, it might also be said that that the Article 218(10) TFEU is a reflection of 
that practice. 
78 Article 15(3) TFEU; Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents OJ 2001 L 145/43; for the Commission’s proposal to amend this Regulation see COM(2011) 137. 
79 Regulation 1049/2001, ibid., Art. 4(1)(a). 
80 Ibid., Art. 4(4). 
81 Ibid., Art. 9. 
82 Case T-301/10 In ‘t Veld v Commission judgment 19 March 2013. In an earlier case T-529/09 In ‘t Veld v. Council, 
judgment 4 May 2012, concerning the negotiation of the EU-US ‘SWIFT’ agreement and brought under Regulation 
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Court generally supported the Commission argument that public disclosure of negotiating positions 
and discussions during a negotiation would compromise the EU’s position and be contrary to its 
interests. The Court argued that even if a treaty negotiation could be assimilated to a legislative 
process, this does not preclude the application of the exception to transparency based on the public 
interest in the effective conduct of international relations. The Court also stated: 
‘That the conduct of negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement falls, in 
principle, within the domain of the executive … and that those negotiations do not in any 
way prejudice the public debate that may develop once the international agreement is 
signed, in the context of the ratification procedure.’83 
The 2010 inter-institutional agreement and these cases on Regulation 1049/2001 clarify somewhat the 
position of the Parliament in international negotiations but do not make it easy to have a full public 
debate on draft texts or on the EU’s negotiating position. In any event, the efforts made by the 
Commission in 2010 and 2011 in the case of the ACTA did not convince the Parliament.  In April 
2012 David Martin, rapporteur to the Parliament’s International Trade (INTA) Committee, 
recommended that the ACTA should not be accepted by the Parliament as it stands,84 and the INTA 
committee – being the lead Parliamentary committee for this issue – voted in June 2012 to reject the 
agreement,85 four other Parliamentary committees (industry,86 civil liberties,87 development88 and 
legal affairs89) having also recommended rejection. Despite suggestions from the Commission that the 
Parliament should wait for the Court’s opinion (requested in May 2012) before voting definitively, the 
proposal to conclude the ACTA was rejected in a plenary vote on 4 July 2012.90  
Immediately after the vote, EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht, while accepting the Parliament’s 
choice and welcoming the debate created by the ACTA, said that the Court’s opinion was still 
important: ‘European citizens have raised these concerns and now they have the right to receive 
answers. We must respect that right.’ Once the Court’s opinion has been given, he said, the 
Commission would consult with its international partners on how to move forward. However the 
INTA Committee rapporteur said that he did not understand the Commission’s proposal to return to 
the Parliament after the Court has given its opinion: ‘if you're against ACTA, there is no point waiting 
for the ruling, because no matter what the court says, your position doesn't change. … No assurances 
the Commission could give to the Parliament would change a legal text’.91 Indeed, as already noted, in 
December 2012 the Commission withdrew its request for an opinion on the agreement. This is not the 
first time that the Parliament has refused its consent to an international agreement, but a plurilateral 
(Contd.)                                                                  
1049/2001 on public access to documents, the General Court granted access to an opinion of the legal service except insofar 
as the opinion revealed the possible content of the proposed agreement or the negotiating mandate of the Council. The 
Council has appealed (C-350/12P). 
83 Case T-301/10, para. 181. 
84 See supra note 49. 
85 Recommendation of the Committee on International Trade, EP doc. 2011/0167(NLE), PE 486.174v03-00, 22 June 2012. 
86 EP doc. PE483.518v02-00, 5 June 2012. 
87 EP doc. PE 480.574v02-00 4 June 2012. 
88 EP doc. PE478.666v03-00, 5 June 2012. 
89 The draft opinion of rapporteur for the legal affairs committee recommended acceptance (PE 487.684v01-00, 
JURI_PA(2012)487684, 10 April 2012) but the committee voted against approval: EP doc. PE487.684v02-00, 4 June 2012. 
90 See supra note 28. 
91 Interview with David Martin, available at  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20120220FCS38611/>. 
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agreement such as ACTA is harder to re-negotiate than a bilateral agreement.92 In practice it appears 
that any possibility of the EU concluding the ACTA has disappeared, and with it, probably, any 
possibility of the ACTA coming into force. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
The EU seeks to ensure that its trade policy supports EU exporters of goods and services, and that 
internal regulatory policy does not put EU enterprises at a disadvantage on third country markets. 
These goals have led to an emphasis on extending the regulatory dimension of trade agreements, on 
regulatory cooperation, the promotion of existing international standards, and EU leadership in 
developing new international standards which are at least consistent with EU standards. The EU’s 
involvement in the negotiation of the ACTA is an example of such leadership. The EU, identifying 
weaknesses in IPR enforcement as a major problem for EU exporters and IP rights-holders, was keen 
to get an agreement which would build upon the TRIPS. At the same time it saw the need to ensure 
that the concerns of developing countries, especially over patents and imports of generic medicines, 
were addressed (whether they have been adequately reflected in the final text is one of the issues still 
subject to debate). The EU was also keen to ensure that the agreement would follow as closely as 
possible existing EU legislation on enforcement, and would not interfere with accepted EU exceptions, 
although it did not see the need to ensure that EU ‘best practice’ was incorporated in the form of 
binding commitments in the agreement itself: both the EU and the US preferred an agreement which 
would give them flexibility to maintain their own existing approaches.  
Despite the existence of potential external competence over the criminal enforcement provisions of 
ACTA, in the absence of internal EU criminal enforcement legislation it was decided to conclude 
ACTA as a mixed agreement. The EU finds it easier to exercise its external regulatory competence 
where it has already worked out a position at the internal level, and once that position has been worked 
out, it will have an incentive not to engage in international commitments which represent a significant 
departure from the policy balance achieved internally. Indeed the Parliament’s INTA Committee 
rapporteur suggested that the Commission should bring forward new legislative proposals to meet the 
challenge of ensuring effective IPR protection and its balance with fundamental rights: an ‘internal’ 
regulatory approach as an alternative – or at least a precursor – to external action.93  
Despite efforts to ensure that ACTA not only complied with EU primary law but also would not 
require changes to the existing internal acquis, Parliament rejected the final outcome. The history of 
ACTA, with its many specificities, demonstrates some of the questions raised by the new generation 
of international agreements that are essentially legislative in character.  
First, within the EU’s internal decision-making mechanisms Parliamentary consent ‘parallels’, but is a 
blunt instrument compared to, the ordinary legislative procedure. In a consent procedure, with its ‘take 
it or leave it’ dynamic, and even where Parliament is kept informed, there is less scope for debate and 
adjustment or the accommodation of different interests; this has already taken place at the international 
level and is difficult to replicate within the EU.  
                                                     
92 In February 2010 the Parliament refused its consent to the EU-US Agreement on the transfer of financial messaging data 
(the so-called SWIFT Agreement); following re-negotiation a revised agreement was approved by the Parliament in July 
2010; see further J. Monar, ‘The Rejection of the EU-US SWIFT Interim Agreement by the European Parliament – A 
Historic Vote and its Implications’, 15 European Law Rev. 2010, 143; M. Cremona, ‘Justice and Home Affairs in a 
Globalised World: Ambitions and Reality in the tale of the EU-US SWIFT Agreement’, Austrian Academy of Sciences 
Institute for European Integration Research, Working Paper 04/2011. 
93 See supra note 49. 
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Second, although in some cases there will be room for internal debate at the implementation stage, 
ACTA was presented as establishing regulatory goals while permitting but not requiring adherence to 
good practice in terms of due process and fundamental rights. In such a context it is instructive that the 
dissent to ACTA within the EU was founded in part on its possible implications for non-EU 
jurisdictions as well as the risks of differential implementation within the EU and different 
understandings of what it requires. To what extent, if at all, should such regulatory treaties make 
explicit reference to international human rights standards?  
Thirdly, ACTA raises the issue of promoting to third countries regulation (in casu, criminal 
enforcement) which has not been agreed internally within EU structures.94 Conclusion as a mixed 
agreement might quieten concerns within the EU that an international treaty is being used as a basis 
for ‘competence creep’, but may not alter a perception that the EU is involved in designing regulation 
intended to apply to others and not itself.  
Some of the issues raised here are structurally embedded in the EU’s external decision-making 
processes (the operation of the Parliamentary consent procedure); some offer an example of the 
challenges faced by the EU as an international negotiator balancing Union interest and internal 
constitutional dynamics; and some reflect the broader concern over the legitimacy of regulating 
through international treaty-making. Nicolaïdis, for example, in referring to the indirect legitimacy of 
global governance which may be provided by national democracy and domestic politics, reminds us 
also of the limits to this indirect form of legitimacy: ‘in the end … it fails to capture the collective 
imagination of citizen and civil society actors who do not trust politicians to hold a monopoly over 
legitimate transnational deal-making’.95 The EU’s external regulatory policy, even where exercised 
through its trade competence, needs to be shaped by broadly-based debate. Scholars may appreciate 
the complexity and – sometimes – the elegance of the EU’s brand of multi-level law-making which 
allows the EU and its Member States to retain involvement in regulatory choices. But for the EU, 
seeking to become a leader in the design of international regulation, the indirect legitimacy that may 
be derived from national democratic institutions is rendered even less intelligible to its citizens when 
refracted through the EU’s own multi-layered decision-making system. 
 
                                                     
94 C.f. C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden [2010] ECR I-03317. 
95 K. Nicolaïdis, ‘Towards Responsible Interdependence’ in M. Poiares Maduro (ed.), ‘An EU Agenda for Global 
Governance’, RSCAS Policy Papers 2011/01. 
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Regulatory Cooperation in Transatlantic Trade Relations 
 
Tamara Takács 
 
1.  Introduction  
Regulatory differences have long been at the heart of and impacted EU-US economic relations.  On various 
occasions since the early 2000 they even cumulated in full-fledged litigation before the World Trade 
Organization’s dispute settlement forums.1 Amongst those differences that led to formal WTO litigation, 
the Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) authorised the US to impose trade sanctions to retaliate against the 
ban that the EU – for the health of its citizens – had introduced in 1988 on imports of beef treated with 
certain growth-promoting hormones. The more recent GMO dispute has still to date not been resolved, 
despite the WTO panel’s finding in 2006 that the stringent EU measures had not been based on risk 
assessments satisfying the definition of the SPS Agreement and hence could be presumed to be maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence. While the EU and the US take pride in the fact that only 2% of their 
trade is involved with actual litigation in Geneva, the clashes stemming from trade irritants have strained 
their trade relations, brought up seemingly irreconcilable differences, and their respective retaliations have 
been viewed as ‘mini trade wars’.2 
Disputes emerging from such regulatory differences characterised as non-tariff barriers to trade can be 
regarded as ‘new-style disputes’ as they go beyond ‘classical’ trade confrontations stemming from tariffs, 
subsidies and dumping and involve domestic laws adopted for legitimate purposes after democratic 
deliberation.3 These disputes are especially hard to resolve, because they involve wider issues of political 
concern or public interest, unlike traditional protectionist trade measures.4 Indeed, barriers resulting from 
regulatory policies have long been recognised as the ‘most significant impediment’ to trade and investment 
between the EU and the US.5  
Regulatory cooperation is ‘an umbrella concept that incorporates a broad range of activities. At the end of 
the spectrum are information exchanges and dialogues among regulators that are designed to build trust and 
confidence. At the other end of the spectrum are activities designed to harmonise regulatory approaches 
through acceptance of common principles and standards. In between are activities that involve varying 
degrees of intrusion into the autonomy of regulators.’6 Regulatory cooperation is aimed at divergent ways 
of regulating markets for both goods and services. The most serious barriers can take the form of redundant 
standards, testing, and certification procedures, requiring re-labelling, re-packaging or re-testing of 
products or services and creating additional costs associated with complying with two different sets of 
regulations and standards. While the purpose of many regulations is to protect consumers and the 
                                                     
1 Dispute DS26 European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones); Dispute DS291 
European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products; Dispute DS389 European 
Communities — Certain Measures Affecting Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United States. 
2 F. Breuss, ‘Economic integration, EU-US trade conflicts and WTO Dispute settlement’, 9 European Integration Online 
Papers (2005), at p. 2, available at <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005-012.pdf>. 
3 M. D. C. Johnson, ‘US-EU trade disputes: their causes resolution and prevention’, European University Institute (2001), at 
p. 4, available at  
<http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Transatlantic/Johnson.pdf>. 
4 Ibid. 
5 European Commission, ‘EU-USA Regulatory Cooperation’, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/regulatory-cooperation/>. 
6 R. J. Ahearn, ‘Transatlantic regulatory cooperation: background and analysis’, CRS Report RL34717, (24 August 2009), at 
p. 2, available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/64460.pdf>. 
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environment, divergent domestic regulations and standards can affect the competitive position of firms as 
well as many economic activities and sectors.  
The transatlantic economy is regarded as the world’s most integrated economic relationship due to the 
remarkable extent of mutual investment relations, their economies account together for about half the entire 
world GDP and for nearly a third of world trade flows.7 Despite such high rate of integration within the 
transatlantic market, differences in regulatory approaches, standards, and philosophies have been identified 
to militate against the development of an even tighter and more integrated marketplace. Efforts aiming at 
the reduction of such regulatory differences have been at the centre of transatlantic economic cooperation, 
and addressed by various means and dialogues resulting in varying success. Creating stronger convergence 
in regulation is more actual and opportune than ever now that the economic crisis and its negative impact 
on both sides of the Atlantic directed focus on maximising bilateral trade (and investment) to spur growth 
and create jobs. Serious efforts have been exerted on both sides of the Atlantic to expand market access and 
trade liberalisation with respective bilateral and regional trade partners.8 Most recently, creating regulatory 
coherence and cooperation negotiations have been referred to as the ‘crown jewel’ of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (‘TTIP’) negotiations.9 In  addition, the EU’s Trade Policy Strategy 2020 
incorporates as an explicit objective the intensification of relations with its most important trade partners 
(such as the US) for market access that goes beyond elimination of (already low) tariffs and regulatory 
convergence through mutual recognition, harmonisation, equivalence and introduction of international 
standards.10 
 
2. Bridging Regulatory Gaps in Transatlantic Trade Relations: Why So Difficult? Why So 
Important? 
When one looks at the long-lasting trade disputes that ended up before the WTO dispute settlement forums, 
and the fact that none of them have resulted in actual compliance with the WTO rulebook (the Beef 
hormones case was solved by a trade liberalising compromise,11 and the GMO dispute has still not received 
satisfactory resolution) it is apparent that the WTO dispute resolution system does not achieve regulatory 
convergence in every case, and bilateral regulatory policy coordination can thus be a useful mechanism to 
resolve such differences. These bilateral disputes involve clashes between domestic priorities, larger 
societal values and public preferences and interests favouring domestic regulation in the absence of 
international standards, which render dispute resolution all the more difficult.12 Apart from clashes in 
public opinion, regulatory divergence can also stem from lack of coordination between regulators following 
existing legislation, which can at times be hard to change. At the centre of a highly politicised regulatory 
                                                     
7 European Commission, ‘Countries and Regions – United States’, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/united-states/>. 
8 See the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations (US) and for the status of the various negotiations by the EU, the 
European Commission Memo on ‘The EU's bilateral trade and investment agreements – where are we?’ 1 August 2013, 
available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150129.pdf>. See further F. Hoffmeister in this 
volume. 
9 See interview with João Vale de Almeida, Head of the EU Delegation to the United States, on TTIP, 7 September 2013, 
available at <http://cepa.org/content/insider-view-head-delegation-eu-united-states-ambassador-jo%C3%A3o-vale-de-
almeida>. 
10 ‘Trade, growth and world affairs - Trade policy as a core component in the EU’s 2020 Strategy’, COM (2010) 612, 
available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146955.pdf>. 
11 ‘USTR Announces Agreement with European Union in Beef Hormones dispute’, available at <http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2009/may/ustr-announces-agreement-european-union-beef-hormones->. 
12 R. J. Ahearn, ‘U.S. – European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges’, CRS Report, (17 March, 2006), 
available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/64460.pdf>. 
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policy (which has resulted in trade clashes relating to agricultural products such as the Beef Hormones and 
the GMO disputes, the ongoing Poultry dispute and the recently arisen ractophamine-fed pork spat), is the 
US approach, a relatively science-based system of risk management adopting regulation only in case of 
identified risk  ― in contrast to the EU’s precautionary principle,13 allowing for regulation before a danger 
has scientifically been proved to exist but where there are reasonable grounds for concern as to the risk of 
harm. While EU regulators prefer a precautionary approach leading to more stringent risk regulation, US 
officials tend to engage in science-based, cost-benefit analysis strategies that are widely supported by 
farmers and industries.14 As a result, the ‘sensitive political balance’ between legitimate public policy 
choices and regulatory autonomy on the one hand and on the other market access prescribed by trade 
liberalisation has on multiple occasions strained transatlantic economic relations.15  
The rationale of regulatory cooperation therefore, would be to minimise divergences, or achieve mutual 
acceptance of divergences and reduce necessary regulatory burdens so as to facilitate trade and minimise 
trade frictions, while respecting the regulatory autonomy of each party. While the trade disputes already 
mentioned are often politically-charged their significant economic impact on exporters has been noted, and 
studies have found that eliminating NTBs would not only imply a reduction of costs for business but would 
also lead to an overall increase in GDP, the volume of exports and the national income. A study 
commissioned by the EU in 2009 indicated that eliminating even half of the non-tariff barriers to trade 
caused by regulatory divergences could increase transatlantic GDP by half a per cent, or by $150 billion.16 
A more recent economic impact assessment report noted that reducing non-tariff barriers is a crucial driver 
of the negotiations toward a comprehensive TTIP, and could amount to as much as 80% of the total 
potential gains of such a trade and investment deal.17 Thus regulatory issues going beyond classical market 
access liberalisation in the form of abolishing duties, carry the highest potential benefit in the trade 
negotiations. Beyond the impact of NTB elimination on the respective trade partners, i.e., the EU and the 
US, regulatory convergence in the form of harmonised standards and norms would help the transatlantic 
axis appear as a ‘common normative power vis-à-vis third countries, in particular China’18  and other rising 
economic powers, and would contribute to the improvement of the multilateral trade system. 
Domestically, in the US, an additional (political) pressure was exerted by the reconstituted Administrative 
Conference of the United States (ACUS), which in December 2011 adopted a new recommendation on 
international regulatory cooperation (Recommendation 2011-6),19 updating its 1991 recommendation on 
this subject, on the general premise that the predicates for international regulatory cooperation have only 
                                                     
13 The precautionary principle is to be relied upon when ‘scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain and 
where there are indications that the possible effects on the environment, or human, animal or plant health may be potentially 
dangerous and inconsistent with the chosen level of protection.’ See ‘Communication from the Commission on the 
Precautionary principle’, COM(2000) 1 final . 
14 D. Vogel, The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), cited by  S. I. Akhtar and V.C. Jones ‘Proposed Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP): In brief’, 23 July 2013, Congressional Research Service, (23 July 2013), at p.7, available at 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43158.pdf>. 
15 See M.A Pollack, ‘The Political Economy of Transatlantic Trade Disputes’, in E.-U. Petersmann and M.A. Pollack (eds.) 
Transatlantic Economic Disputes, The EU, the US and the WTO (Oxford: OUP, 2003) pp. 65-118. 
16 ‘Non-tariff measures in EU-US trade and investment – An economic analysis’, Final report by ECORYS, (11 December 
2009), available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/december/tradoc_145614.pdf>. 
17 European Commission, ‘Transatlantic trade and investment – the economic assessment explained’, (September 2013), 
available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151787.pdf>. 
18 European Council of Foreign Relations, ‘European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010/2011’, available at 
<http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2010/usa/30>. 
19 Administrative Conference Recommendation 2011-6, ‘International Regulatory Cooperation’ adopted 8 December 2011, 
available at <http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation%202011-
6%20%28International%20Regulatory%20Cooperation%29.pdf>. 
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grown more robust and complex over the past 20 years.  Among other things, the new ACUS 
recommendation encourages the executive office of the President to ‘consider creating a high-level 
interagency working group of agency heads and other senior officials to provide government-wide 
leadership on, and to evaluate and promote, international regulatory cooperation.’ As a result, in May 2012, 
President Obama issued a new executive order endorsing much of the contents of Recommendation 2011-6, 
and its goal of regulatory harmonisation (especially to promote trade and competitiveness) consistent with 
federal agencies’ domestic missions (especially to protect health, safety, and the environment) with the 
ultimate aim ‘to reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements’.20 
Regulatory cooperation has also been noted as the ‘most important element’ in the negotiations for a 
comprehensive TTIP, based on the preparatory work of the High Level Working Group on Growth and 
Jobs, launched in June 2013 and constituting the biggest trade and investment talks ever undertaken. 
However, already in 2012 at the Davos World Economic Forum the former EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson noted that the EU-US deal ‘would have to focus not on tariffs but on very many non-tariff 
barriers, technical specifications, differences in regulation. They are the hardest things to agree and those 
two negotiating partners are the hardest to find an agreement’.21  The difficulty of striking a compromise 
over the stronghold of existing legislation in the most sensitive areas is witnessed by comments such as that 
of the current EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, who noted in relation to regulation in agriculture: 
‘A future deal will not change the existing legislation. Let me repeat: no change.’22 In these circumstances, 
accompanied by added pressure from business organisations toward the removal of market distorting 
elements, tackling regulatory differences will shape the manner in which the EU and US carry on 
transatlantic economic relations.  
As will be shown in this paper, efforts aimed at creating regulatory convergence are not new agenda points 
in EU-US economic relations. Attempts and ambitions directed at this object date back to the mid 1990s 
and since then have featured in discussions among regulators at the executive level,23 in declarations, action 
points and agreements. While the instruments so far have been without legally binding character, the Court 
of Justice clarified (in relation to the Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency from 2002 – 
see section 3.2) that negotiations and adoption of instruments of regulatory cooperation between the EU 
and the US have to respect underlying principles of division of powers and institutional balance, as 
determined for common commercial policy, and be supported by the adequate legal basis for competence to 
negotiate and adoption.24 Currently, working towards regulatory cooperation between the EU and US 
constitutes the most important cornerstone of the ongoing TTIP negotiations.  
The paper gives an overview of the efforts aimed at creating compatible regulatory requirements or 
comparable policy responses by the EU and US as trading partners (3); discusses the role and status of 
regulatory cooperation in the ongoing TTIP negotiations so far (4); and outlines options and their 
implications so as to bridge regulatory differences (5).  
                                                     
20 The White House President Barack Obama, Executive order ‘Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation’, available 
at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/executive-order-promoting-international-regulatory-
cooperation>. 
21 T. Vogel, ‘Crisis leads to push for transatlantic trade’, European Voice (6 May 2012). 
22 D. Butler and D. Melvin, ‘New EU-US talks threatened by agriculture spats’, 23 March 2013, available at 
<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/agriculture-disputes-threaten-new-us-eu-talks>.  
23 The governance-side of transatlantic regulatory cooperation, including a lengthier overview of forums of dialogue and 
stakeholder participation is discussed in an extended version of this paper in T. Takács, ‘Transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
in trade: objectives, challenges and instruments of economic governance’, in D. Curtin and E. Fahey (eds), A Transatlantic 
Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US legal orders (Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming). 
24 ECJ, Case C-233/02 France v Commission [2004] ECR I-2759 para. 40.  
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3.  Overview of Methods and Extent of Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation   
As has been noted, regulatory cooperation can take various forms and expand from mutual recognition to 
using common data sets, dialogues, information sharing, recognising common testing procedures, common 
labelling or product information, joint compliance and enforcement, referencing and developing common 
standards, joint regulatory development plans, and harmonisation. These methods allow for a differing 
extent of engagement between regulators, and a varying level of interference in domestic regulatory 
autonomy so as to remove existing, and prevent new market access diverting elements. In light of the 
remarkable volume of transatlantic trade and its economic significance for both parties, a number of 
initiatives have been developed representing various forms of regulatory cooperation. 
 
3.1.  Early Initiatives 
Transatlantic initiatives in trade and economic issues began in the 1980’s with declarations of good intent 
that led to the Transatlantic Declaration in 1990.25 The initial impetus for a transatlantic dialogue on 
regulatory standards was the intensive domestic harmonisation process that the establishment of the EU’s 
Internal Market entailed, and the concomitant concerns of US exporters as regards anticipated market 
access impediments and competitive disadvantages in the face of aligned EU standards.26 The subsequent 
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) (1995) aimed to reinvigorate and upgrade the bilateral relationship, 
foster transatlantic bilateral economic relations in the form of a New Transatlantic Marketplace and work 
towards the expansion of world trade, albeit without specific commitments and deadlines and thus with no 
political or legal force. Part of the NTA, a joint declaration adopted at the 1995 Madrid Summit, added 
political support for strengthened regulatory cooperation, in particular by encouraging regulatory agencies 
to give high priority to cooperation with their respective transatlantic counterparts, so as to address 
technical and non-tariff barriers to trade resulting from divergent regulatory processes, and by conclusion 
of mutual recognition of conformity assessment  (including certification and testing procedures) for certain 
sectors as soon as possible.27  
The Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) was agreed in 1998 with the aim of furthering bilateral 
economic and trade relations. The TEP included a call for action to address technical barriers to trade in 
goods,28 including an ‘ambitious programme of regulatory cooperation designed to reconcile, if not 
eliminate, regulatory barriers to trade’,29 and cooperation among regulators to intensify economic ties and 
approach trade irritants, alongside the traditional process of trade negotiations and dispute resolution.30  
 
 
                                                     
25 The Transatlantic Declaration of 22 November 1990 states that the European Community and the United States ‘will 
inform and consult each other on important matters of common interest, both political and economic, with a view to bringing 
their position as close as possible, without prejudice to their respective independence’ Bulletin of the European Communities, 
23 (11), point 1.5.3 (1990) Official title: Declaration on Relations between the European Economic Community and the 
United States. 
26 R. J. Ahearn, supra note 12, at p. 5.  
27 EC Delegation to the US, New Transatlantic Agenda, 3 December 1995, EC-US Summit, Madrid. 
28 European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry – International Affairs, ‘EU-US Regulatory Cooperation’, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/regulatory-cooperation/index_en.htm>. 
29 M. Pollack, ‘The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections on an Experiment in International Governance’, 43(5) 
JCMS 2005, pp. 899-919 at p. 907. 
30 See G. Shaffer and M. Pollack, ‘The Future of Transatlantic Economic Relations: Continuity Amid Discord’, in.  D. 
Andrews et al. (eds.), The Future of Transatlantic Economic Relations: Continuity Amid Discord, (EUI – RSCAS 2005 this 
is the date in the website), pp. 3-9.    
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3.2.  Consultation, Dialogue and ‘Early Warming’ Mechanisms between Regulators 
Following the EU-US Summit in Bonn in 1999 a Joint Statement on Early Warning and Problem 
Prevention Mechanism was adopted. This framework included an early warning system so as to help avoid 
non-tariff barriers to trade by identifying regulations that might result in a trade irritant, preferably at an 
early stage of the regulation drafting process.  However, the subsequent emergence of disputes indicates 
that this coordination was insufficient to prevent trade irritants and rows. This was apparent with the 
instigation of the GMO dispute at the WTO in 2006, as biotechnology was exactly one of the areas where 
structured dialogue among regulators had been initiated already in 2000, within the Consultative forum on 
Biotechnology, with the aim of gradual convergence of regulatory standards and prevention of trade 
disputes.  
Consecutive consultation-oriented initiatives still lacked actual political commitment, set deadlines, and 
binding goals. Adopted at the 2002 EU-US Summit, the Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and 
Transparency encouraged dialogue between EU and US regulators and agencies in government-to-
government consultations on a voluntary basis in the form of regular consultation, exchange of date and 
information, as well informing one another at an early stage on planned new regulation, so as to enhance 
cooperation between regulators. In the absence of legal binding force, the primary function of the 
Guidelines is to ‘enshrine political commitment to dialogue between EU and US regulators’, though so far 
‘little effort has been made to implement them’.31 Despite the regulatory cooperation commitments and 
especially the mutually accepted early warning system, legislations introduced unilaterally by both the EU 
and the US creating further divergence. The EU adopted the REACH Directive32 without meaningful 
dialogue with US stakeholders (despite the obvious impact the legislation has for the testing and approval 
of chemicals) and the US adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the reform of public accounting standards 
‘without taking into account EU views’.33 Both these regulatory actions created an important barrier to 
commerce. In addition it has been noted that, in parallel with the initiatives directed at regulatory 
cooperation, European standards have become more stringent and comprehensive than US standards. The 
standards for the approval and labelling of genetically modified foods and seeds, for example, are far more 
stringent than in the US, and the REACH Directive made the European standards for the approval of 
existing and new chemical much more demanding than in the US. Another important and recent example is 
the EU legislation to impose restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions announced in 2008, and to levy 
emission-charges on all flights in or out of EU airports. This move has opened a highly contentious chapter 
in EU-US relations.34 
 
                                                     
31 A. Meuwese, ‘EU-US horizontal regulatory cooperation: Mutual recognition of impact assessment’, in. D. Vogel and J. 
Swinnen (eds.) Transatlantic regulatory cooperation: the shifting roles of the EU, the US and California (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) pp. 249-264, at p.255. 
32 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, 
OJ [2006] L 396, 30.12.2006. 
33 R. J. Ahearn, supra 12, at p. 19. 
34 Altough the EU offered to make concessions, in the form of suspending the application of the measure for a year, President 
Obama signed a bill in November 2012 shielding US airlines from complying with the EU’s emission system in the aviation 
sector. See ‘Obama shields US airlines from EU’s carbon scheme’, EurActiv (28 November 2012), available at 
<http://www.euractiv.com/transport/obama-shields-us-airlines-eu-car-news-516299>. For more information on the 
worldwide reception – including by the US – see S. Huber, ‘The EU, international aviation and climate change – a case study 
for the EU as a global role model?’, in W. Douma and S. van der Velde, EU environmental norms and third countries: the 
EU as a global role model?’ 5 CLEER Working Papers (2013), pp. 83-93 available at 
<http://www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?site_id=26&level1=14467&level2=14468>. 
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3.3.  Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) 
Going beyond regulatory dialogue and consultation, mutual recognition agreements are methods of 
regulatory cooperation and can entail either the recognition of conformity assessment certification 
(certification tests) or the mutual recognition of relevant standards. Recognition of conformity assessment 
certification does not involve harmonisation and aligning of substantive standards, but is limited only to the 
recognition of each other’s testing and certification of production processes, so that the product needs only 
be tested once. This was exactly the scope of the MRA from 1998 between the EU and US, which was 
called for by the NTA and the regulatory cooperation ambitions laid down therein. The MRA entailed 
recognition of the results of conformity assessment procedures by identified certification bodies in the 
exporting country that could assess the conformity of goods in these sectors with standards in the 
destination country. However, the limited impact of these MRAs shows in the complete lack of legally 
binding, enforceable effect, and their limited scope in terms of sectoral coverage. The Annexes to this 
agreement covered six sectors (telecommunications and ICT equipment, pharmaceuticals, electronics, 
electromagnetic compatibility, sport boats and medical devices), and the regulators of each party are 
required by the conformity assessment procedures to accept the competence of the other party to conduct 
product testing, inspection and certification. While this form of mutual recognition as a method of 
regulatory cooperation can be of considerable significance for market access and is relatively easy to 
implement as – in contrast to recognition of standards - it does not concern the substance of regulation,35 
the implementation of these MRAs have proved problematic in a few sectors. Some of the independent US 
regulatory agencies were slow to implement recognition processes (for example the Food and Drug 
Administration Agency (FDA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) towards 
European laboratories’ certification of pharmaceuticals, medical devices and electrical safety standards.36 
As a result, ‘tensions grew when the USA failed to implement the agreement with respect to three of the 
sectors which were initially of greatest interest to the EU (electrical safety, medical devices and 
pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices)’.37  
While they can be useful tools of regulatory cooperation, the MRAs adopted in these sectors stated that 
they are not to be construed as entailing mutual acceptance of standards or the technical regulations of the 
parties, only the recognition of conformity assessment procedures. The MRAs also contain a provision on 
the preservation of regulatory autonomy stating that ‘nothing [in this Agreement] shall be construed to limit 
the authority of a Party to determine, through its legislative, regulatory and administrative measures, the 
level of protection it considers appropriate for the relevant public policy area’. Among the adopted MRAs, 
one finds safeguard clauses (see Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices Article 21, 1998 MRA) or 
Transitional periods (Medical device Art. 5.), during which the parties engage in confidence-building 
activities for the purpose of obtaining sufficient evidence to make determinations concerning the 
equivalence of Conformity Assessment Bodies of the other party (joint confidence building programme).  
The MRA for Marine equipment (adopted in 2004) went further than the 1998 MRA by providing mutual 
recognition of certificates of conformity for marine equipment, and at the same time promoting global 
harmonisation of technical requirements in the framework of international agreements and organisations in 
which both the EU and the US participated.  Under the terms of this MRA, designated products which 
comply with EU requirements would be accepted for sale in the US without any additional testing or 
certification and vice versa, and the parties’ procedures are regarded as ‘equivalent’ for the purposes of 
                                                     
35 R. von Borries, ‘Transatlantic regulatory initiatives in Europe’, in. G.  A. Bermann et al. (eds.),  
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation Legal Problems and Political Prospects (Oxford: OUP, 2000) pp. 451-465. at p. 460.  
36 M. Pollack, supra note 29, at p. 909. 
37 G. Shaffer: Managing EU-US Trade Relations through Mutual recognition and safe harbour agreements: ‘New’ and 
‘Global’ Approaches to Transatlantic Governance? In E.-U. Petersmann and M.A. Pollack (eds.) Transatlantic Economic 
Disputes, The EU, the US and the WTO (Oxford: OUP, 2003) pp.297-325, at p. 303. 
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assessment conducted by conformity assessment bodies in either country (Articles 3 and 4), where 
equivalence rests on the parties’ legislation being aligned with certain International Maritime Organisation 
Conventions.38 In 2011, a US-EU Bilateral Air Safety Agreement on the regulation of civilian aviation 
safety entered into force, which ‘allows for reciprocal acceptance of findings of compliance and approvals 
issued by each other’s relevant authorities’.39 Most recently, in 2012, two mutual recognition agreements 
were adopted between EU and US regulators with both sides holding high expectations as to their impact in 
reducing barriers to trade. The EU and US Organic Trade partnership and equivalence arrangement 
established mutual recognition of conformity assessment for organic products, eliminating the need to 
obtain separate certifications with reference to two standards and thus lowering red tape and related costs.40 
Through this arrangement, the EU and USA agreed on a mutual recognition of their respective Organic 
Standards legislation, the EU Regulation 834/2007 and the Organic Foods Production Act. The ‘Trusted 
traders’ MRA authorised economic operators, whose certification will now be recognised by both parties 
thereby allowing these companies to benefit from faster controls and reduced administration for customs 
clearance. Under this agreement the EU and the US recognise each other’s security-certified operators. 
Authorised economic operators in the EU will receive benefits when exporting to the US market, and the 
EU will reciprocate for certified members of the US Customs-Trade Partnership against terrorism (C-
TPAT).41 
 
3.4.  Horizontal Regulatory Initiatives for Alignment of Regulatory Approaches, Methods 
Another form of cooperation so as to establish regulatory compatibility lies in horizontal, methodological 
initiatives focusing on the how of regulation and seeking convergence between regulatory actions. At the 
June 2005 EU-US Summit, the United States and European Commission issued the Roadmap for EU-US 
Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency to provide a framework for cooperation on a broad range of 
important horizontal (and sector-specific) areas.42 Under this ongoing multi-year initiative, US and 
European authorities aim to build effective mechanisms to promote better quality regulation and minimise 
unnecessary regulatory divergences so as to facilitate transatlantic trade and investment and increase 
consumer confidence in the transatlantic market. This Roadmap set a framework for specific regulatory 
activities in 15 sectors.43 Regulatory cooperation featured as the main objective of transatlantic co-
operation in the Communication on A Stronger EU-US Partnership and a More Open Market for the 21st 
Century in 2005, suggesting a reinforced approach to regulatory policy cooperation.44 In the same year, the 
EU-US Declaration ‘Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration and Growth’ promoted 
regulatory cooperation and standards by identifying cooperation and coordination mechanisms in order to 
                                                     
38 Ibid., at p. 306. (Shaffer notes the pre-existing harmonisation of standards in this sector under the International Maritime 
Organization, which allowed for mutual recognition of ‘equivalence’ of each other’s standards). 
39 S. I. Akhtar and V. C. Jones, supra note 14, at p. 7. 
40 Formal letters creating this partnership were signed on 15 February 2012, available at 
<http://www.fas.usda.gov/organictrade/Agreement.pdf>. 
41 European Commission Press Release, ‘Customs: EU and USA agree to recognise each other's "trusted traders"’, available 
at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-449_en.htm>. 
42 Office of the US Trade Representative, ‘2005 Roadmap for EU-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency’ available 
at 
<http://www.ustr.gov/archive/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Europe/US_EU_Regulatory_Cooperation/2005_Roadma
p_for_EU-US_Regulatory_Cooperation_Transparency.html>. 
43 Pharmaceuticals, automobile safety, ICT standards in regulations, Cosmetics, consumer product safety, unfair commercial 
practices, nutritional labelling, food safety, marine equipment, eco-design, chemicals, energy efficiency, telecommunications 
and radio communications equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, medical devices. 
44 Commission’s Communication on ‘A Stronger EU-US Partnership and a More Open Market for the 21st Century’, 
available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/may/tradoc_123438.pdf>. 
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improve regulatory quality and reduce divergences; exchanges of experience and the sharing of knowledge 
are encouraged through a high-level dialogue in accordance with the roadmap for EU-US regulatory 
cooperation.45 Formal dialogue on horizontal regulatory issues is conducted in the frame of the High Level 
Regulatory Cooperation Forum, set up by the EU-US summit in 2005, bringing together senior officials of 
both parties from all areas of the government to discuss regulatory policy matters of mutual interest. The 
Forum is co-chaired by the Director-General of the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry on the 
EU side and the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of 
Management and Budget on the US side. The Forum ‘lends senior-level support and visibility to the 
concrete activities of informal dialogue’46 and as a more institutionalised dialogue on good regulatory 
practices aims to improve the quality of regulation on both sides, through sharing best practices such as risk 
and impact assessments, and techniques designed to reduce the costs to business and consumers arising 
from unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The EU-US Regulatory Cooperation Best 
Cooperative Practices in 2006 distilled a set of suggested best practices to complement the EU-US 
Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency as a guide for regulators to use in cooperative 
approaches or informally.47 
Morall points out that ‘a review of the regular progress reports on the roadmap sectors [Roadmap for EU-
US Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency] issued between 2005 and 2008 finds the reports mostly 
speaking in terms of the “enhanced” dialogue, “expanded” information exchanges and “deepening” 
collaboration. By 2008, despite monthly meetings held by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative with 
the regulatory agencies with roadmap responsibilities, there was little to showcase, except in the financial 
and securities sectors, and both sides stopped reporting on progress on the roadmaps. Emphasis shifted 
back again to methodological and horizontal issues such as risk assessment, regulatory impact analysis, 
voluntary standards, and early warnings of new regulations.’48 
Another commentator notes that despite the fact that ‘initiatives to removing or reducing transatlantic 
regulatory barriers to trade since the NTA have made some progress towards reducing regulatory burdens, 
many U.S. and European companies heavily engaged in the transatlantic marketplace maintain that the 
results have not been materially significant’.49 It is apparent from the infamous disputes before the WTO 
panels that the most controversial regulatory differences emanate from ‘diverging regulatory philosophies’, 
different risk-assessment systems, public policy considerations, regulatory approaches and make it difficult 
or seemingly impossible to establish harmonisation or mutual recognition of standards without complex 
legislative changes (for example in consumer protection, health and food standards).50 
                                                     
45 EU-US Declaration ‘Initiative to enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration and Growth’, 20 June 2005, available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201004/20100427ATT73625/20100427ATT73625EN.pdf>. 
46 A. Meuwese, ‘EU-US horizontal regulatory cooperation: Mutual recognition of impact assessment’ in. D. Vogel and J. 
Swinnen (eds.), Transatlantic regulatory cooperation: the shifting roles of the EU, the US and California (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) pp. 249-264 at p. 256. 
47 ‘EU-US Regulatory Cooperation-Best Cooperative Practices’, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/july/tradoc_129223.pdf>. 
48 J. Morall III, ‘Determining compatible regulatory regimes between the U.S. and the EU’, US Chamber of Commerce, 
Advancing Transatlantic Business, at p. 39. 
49 R. J. Ahearn, ‘Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis’ Congressional Research Service, 
RL34717, (August 24, 2009), at p.1. 
50 S. Mildner and O. Ziegler, ‘A Long and Thorny Road, Regulatory Cooperation under the Framework for Advancing 
Transatlantic Economic Integration’, Intereconomics (2009), pp. 49-58 at. p. 49. 
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The Common Understanding on Regulatory Principles and Best Practices,51 drafted by the High Level 
Regulatory Cooperation Forum in 2010, reaffirmed the shared joint commitment to regulatory principles of 
evidence-based policy-making, transparency and openness, analysis of relevant alternatives; monitoring 
and evaluation of the effectiveness of existing regulatory measures; and use of approaches that minimise 
burden and aim for simplicity. However, the document indicates that these regulatory principles are not 
binding on the regulators, and are to be considered only as much as the applicable laws in each jurisdiction 
allow. Furthermore, for the EU, they serve as ‘an aid to better lawmaking’ and do not bind the EU 
institutions. 
As we have seen, numerous political declarations have called for regulatory convergence and 
harmonisation, but enacting changes into laws that would encourage the convergence of regulatory 
approaches have been extremely limited. Stakeholders have criticised such slow progress, and the US 
Chamber of Commerce raised the idea of a binding Agreement on Regulatory Cooperation that would 
oblige regulators on both sides to operate under a common set of regulatory principles and assess the cost 
impact of forthcoming regulations on transatlantic commerce, adopt each other’s best practices and utilise 
similar methodologies to assess the costs and benefits of proposed regulations.52  
 
3.5.  Sector Specific Approaches, Initiatives and Achievements  
While the previously described general methodological cooperative efforts on principles and guidelines 
(such as transparency, openness, etc.) have a horizontal scope, actual regulatory initiatives in the bilateral 
regulatory talks have focused on a sectoral, case-by-case approach. As has been noted, quite a few of the 
initiatives contain suggestions for sector-specific cooperation between regulators. To provide impetus and 
boost regulatory cooperation, the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration agreed 
between the EU and the US in 2007 was aimed at ‘achieving more effective, systematic and transparent 
regulatory cooperation’, and at reinforcing the existing structures of transatlantic dialogue by intensifying 
sector-by-sector regulatory cooperation in a defined set of areas, as well as ‘lighthouse projects’, and 
dialogue on methodological issues.53 The 2007 EU-US Summit launched the Transatlantic Economic 
Council (TEC)54 a political body, with the purpose of guiding and stimulating the work on transatlantic 
economic convergence so as to strengthen EU-US economic integration. It brings together those Members 
of the European Commission and US Cabinet Members who carry the political responsibility for the policy 
areas covered by the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration. In a government-to-
government cooperation, the TEC was expected to have the kind of high-level political support that 
previous efforts at economic integration may have lacked and which is ‘is perceived as necessary to 
persuade domestic regulators to yield some of their authorities or to better cooperate with their counterparts 
across the Atlantic in the harmoniing regulatory approaches’.55 However, both in its efforts to resolve a 
number of longstanding bilateral trade disputes and prevent new ones, as well as in its efforts to harmonise 
regulation on a sector-by-sector basis, the TEC’s mission proved difficult due to political and bureaucratic 
resistance on both sides to the revision of existing laws and regulations.56 
                                                     
51 US-EU Commission, ‘High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum-Common Understanding on Regulatory Principles and 
Best Practices’, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/common-understanding-on-
regulatory-principles-and-best-practices.pdf>. 
52 R.J. Ahearn, supra note 12 at p. 12. 
53 ‘Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration between the EU and the US’, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/tec_framework_en.pdf>. 
54 Co-chaired by the White House Deputy National Special Advisor for International Economic Affairs, and European 
Commissioner for Trade. 
55 R. J. Ahearn, supra note 12 at p.18. 
56 Ibid., at p. 18. 
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Critics have pointed to the TEC’s ‘discussion rather than action’ nature,57 the modest success of 
transatlantic initiatives attributed to the absence of economic guidance and lack of clear direction,58 the 
limited agenda, its ‘small-scale incrementalism’ and the too-low ambition of regulatory cooperation within 
the TEC and otherwise.59 In 2010, a Memorandum of understanding was signed on E-health and the 
harmonisation of electronic health records and education programmes for IT and health professionals in 
the context of the TEC, however, implementation is slow.60 More recently, in April 2011, an agreement 
laid down a set of fundamental regulatory principles for trade in information and communication 
technology (ICT) services.61 
 
3.6.  Promoting International Standards within Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation 
Initiatives aimed at the application of international standards in the transatlantic context have faced 
difficulties, since in the US the regulatory agencies are required to use international standards only to the 
extent prescribed by the TBT Agreement and are not prevented from taking measures they consider 
necessary to attain a public policy objective (such as the protection of human, animal or plant life, or of the 
environment) at the level they deem necessary. The ‘voluntary’, private sector and marketplace-driven 
character of the US standard system differs from the EU’s intensive implementation of international 
standards in its domestic regulatory practice.62 In 2010, leaders at the political level of the TEC and the 
High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum encouraged regulatory agencies, services, and standardisation 
bodies to implement the joint improvements agreed on in a new document Building Bridges between the 
EU and U.S. Standards Systems.63 Based on this agreement, the parties agreed ‘to create new mechanisms 
to promote cooperation, collaboration, and coherence in this area, with a view towards minimising 
unnecessary regulatory divergences, and better aligning respective regulatory approaches to facilitate 
transatlantic trade. Elements of such jointly agreed undertaking was, among others, to take into account 
existing international standards for technical regulations, laid down by international standard-setting 
bodies, and developed by the TBT Committee Decision Agreements, and WTO law.  
 
3.7.  Most Recent Focus: Upstream Regulatory Cooperation in Emerging Technologies 
Exploring upstream regulatory cooperation has been an important element in efforts to detect possible trade 
irritants and non-tariff barriers to trade, and to gauge the possibility of convergence at an early stage, before 
(diverging) domestic legislation is adopted. Such upstream regulatory cooperation has been prominent in 
recent years on the agenda of the TEC, once the inherent limitations in the TEC’s political clout in the face 
of existing regulation became apparent. Consequently, the TEC seems to have shifted its focus to the pre-
emption of future trade irritants and refocused its work toward ‘upstream regulatory cooperation’ with the 
                                                     
57 F. Erixon and L. Brandt, ‘Ideas for New Transatlantic Trade’, Transatlantic Task Force on Trade Working Papers, at p. 5, 
available at <http://www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/ideas-for-new-transatlantic-initiatives-on-trade.pdf>. 
58 Ibid., at p. 2.  
59 See F. Erixon and G. Pehnelt, ‘A New Trade Agenda for Transatlantic Economic cooperation’, 9 ECIPE WP 2009, at p. 5, 
available at <http://www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/a-new-trade-agenda-for-transatlantic-economic-cooperation.pdf>. 
60 European Council for Foreign Relations, ‘Scorecard 2010/2011’, supra note 18. 
61 ‘European Union-United States Trade Principles for Information and Communication Technology Services’, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/april/tradoc_147780.pdf>. 
62 Report on the use of voluntary standards in support of regulation in the US October 2009, at p. 11, available at 
<http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/Voluntary_Standards_USRegs.pdf>. 
63 Building Bridges Between the U.S. and EU Standards Systems, available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-eu-standards-bridges.pdf>. 
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‘potential to develop into a genuine strategic instrument focusing on dispute prevention.’64 Accordingly, 
upstream regulatory cooperation has focused on emerging technologies and innovation since the TEC’s 
December 2010 meeting,65 serving as platform to facilitate  discussions in areas such as electric vehicles, 
ICT services, e-health, nanotechnology, energy saving products, electric vehicles, cloud computing. The 
Transatlantic Innovation Action Partnership of 2011 coordinates US and EU activities aimed at 
strengthening innovation ecosystems and promoting the commercialisation of emerging technologies and 
sectors. The Innovation Action established two new sectoral work streams in priority areas, raw materials 
and bio-based products, not sufficiently addressed through the then existing co-operation.66 The European 
Council on Foreign Relations in its Scorecard of 2012 notes that ‘with the participation of carmakers such 
as Audi and Ford, some progress was also made on harmonising norms for electric vehicles and for the so-
called smart grids designed to distribute electricity more efficiently. The transatlantic partners are hoping to 
set global standards for tomorrow’s industries such as cloud computing and nanotechnologies, and they 
have joined forces to answer multi-faceted challenges such as antibiotic resistance.'67 Early upstream 
regulatory cooperation carries the potential to prevent and pre-empt regulatory differences ahead of 
regulatory action, and cooperation in these areas can also pave the way for global regulatory actions and 
standards. 
 
4.  Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP Negotiations: Objectives and Options 
 
4.1.  Removal of Unnecessary Regulations and NTBs: A Key Objective in Economic Partnership 
In November 2011, the EU-US Summit tasked the TEC to establish a High-Level Working Group on Jobs 
and Growth (‘HLWG’) to explore, assess and identify options to further enhance EU-US economic 
relations, and examine negotiations on horizontal and sectoral regulatory issues. The report of the findings, 
conclusions and recommendations by the HLWG, co-chaired by EU Commissioner for Trade, Karel De 
Gucht and US Trade Representative Ron Kirk, had been preceded by intense consultation and dialogue 
with public and private stakeholder groups. The potential options for expanding transatlantic investment 
and trade presented in an Interim report (June 2012) by the HLWG included, amongst others, to seek 
opportunities for enhancing the compatibility of regulations and standards, and the elimination, reduction, 
or prevention of unnecessary ‘behind the border’ non-tariff barriers to trade in all categories. These options, 
together with other means for expanding market access and strengthening the leadership of the transatlantic 
partners in setting global rules, were envisaged as building towards a comprehensive trade and investment 
agreement. The Interim report drew up the following suggestions to be included in the negotiations toward 
such a comprehensive agreement, specifically with respect to regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers: 
- ‘An ambitious ‘‘SPS-plus’’ chapter, including establishing a bilateral forum for improved dialogue 
and cooperation on SPS issues.  
- An ambitious ‘‘TBT-plus’’ chapter, including establishing a bilateral forum for addressing bilateral 
trade issues arising from technical regulations, conformity assessment procedures, and standards.  
                                                     
64 Speech by Catherine Ashton EU Trade Commissioner on ‘The transatlantic challenge: working together to shape the rules 
of globalisation’, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Washington D.C., 26 October 2009, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-09-499_en.htm?locale=fr>. 
65 U.S.-EU Transatlantic Economic Council, Joint Statement, 17 December 2010, Washington D.C., available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/december/tradoc_147140.final.pdf>. 
66 ‘Transatlantic Innovation Action Partnership Work Plan’, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147174.pdf >. 
67 European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012, ‘Relations with the US on standards and norms’, available at < 
http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2012/usa/29>. 
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- Horizontal disciplines on regulatory coherence and transparency for goods and services, including 
early consultations on significant regulations, impact assessment, upstream regulatory cooperation, 
and good regulatory practices.  
- Provisions or annexes containing additional commitments or steps aimed at promoting regulatory 
compatibility over time in specific, mutually agreed sectors.’68  
Taking these suggestions further, the Final report (February 2013) of the HLWG highlighted what the 
parties saw as the key elements and objectives of regulatory cooperation:  
‘addressing “behind-the-border” obstacles to trade, including, where possible, through 
provisions that serve to reduce unnecessary costs and administrative delays stemming 
from regulation, while achieving the levels of health, safety, and environmental 
protection that each side deems appropriate, or otherwise meeting legitimate regulatory 
objectives; identify new ways to prevent non-tariff barriers from limiting the capacity of 
U.S. and EU firms to innovate and compete in global markets; seek to strengthen 
upstream cooperation by regulators and increase cooperation on standards-related issues; 
putting processes and mechanisms in place to reduce costs associated with regulatory 
differences by promoting greater compatibility, including, where appropriate, 
harmonization of future regulations, and to resolve concerns and reduce burdens arising 
from existing regulations through equivalence, mutual recognition, or other agreed 
means, as appropriate.’69 
The specific recommendations in the final report offer more detail than the interim report concerning the 
form of cooperation in various areas of trade and regulatory cooperation. With respect to sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary issues, it calls for SPS measures which are based on international standards and global 
(WTO) principles, and application following scientific risks assessment, in accordance with proportionality 
and transparency.70 Similarly, TBT issues should be tackled in light of cooperative efforts between 
regulators, in transparent and coordinated processes, and for enhanced confidence in conformity assessment 
procedures and standards. As to horizontal regulatory issues, methodological rapprochement is called for 
by highlighting the importance of early consultations, use of impact assessment, periodic reviews and 
application of best practices. With respect to specific sectors, the final report calls for a plan of 
commitments in sector-specific cooperation and the approaches applied to create more convergence. 
Finally, the HLWG emphasised the need for a (permanent) institutional framework within which future 
regulatory cooperative steps can be explored and processed.71  
With such detailed and ambitious recommendations in sight, the negotiations of the comprehensive trade 
agreement were announced72 (in no less significant a context than the State of the Union address delivered 
by President Obama on 12 February 2013),73 and shortly afterwards the European Commission drafted the 
                                                     
68 Interim Report to Leaders from the Co-Chairs EU-U.S. High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth 19 June 2012, 
available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149557.pdf>. 
69 Final report of the High Level Working Group on Growth and Jobs, 11 February 2013, at p.3, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf>. 
70 The HLWG takes note of the (public policy) sensitivity of SPS measures on both sides of the Atlantic and recommends 
closer cooperation in this area, next to the bilateral negotiations involved in the comprehensive agreement. Accordingly, the 
report calls on the parties to ‘seek to make early and continuing progress on SPS measures affecting bilateral trade, taking 
into account the priorities of either side, and their respective institutional frameworks’. 
71 Ibid. 
72 European Commission Press Release, ‘European Union and United States to launch negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership’, (13 February 2013), available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-95_en.htm>. 
73 ‘Obama’s 2013 State of the Union Address’, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/us/politics/obamas-2013-
state-of-the-union-address.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. 
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EU’s draft negotiating mandate for the negotiations toward ostensibly the biggest bilateral trade ever 
negotiated.74 Commentaries singled out the importance attached to the removal of regulatory barriers to 
trade;75 the focus on aligning rules and technical product standards which form the ‘most important barrier 
to transatlantic trade76 which were seen as ‘potentially “making or breaking” the agreement’;77 the 
dismantling of unnecessary regulatory barriers, and the inclusion in the agreement of mechanisms 
(including upstream regulatory cooperation) aiming at preventing future trade barriers.78 
 
4.2.  The Priorities of Discussing Regulatory Cooperation in the Negotiations for the TTIP 
The launched negotiations and mandate adopted by the Council and bestowed upon the Commission built 
upon the recommendations of the HLWG, laying down objectives around three main topics: (i) market 
access; (ii) regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers; (iii) addressing global trade rules. Emphasising the 
significance attached to the removal of NTBs, the objectives with respect to regulatory compatibility call 
for mechanisms to achieve regulatory compatibility through harmonisation, mutual recognition and 
enhanced cooperation between regulators. Accordingly, both sides wish to aim to negotiate an ambitious 
agreement on sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues as well as technical barriers to trade. In addition, 
negotiators will work on regulatory compatibility in specific sectors, such as chemical, automotive, ICT, 
pharmaceutical and other health sectors such as medical appliances. The need for regulatory convergence is 
not limited to trade in goods, but also extends to services.  
Recognising the sensitivity of the negotiating chapter, it has been acknowledged that not all regulatory 
divergences can be eliminated in a single agreement, and both sides envisage a ‘living agreement’,79 with a 
framework that allows for progressively greater regulatory convergence over time against defined targets 
and deadlines. This will, it is envisaged, enable not only the elimination of existing barriers, but also the 
prevention of new ones.80 While regulatory compatibility is the ultimate aim in this important chapter 
within the negotiations, it is also clear that the agreement should not prejudice domestic regulatory 
autonomy as to the level of health, safety, consumer, labour and environmental protection and cultural 
diversity. 
 
4.3  Suggestions for Creating Regulatory Compatibility  
In the varied reactions to the perspective of and the priorities for regulatory cooperation within the TTIP, 
we find differing assessments of these objectives. In the US, some worry that regulatory harmonisation will 
remove domestic regulatory autonomy, an aspect of national sovereignty, and will lead to more government 
                                                     
74 European Commission Press Release, ‘European Commission Fires Starting Gun for EU-US Trade Talks’, (12 March 
2013), available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-224_en.htm>.  
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76 ‘Progress made on new EU-US Trade Agreement at the EU Trade Informal’, (18 April 2013), available at 
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77 S. I. Akhtar and V. C. Jones, supra note 14. 
78 ‘European Parliament resolution of 23 May 2013 on EU trade and investment negotiations with the United States of 
America’, INTA/7/12078, available at 
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80 European Commission Press Release, ‘Member States endorse EU-US trade and investment negotiations’, (15 June 2013), 
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regulation dictated by the trade partner, such as the introduction of the precautionary principle for 
example.81 On the other hand the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, in their letter to the highest political 
leaders of the parties, expressed fears of lower regulatory standards, and warned against focusing simply on 
business and economic considerations and interests, to the detriment of public policy concerns such as 
consumer and environmental standards.82 The European Parliament has also voiced concern – repeatedly - 
in particular with respect to the importance of the precautionary principle, which in its view must be 
defended in the trade talks.83 As was noted earlier the EU at its highest executive level also commits to 
safeguarding most sensitive areas of regulation, such as agriculture.84 
Amongst the specific suggestions directed at the TTIP negotiations, the US Chamber of Commerce called 
for transparency as a guiding principle, and a horizontal framework within which to ‘empower and 
encourage regulators to cooperate at an early stage and through the life-cycle of a regulation’.85 Such a 
horizontal framework would require the setting of clear goals, the provision of regulatory tools to achieve 
such goals, the establishment of an oversight body to monitor and encourage progress, and open access to 
regulatory agreements in various sectors.86 In addition, they call for sector specific mutual agreements and 
equivalence arrangements, focusing on cosmetics, chemicals, automobiles, medical devices. 
The negotiations started in July 2013, and commentaries already at the preliminary stage of talks have 
indicated that the discussions surrounding regulatory cooperation would reveal different positions. It has 
been noted that while the EU favours mutual recognition arrangements in a list of priority sectors 
(including medical devices, chemicals, pharmaceutical and automobiles), the US eye is rather set on 
horizontal issues (thus the methodological approaches discussed in 3.4), a framework with the aim of 
tackling future regulations.87 It appears that existing regulatory differences may be hard to address, but 
upstream regulatory cooperation in emerging technologies carries more potential for successful cooperation 
and establishment of convergence, as well as standard setting globally. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In considering what regulatory cooperation has achieved, most observers would agree that new 
mechanisms for dialogue and information exchange have improved mutual understanding and working 
relationships among economic regulators in a wide range of sectors, and that the political declarations and 
soft law instruments have committed (albeit without legally binding effect) the parties to such cooperation 
time and time again. However,  certain sensitive areas such food safety constitute a ‘ground zero in the 
transatlantic dialogue delivering no result, while consumer protection issues such as product safety, 
exchange of information on scams and dangerous products for recalls also show slow result’.88 Experience 
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has shown that structured dialogue fell short of delivering results in the GMO dispute, despite the fact that 
biotechnology was exactly one of the areas where structured dialogue among regulators had been initiated 
with the aim of gradual convergence of regulatory standards and prevention of trade disputes.89  
While it was established to encourage regulatory harmonisation and to steer and evaluate regulatory 
cooperation, the TEC seems to have fallen short of expectations. Despite the declarations, ambitious 
wording of intentions focusing on exchanging views, best practices, shaping common principles and 
frameworks, the TEC’s performance can hardly be viewed as successful in the light of its mission to 
streamline regulations and eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade and investment. The recent tendency in 
regulatory cooperation has been to focus on new and relatively unregulated areas, and to align regulations 
in emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology and electric cars, where both the EU and US are 
developing regulatory approaches and where dialogue can prevent divergent regulatory action. These are 
the innovative, new areas in which the transatlantic axis can also feed into global norm-setting.  
While regulatory issues feature as an important element in the TTIP negotiations, and creating 
compatibility, equivalence of regulations and cooperation between regulators are regarded as the 
cornerstone of the entire negotiation undertaking, already at the early stages different visions are apparent 
as to the way to achieve these aspirations. The TTIP does however carry the potential to address these 
issues, and there appears to be political commitment to take this forward. The agreement itself may not be 
able to address every issue. However it could, with defined targets and deadlines  and with methods tailored 
to different sectors, lead progressively to further mutual recognition agreements, covering not only testing 
and certification but also substantive standards. This would boost the confidence of regulators on both sides 
of the Atlantic, and, if communicated effectively, that of consumers, as well as reducing costs and 
eliminating trade barriers to transatlantic trade. 
                                                     
89 See supra section 3.2. 
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Competition, Reciprocity and Harmonisation: 
EU-China Regulatory Cooperation on Standards in the Light of the EU Better 
Regulation Strategy, the Europe 2020 Strategy and Europe’s Trade Policy 
 
Andrea Wechsler 
1. Introduction∗ 
Standards – and in particular technical standards – are becoming ever more important in modern trade 
and investment policies and negotiations.1 While the focus of this paper is on technical standards and, 
thus, on norms and requirements for technical systems, it should nevertheless be noted that the term 
‘standard’ has a variety of meanings. It covers norms or requirements ranging from norms for 
governments, norms for economic actors, norms for international standard-setting organisations 
(SSOs) and for international standard-developing organizations (SDOs) to technical standards.2 
Technical standards can be developed privately by, for instance, corporations and industry groups or 
publicly by institutions such as standards organisations. They can also be the result of mixed public-
private standard-setting processes.  
The relevance of technical standards is, inter alia, reflected in their treatment in international 
economic law and international trade regulation. On the one hand, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) recognises the potential danger of technical regulations, product standards, testing and 
certification procedures becoming technical barriers to trade, i.e., non-tariff barriers to trade. On the 
other hand, the WTO acknowledges the role of standards in facilitating barrier-free trade through 
interoperability, compatibility and functionality and in benefiting environmental protection, safety, 
national security and consumer information.3 In consequence, the WTO Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) aims to eliminate unnecessary obstacles to trade by ensuring 
barrier-free trade and sets out a code of good practice for both governments and non-governmental or 
industry bodies.4  
With the tremendous growth in the number of technical regulations and standards, the TBT Agreement 
is considered a crucial international instrument for ensuring global market access. In addition, the 
European Union (EU), countries worldwide and private stakeholders are pushing for further 
standardisation policies to support the objectives of the economic growth and competitiveness of their 
home markets and industries. Furthermore, various national, European and international networks 
have been created by public authorities, industry and other stakeholders with the intention of 
enhancing cross-border collaboration on standards. Altogether these policy and collaboration efforts 
can be characterised on a scale ranging from competition to reciprocity to harmonisation.  
 
In designing cross-border collaboration on standards, the EU has placed particular emphasis on 
promising emerging markets and target markets for exports, such as the People’s Republic of China 
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(China). At the same time, however, the Chinese government has been re-directing its economic 
strategies and trade policies towards making China the leading global innovator in the world – a 
phenomenon that has been characterised as ‘techno-nationalism’.5 Becoming the leading global 
innovator entails not only emphasis on the development of indigenous innovative activities but also an 
increased focus on standard-setting policies as a core component of a domestic innovation strategy. In 
consequence, standardisation has become of paramount importance in China’s 12th 5-Year Plan 2011-
2015.6   
In the light of these developments, this paper analyses the question of the direction that EU-China 
regulatory cooperation on standards has taken, is taking and should take in the light of the EU Better 
Regulation Strategy7, the Europe 2020 Strategy8 and Europe's trade policy. It, thus, focuses on the 
issue of how larger regulatory strategies and policies are informing and should inform European 
standardisation policy towards this global player in an ever more techno-nationalistic setting. In 
essence, the paper argues that international trade policy – including standards policy – should be re-
evaluated from ‘low politics’ to ‘high politics’ whilst EU regulatory cooperation should place greater 
emphasis on raising China’s awareness of the danger of controlling standardisation as opposed to 
facilitating standardisation processes.  
The paper, first, outlines the respective policy and regulatory approaches towards standards and 
standardisation in the EU and China. Second, an analysis of EU-China regulatory cooperation on 
standards focuses on the history, current state, substance and achievements of EU-China cooperation 
on standards. Third, a discussion of EU-China regulatory cooperation provides for an evaluation of 
this cooperation in the light of the EU Better Regulation Strategy, the Europe 2020 Strategy and 
Europe’s trade policy. This is followed by conclusions and suggestions for new directions in EU-
China regulatory cooperation on standards.  
 
2. Standardisation Policy and Regulatory Approaches in the EU and China  
 
Standardisation processes have moved beyond the realm of purely private initiatives. As standards 
have become the basis for international competition among countries, the fact of and the need for 
government involvement and regulation is becoming ever more visible.9 Standards are increasingly 
emerging through a hybrid process of coordinated mechanisms and market mechanisms in which firms 
and governments collaborate.10 Some newcomer governments, such as the Chinese and the Korean, 
have clearly opted for increased strategic involvement in and regulation of their country’s standard-
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setting policies,11 and even European governments and the EU have interceded in standard-setting in a 
variety of industries, such as the mobile telecom industry. The area of technical standardisation has, 
thus, become an area of multi-jurisdictional and multi-layered governance in which cross-border 
regulatory cooperation is becoming ever more important.  
 
2.1. The European Regulatory acquis on Standards  
Developments in EU standardisation policy need to be set against the larger background of EU policy-
making for European integration and, in particular, neo-functionalist models of integration.12 The 
European Commission stresses the contribution of standardisation to the implementation of internal 
market legislation and its nature as a tool for the completion of the Single Market.13 Standardisation 
policy is considered to provide for an important contribution to the development of sustainable 
industrial policy, of innovative markets and of a strong European economy.14 Standards are further 
considered to contribute to economic and social development and to environmental protection. The 
role and relevance of standardisation is further stressed in relation to the fostering of the landscape for 
the ICT industry as well as for services. In the realm of technical standards, it should also be noted that 
the Commission launched a fact-finding study in 2008 to analyse the connection between IPRs and 
standards in promoting innovation.15  
More specifically and in the realm of technical harmonisation, the European Commission – until the 
1980s – followed an approach of mutual recognition of national policies.16 As mutual recognition and 
negotiations of common regulations proved more and more difficult, the so-called ‘New Approach’ 
was adopted in a Council Resolution in 1985.17 The Council Resolution set out a number of key 
principles for the Communities’ approach to technical harmonization and standards. Most noticeably, 
it established a clear separation of responsibilities between the European legislator, on the one hand, 
and European standard bodies (CEN,18 CENELEC,19 ETSI20), on the other hand. At the same time, 
EEC legislative harmonisation was limited to essential prerequisites for the free movement of products 
throughout the Community. Thus, ample space was left for voluntary standards and standard setting by 
standardisation bodies. Further rules at the time reflected the spirit of the New Approach: the 
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Environment (Stanford University Press 2002), p. 412. 
17 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards, OJ C 136, 4.6.1985, pp. 
1-9.  
18 European Committee for Standardisation, available at <https://www.cen.eu/cen/pages/default.aspx>. 
19 European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation, available at <http://www.cenelec.eu/>. 
20 European Telecommunications Standards Institute, available at <http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/homepage.aspx> . 
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European Communities intended to promote voluntary, market-led standardisation while fusing the 
professional authority of non-governmental standardisation bodies with their own regulatory powers.21  
Taken together, the functional approach to standardisation and the New Approach have translated into 
the establishment of a general framework for European standardisation policy. In the late 1990s, 
Directive 98/34/EC laid down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
standards and regulations.22 In 2003, General guidelines were published for cooperation between 
CEN, CENELEC and ETSI and the European Commission and the European Free Trade 
Association.23 In 2006, Decision No. 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 2006 created a legal basis for the financial support of the European Commission for the 
European standardisation system.24 Furthermore, since 1998, about 20 new legislative acts in which 
standards play a decisive role, relating to ICT, the environment and consumer protection, have been 
adopted and implemented by the EU.25 In the early 2000s, the European standards bodies CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI well established their position amongst national and international SSOs and 
implemented their tasks of providing for voluntary processes for the development of technical 
specifications based on consensus among all interested parties.  
However, recent years have seen an ever more active approach of the Commission towards 
standardisation, which goes far beyond the New Approach. In 2006, the Competitiveness Council 
identified the need to enhance the European standard-setting system26 as did the European Parliament 
in its resolution on innovation strategy in 2007.27 In 2008, the Commission issued a Communication to 
the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee setting out 
the political objectives and challenges of leveraging standardisation for innovation in Europe. In 2011, 
a Commission Communication suggested a strategic vision for European standards.28 Furthermore, the 
Europe 2020 Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth29 envisages a bigger role for 
European standardisation in European competitiveness, consumer protection and environmental 
matters.  
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In response to these strategic declarations, the Commission adopted concrete annual work programmes 
and action plans, such as the 2010-2013 Action Plan for European Standardisation,30 which provides 
not only information about recently issued mandates (standardisation requests) but also sets out future 
standardisation initiatives. However, the increased focus of the EU on standardisation has not only 
translated into policies, action plans and recommendations. It has further culminated in the adoption of 
the 2012 Regulation on European Standardisation,31 which establishes rules governing cooperation 
between European standardisation organisations, NSBs, Member States and the Commission, as well 
as for the establishment of European standards and European standardisation deliverables, for the 
identification of ICT technical specifications, for stakeholder participation and for financing of 
European standardisation (Article 1). 
What is most remarkable in the context of this renewed focus on standardisation is that – in its 2008 
Communication – the Commission envisaged not only a stronger role for standardisation in support of 
innovation and complementing market-based competition but voiced, for the first time, concerns about 
‘growing international competition in standard-setting from emerging powers’.32 Responding to these 
concerns, emphasis has been placed on the active role of the EU in facilitating European contributions 
to international standardisation work. The Commission has repeatedly expressed its intention of 
strengthening its efforts ‘through multilateral agreements and through bilateral trade and regulatory 
dialogues to promote regulatory models based on the reliance on voluntary standards, and to enhance 
the commitment of our trade partners to the development and use of international standards.’33 The 
2012 Regulation on European Standardisation34 further reinforces this intention by stressing in its 
recitals the promotion of multilateral and bilateral regulatory cooperations and by requiring objectives 
for an international dimension of European standardisation in the annual Union work programme 
(Article 8). 
In summary, past and current standardisation policies in the EU demonstrate an instrumental 
understanding of standardisation as a tool for market-led regulation in furtherance of European 
integration. At the same time, however, recent years have witnessed an ever more pro-active policy 
approach by the Commission towards standardisation. It has not only recognised the insufficient 
involvement of European actors in international standard setting but has also redefined its own role as 
facilitator for standardisation within and beyond the European market. The Commission has, thus, 
moved from a policy coordination model in standardisation policy towards the EU regulatory model.35 
To sum up, the EU has adapted both its regulatory model and the substance of its standards policies so 
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as to reinforce its role as facilitator for standardisation in a fast changing global landscape with an ever 
stronger proliferation of standardisation organisations and public and private actors.36 
 
2.2. Standardisation Policy in the P.R. China 
Developments in Chinese standardisation policy need to be set against the background of the rise of 
China’s economic power and its underlying reform and opening policies in the last 30 years. 
Beginning with the Chinese path to socialism with Chinese characteristics in 1978, the Chinese 
economy has become the second largest economy in the world. Annual economic growth rates have 
been at an average high of 9,5%.37 In 2001, China joined the WTO in 2001, marking yet another 
milestone in Chinese economic and legal development.38 From 2005 to 2012 in line with aspirations 
towards a Harmonious Society the administration reform policies were reshaped so as to promote the 
rise of large national champions coupled with egalitarian and populist industrial policies. 
Recent years have seen a fervent drive towards indigenous innovation and corresponding industrial 
policies. Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao pushed plans – most noticeably the 2006 
Medium- to Long-Term Strategic Plan for the Development of Science and Technology39 – to turn 
China into a science and technology (S&T) powerhouse by 2020 and into the global innovation leader 
by 2050. Particular emphasis has thereby been placed on the fostering of indigenous and home-grown 
innovations as well as on turning Chinese society into an innovation-oriented society by the year 2020. 
This fostering is to be attained through a variety of legal and policy instruments ranging from 
educational initiatives, to financing innovation, increased inter-firm competition, improvements in 
corporate governance and public procurement to advances in intellectual property (IP) protection.40 
Moreover, technical standards are considered a key instrument for promoting technological 
development in China. 
In the years leading up to its WTO accession, China regarded standards as an essential part of 
industrial development strategies and, thus, gradually embedded standards policies into its larger 
industrial policies. A sound legal and institutional framework came to complement these policy 
efforts. In 1988, the Standardisation Law of the P.R. China was adopted with the objective of 
‘developing the socialist commodity economy, promoting technical progress, improving product 
quality, increasing social and economic benefits, safeguarding the interests of the state and the people 
and adapting standardisation to the needs of socialist modernization and the development of economic 
relations with foreign countries’.41 In 1990, the National Programs for Science and Technology 
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Developments were adopted. And in 1995, the China National Institute of Standardisation (CNIS) was 
founded.42 
Subsequent to its WTO accession, China has given increased policy priority to indigenous innovation 
and, thus, also to the idea of using technical standards to enhance China’s innovation capabilities.43 
First of all, in 2001, the TBT Agreement entered into force. In the same year the Administration for 
Quality Supervision Inspection & Quarantine (AQSIQ),44 Standardisation Administration of the P.R. 
China (SAC)45 and the Certification and Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic of 
China (CNCA)46 were established. In 2008, China became a Permanent Member of the International 
Organization for Standardisation (ISO). In 2011, it applied to become a Group A Member in the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). These institutional achievements have translated 
into an ever greater number of Chinese national standards – both de facto and de jure.   
Even though Chinese standardisation policies are considered to have already borne fruit, it is difficult 
to assess the extent to which such standards are the fruit of national S&T achievements as opposed to 
the mere adoption of international standards. It is suggested that China has an estimated 10,000 active 
standards that are built upon standards issued by the international standardisation bodies ISO, EIC and 
the International Telecommunication Unit (ITU).47 Furthermore, it is estimated that thousands of 
Chinese standards are based on European standards. At the same time, however, there are now more 
than 27,000 national standards in force in China.48 In response to this rise in national standards, 
complaints have been raised about China not meeting its obligations under the TBT Agreement and, 
thus, about lack of conformity of Chinese national standards with their international counterparts.49 
Moreover, China is known for having developed its own standards, such as in the case of the standard 
for DVDs, known as EVD, to avoid royalty payments to patent-holding corporations worldwide.50 
These developments testify to the Chinese realization that standards lead markets. 
It is therefore not surprising that Chinese efforts in the realm of standardisation policies have been 
even further enhanced in the most recent years. In 2006, the SAC formulated the Outline of the 11th 5-
Year-Plan on the Development of Standardisation which aims at an adoption rate of international 
standards of 80% by 2010, the adoption of 6.000 standards annually, and the reduction of standard 
adoption time from 4,7 years to two years.51 Another essential pillar of Chinese standardisation policy 
constituted then the focus on key industrial areas for standardisation. Furthermore, the 12th 5-Year-
Plan aims to eliminate obsolete technologies from Chinese industry while supporting it in integrating 
state-of-the-art, environmental considerations and a favourable environment for the services industry 
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through accelerated reforms.52 The Plan refers to a number of additional objectives to be achieved with 
the support of standardisation for other specific industrial sectors of strategic importance.53 On a larger 
policy level, the Plan constitutes not only a clear declaration of intent to strengthen China’s 
standardisation policy but also a declaration of intent to reinforce China’s global presence through 
standardisation policies. This declaration is motivated by estimated annual losses of 36 billion USD to 
Chinese companies as a result of technical barriers to trade.54 
The Plan is complemented by sector-specific and local standardisation strategies. Not only does the 
overall standardisation strategy put emphasis on sector-specific standard development and setting, 
various governments departments have adopted standardisation strategies for different industries. In 
2005, for instance, the National Standardisation Plan 2005-2010 for the Logistics Industry was issued 
jointly by SAC, NDRC, three Ministries, the AQSIQ, the National Bureau of Statistics, and the Civil 
Aviation Administration of China.55 In 2006, a comparable scheme was issued in the form of the 
Standardisation Development Plan for Seawater Utilization. And in 2007, MOFCOM issued both the 
11th Five-Year Standardisation Development Plan for Commodity Circulation and the Outline of 
Innovation and Development Plan 2006-2007 for Traditional Chinese Medicine. Further plans in the 
area of conservation and utilization of resources and the services industry were issued in 2008 and 
2009. In addition to sector-specific innovation, particular emphasis was placed local standardisation in 
support of urban-rural construction and local industrial development. The rationale behind such 
strategies as the 2007 Programs for Implementing Shenzhen Municipal Standardisation Strategy was 
to push the issue of standardisation to the lowest level of economic development. In thus issuing 
sector-specific and rural development plans, the government intends to foster and promote industrial 
development in selected fields and regions through the mobilization of a maximum of governmental 
and social resources. 
In consequence, one of the primary objectives of the Chinese government for the upcoming years is a 
substantial contribution to international standards and, thus, the objective of globalizing Chinese 
standards. The Chapter on ‘Active Participation in Global Economic Governance and Regional 
Cooperation’ of the Plan states that China will ‘actively take part in the drafting and amending of 
international regulations and standards to increase its influence in international economic and financial 
organizations’.56 Particular emphasis will be placed on pushing international standards based on 
Chinese standards in areas of priority, such as agriculture, emerging industries of strategic importance, 
services, safety and security and on strengthened management of standardisation.57  
These emphases clearly reflect the Chinese perception of standards as being key global strategic 
elements in fostering emerging domestic industries.  
In line with China’s intention of making a substantial contribution to international standards, the 
country has expressed its interest in better positioning itself strategically. Thus, China aimed at and 
succeeded in obtaining the status of a permanent member within the IEC so that it can have greater 
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influence on formulating its rules and policies.58 Moreover, the country aims to attain more 
chairmanships and responsibilities in secretariats of international standardisation organisations. 
Furthermore, it aims to deepen international exchange and cooperation in standardisation with leading 
global players, such as the EU, the United States (U.S.), Northeast Asia and ASEAN. Such 
cooperation should lead to increased participation in national mirror committees as well as to active 
participation in all international standardisation work affecting Chinese industry. It will further be 
supported by translation and publication of English versions of Chinese national standards as well as 
the provision of a pool of specialized Chinese standardisation experts.59  
Whilst efforts are now being focused on the international market, issues in the home market remain. 
Such issues are primarily grounded in the Chinese top-down approach to standards. This top-down 
approach is, for instance, reflected in the promotion of standards for existing technologies rather than 
for future innovations. There is widespread criticism that the Chinese government-centred 
standardisation strategy cannot adequately deal with the rising complexity in technology, business 
organisation and markets. It has, thus, been argued that China’s drive towards becoming a co-shaper of 
international standards is considerably inhibited by its continued tight control of standardisation 
processes.  
In summary, China has made remarkable developments in the field of standardisation both in black-
letter law and practice. Recent years have seen it move from being a fast-follower of standards, 
towards being a controller of standards with the aspiration of becoming a co-shaper of international 
standards. At the same time, however, the government has retained its role as controller of 
standardisation processes and has, thus, failed to become a facilitator of standards in China. To sum 
up, China is well on its way towards becoming an active player in international competition in 
standard setting, towards exporting Chinese standardisation deliverables and towards successfully 
placing Chinese technology on the global stage.  
 
3. EU-China Regulatory Cooperation on Standards 
EU-China regulatory cooperation on standards has developed dramatically in recent years. In 
particular, at the collective level of relations between China and the collective organisations of the EU 
substantial progress has been made towards a diverse and pragmatic form of cooperation.  
 
3.1. History and Current State of EU-China Cooperation on Standards 
EU-China regulatory cooperation on standards is embedded in a long history of trade relations 
between China and Europe reaching well back into the Middle Ages.60 However, in the light of 
today’s trade volumes one should remember the fact that there was almost no trade whatsoever 
between China and the EU only 30 years ago.61 Today, China is the second largest economy and the 
biggest exporter in the world. It is also the fastest growing market for European exports with EU-
China trade in goods having reached about 430 billion Euros and trade in services having reached 
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about 20 billion Euros annually.62 While trade volumes are consistently increasing, so it seems are a 
number of trade barriers in China. Amongst them are an ever growing number of country-specific 
standards that are considered hard for foreign competitors to comply with.63 Other difficulties are, 
inter alia, reports in the realm of IP violations64 as well as in the area of public procurement. 
Complaints by foreign stakeholders have, in particular, been voiced in circumstances in which the 
Chinese government pursues its indigenous innovation strategies through instruments, such as, 
procurement, standardisation and IP protection. 
Responding to such complaints, the EU has not only relied on remedies in the context of multilateral 
fora, such as complaints at the WTO,65 it has also engaged in a bilateral dialogue and cooperation with 
China. One of the most striking examples of such bilateral cooperation efforts has been the EU-China 
IPR2 Project from 2007 to 2011.66 The project was designed as a partnership project between the EU 
and China with the objective of promoting a sustainable environment for effective IPR protection and 
enforcement in China. Even though the project has been considered a ‘milestone’ for EU-China 
cooperation in IP matters, critical voices have noted the limits of this form of cooperation in the light 
of Chinese domestic IP and innovation strategies and the natural limitations of any European impact 
on Chinese political, administrative and judicial processes. Nevertheless, the project seems to serve 
almost as a blueprint for European cooperation efforts in the realm of standardisation.  
While on the one hand such blueprints for cooperation have certainly inspired EU-China regulatory 
cooperation on standards, on the other hand, there were also sheer necessities for cooperation in an 
environment of proliferation of specifications and exploding numbers of private SSOs and alliances.67 
It has been shown that recent years have seen an explosion in the numbers and varieties of private 
SSOs, in particular, in the field of ICT, and also a proliferation of – often competing – technical 
specifications. It has, thus, been argued that the private sector ‘has largely failed in managing the 
public good that is standardisation’68 to the detriment of the general public and consumers. 
Government intervention has subsequently been encouraged, such as with suggestions for the 
participation of public representatives in standard-developing or -setting processes. Whilst the value of 
managerial freedom and private cooperation is well recognized, suggestions for stronger regulatory 
intervention for better coordination have increased in recent years. It follows that increased regulatory 
cooperation between the EU and China comes at a time in which ever more concrete suggestions for 
public policy intervention in standardisation and standards battles are being made.69  
This comes also at a time in which the European Commission has come to realize that its traditional 
foreign and trade policies towards China had become outdated. Commentators are going as far as 
claiming that ‘Europe’s approach to China is stuck in the past’.70 Nevertheless, EU-China relations 
have become an important point on the Commission’s international affairs agenda as well as on its 
industrial policy agenda. In 2001, the EU General Affairs Council approved the proposed EU-China 
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Industrial Policy and Regulatory Cooperation Dialogues.71 The institutional basis for this dialogue 
was to become the EU-China Joint Committee, whilst the legal basis was the Agreement on Trade and 
Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People’s Republic of 
China of 1985.72 In 2006, the Commission issued a Communication that set out how it envisaged the 
way forward in dealing with the new economic powerhouse in the global economy.73 While 
acknowledging China as one the EU’s most important partners, particular emphasis was placed on 
building an ever closer, stronger and strategic partnership through bilateral cooperation. An important 
pillar within this regulatory dialogue ever since has been the EU-China regulatory cooperation on 
standards.  
In 2001, at the early beginnings of EU-China cooperation on standards, a regulatory dialogue between 
the European Commission and the AQSIQ began. In essence, the dialogue was called ‘the 
Consultation Mechanism on Industrial Products and WTO/TBT’ and aimed at regulatory convergence 
for the promotion of free trade in goods.74 Presently, the dialogue comprises 12 working groups, 
including one on Standardisation and Conformity Assessment. In 2006, the work within the Seconded 
European Standardisation Expert for China (SESEC) began with the support of CEN, CENELEC, 
ETSI and the European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for Enterprise and Industry and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). It has ever since aimed at raising awareness of the 
European Standardisation System in China.75 In 2008, the EU-China Medical Devices Expert 
Roundtable (MDER) was set up between the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA)76 and DG 
Enterprise & Industry. In the same year, a Working Group for Standardisation and Conformity 
Assessment was founded in the EU Chamber of Commerce in China.77 In 2009, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed between SAC and CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. Likewise, in 2009, a 
dialogue was started on construction and energy-saving standards between the European Commission 
and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MoHURD).78 In the same year, the 
Europe-China Standardisation Information Platform (CESIP) was launched as a practical information 
tool.79 
In summary, EU-China regulatory cooperation in standardisation has intensified considerably in recent 
years. It is well complemented by EU Member State initiatives as well as private and global initiatives 
to reduce technical barriers to trade. It is also well embedded in the general European policy approach 
in terms of foreign affairs and industrial policy towards China. At the same time, both Chinese and 
European industries have come to realise the extent to which their businesses are dependent on 
successful collaboration in the field of standard setting so that their participation has also been intense 
and fruitful in the context of EU-China regulatory cooperation. Nevertheless, it is striking that most of 
the information and collaboration initiatives were initiated by the European Commission or European 
entities rather than by their Chinese counterparts. Whilst Chinese representatives and officials are 
highly motivated to participate in the respective dialogues once they have been approached by EU 
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representatives, the communication and activity patterns nevertheless demonstrate the extent to which 
the EU aims at securing European industry stakes in global commerce and, in particular, in trade with 
one of its largest trading partners.  
 
3.2. The Substance of EU-China Cooperation on Standards 
Investigating the substance of EU-China cooperation on standards in more detail allows for an 
understanding of the nature and depth of EU-China regulatory cooperation. In doing so, it is suggested 
that EU-China regulatory cooperation can be clustered into four categories: first, network building; 
second, information exchange; third, consulting; and fourth, capacity building.  
First, most of these activities would qualify both under the category of network building and selected 
other categories. The motivating factor for fostering network building is the improvement of 
transparency and mutual involvement in standardisation work, and thus, ultimately the removal of 
technical barriers to trade.80To achieve transparency and mutual involvement, the European 
Commission together with the European Standards Organisation (ESO) and EFTA encourage 
cooperation between private industry associations involved in standardisations both in China and the 
EU. Following the Commission’s encouragement, the SESEC project is certainly the most visible 
outcome in the area of network building since 2006. SESEC aims to ‘enhance the visibility of 
European standardisation activities, increase the cooperation between Chinese and European 
standardisation bodies and support European companies facing standardisation-related issues 
hampering market access to China’.81 One of the most successful measures taken to achieve these aims 
has been the deployment of European standards attachés in China. Another big achievement of SESEC 
was the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding82 (MoU) between ESO and SAC in 2009 which 
aims, inter alia, to promote mutual understanding of the development of standards in Europe and 
China (Article 1). In order to achieve the objectives set out in Article 1, the MoU envisages expert 
workshops and seminars, practical training, the exchange of specialists, the establishment of working 
groups and information exchange (Article 2).  
Second, information exchange is one of the core pillars of EU-China regulatory cooperation. The most 
important action taken in this regard was the establishment of the China-EU Standards Information 
Platform (CESIP) in 2009.83 The platform fosters the accessibility of standards and related technical 
regulation to all interested stakeholders by providing information about the relevant applicable and 
upcoming standards – both voluntary and mandatory – in China and Europe. The web site also offers 
sector-specific information in four pilot sectors: electrical equipment, medical devices, machinery and 
environmental protection. The website is bilingual, free of charge and allows for a variety of search 
functions. Another important information exchange between public authorities is the Regulatory 
Dialogue between the European Commission and AQSIQ, with 12 working groups that aim to foster 
reciprocity in standardisation cooperation.84 Yet another regulatory dialogue was started in 2009 in the 
area of construction and energy-saving standards. Based on a MoU, the DG Enterprise and Industry, 
the DG Energy and Transport and the MoHURD host a Cooperation Framework on Energy 
Performance and Quality in the Construction Sector. A great variety of activities are envisaged to 
enhance information exchange in this field.  
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Third, consulting activities work in various directions. On the one hand, the EU SME Centre in 
Beijing advises European Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) on establishing commercial 
activities in China.85 Advice on technical standards and regulation is provided by experts on 
conformity assessment, technical regulation and standardisation. On the other hand, however, there are 
also activities that aim at the development of recommendations for public authorities. Thus, in 2001, 
an EU-China High Level Forum on Medical Devices Standardisation took place with the participation 
of CENELEC, the Beijing Institute of Medical Devices Testing,86 the European Coordination 
Committee of the Imaging, Electromedical and Healthcare IT Industry and the China Centre for 
Pharmaceutical International Exchange.87One of the outcomes of the 2001 Forum was a 
recommendation for the adoption of the third edition of the IEC 60601-1 Standard. Moreover, in 2008, 
an EU-China Medical Devices Expert Roundtable (MDER) was set up between the SFDA and DG 
Enterprise and Industry. In 2008, six working groups provided an extensive report on the differences 
between the European and Chinese medical device regulatory framework. The report contained 
extensive recommendations for the future development of industry standards and regulations as well 
as of the interaction between SSOs and Chinese and European authorities.88 Furthermore, out of the 
European Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC) came a Working Group for Standardisation and 
Conformity Assessment, which lobbies for constructive recommendations to remedy standardisation 
deficiencies in China.89  
Fourth, yet another pillar of EU-China regulatory cooperation is capacity building and collaborative 
training activities. Most notably, the EU-China Standardisation Collaborative Training Program in 
Support for ISO Twinning Scheme was established to support capacity building in the field of 
international standardisation for technical personnel. The project is not only provided for unilaterally 
by the European Commission, but enjoys the support of the SAC while being implemented by the 
Chinese National Institute for Standardisation (CNIS)90 and a number of other European NSBs. It 
aims to train 100 International Chinese Standardisation experts, 20 trainers and 200 supporting experts 
in China. This particular training initiative is embedded in a web of further activities arising out of the 
other forms of regulatory cooperation.  
In summary, extensive activities have been undertaken in the framework of EU-China regulatory 
exchange in the realm of network building, information exchange, consulting and capacity building. 
Such activities have taken place with the participation of a variety of public and private actors and 
have been funded primarily by European funds with the aim of supporting the building of a solid 
knowledge base in China and Europe. Going beyond focusing on harmonization of standards, these 
activities have focused on the promotion of soft regulation on a voluntary basis, on the support of 
authorities and regulators in relation to technical requirements and on knowledge-sharing for optimal 
technical solutions. Rather than focusing on governmental dialogues only, the European Commission 
has encouraged and enabled a variety of actors in standardisation to move towards closer cooperation. 
In sum, the substance of EU-China cooperation aims at amicable cooperation through a variety of 
mechanisms at a variety of levels while paying tribute to the rising role of China as a major global 
player in standardisation.  
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3.3. Achievements and Challenges of EU-China Cooperation on Standards 
Measuring the achievements of EU-China cooperation on standards is a difficult undertaking due to 
the lack of hard facts and data. It can certainly be taken as a positive sign that the first phase of SESEC 
activities from 2006 to 2009 was extended from 2009 to 2012.91 And it is likewise positive that the 
suggested deployment of European standards attachés in China has been well accepted both by 
European industry and Chinese stakeholders. Undoubtedly, EU-China regulatory cooperation has 
contributed to fruitful reciprocity in a fiercely competitive environment. At the same time, however, it 
should be noted that this regulatory cooperation constitutes merely one of many collaborative efforts 
worldwide which promote international standardisation. Mention should be made of the Global 
Standards Collaboration (GSC)92 and cooperation between the Standards Institute (ANSI) and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).93 
Another key issue to consider when assessing the achievements of EU-China regulatory cooperation 
on standards is the competition of interests meeting in the respective alliances. The dedication of 
China to closing its gaps with international standardisation and to complying with WTO commitments 
for the benefit of its domestic economy has been the strongest driver for Chinese regulatory initiatives. 
This dedication – supported and fuelled by economic evidence94 – has not only translated into over 
300 million Renminbi (36 million Euros) being spent on standardisation between 2006 and 2008 
alone, but it has also translated into ever more and ever stronger Chinese standards.95 By the end of 
2008, there were 22,931 local standards in China, of which 3,111 were compulsory.96 Moreover, some 
39,686 sector standards and 14,142 local standards had been registered by 2008. 444 national 
standardisation technical committees (TCs) had been founded by 2008 with 586 sub-committees (SC). 
184 national standards that had resulted from independently-developed domestic technologies by 2007 
testify to the success of the Chinese indigenous innovation strategy.97 At the same time, the 
internationalization of Chinese standards has made considerable progress so that China has not only 
become a permanent member of the ISO and the IEC but has also thereby managed to improve its 
standing in international standardisation. Now, several Chinese nationals hold key posts in relevant 
international standardisation organisations. China is consistently increasing the numbers of its 
submissions of international standards proposals and is increasingly successful in getting them 
adopted.98 As a result, the ISO hails selected Chinese standardisation examples as best practice for the 
benefit of standards, such as in the shipping and the iron and steel industries.99  
Despite the difficulties in attributing these successes to EU-China regulatory cooperation, a long line 
of achievements should nevertheless be recognised. The greatest relevance of EU-China regulatory 
cooperation to be considered is the enhancement of understanding between European and Chinese 
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standardisation experts.100 Economic evidence has shown that professional backgrounds can have a 
tremendous impact on the reliability and substance of standard setting.101 By fostering interpersonal 
dialogues and training as well as through capacity building, EU-China regulatory cooperation has 
greatly contributed to mutual understanding and respect of the respective standardisation approaches.  
Nevertheless, issues with the Chinese standard-setting regime have remained and it has consistently 
been criticized by stakeholders. First, the lack of transparency in the standard-development process 
has been noted to inhibit full access to the market.102 Closely related is, second, the direct involvement 
of the Chinese government in standard setting processes. One of the most well-known examples of 
public control of standard setting was the development of the WAPI (wireless LAN authentication and 
privacy infrastructure) standard in China in 2003.103 While using a security hole in the then established 
international WiFi standard as justification, the Chinese government wanted to set up its own standard 
which was to be incompatible with the international WiFi standard. Details of the encryption 
algorithm were only given to 24 Chinese companies with the result that foreign competitors had to pay 
royalty fees for the Chinese markets. In consequence, foreign companies objected and asked their 
governments to intervene on the grounds of a violation of the TBT Agreement.104 Eventually and upon 
intervention by the US government, the Chinese government conceded to postpone the 
implementation of the WAPI standard. After two years of negotiations and a subsequent ballot, the 
WiFi standard won over the WAPI standard and the latter has never really been commercialised.105 
This WAPI incident demonstrated yet another, third, reason for criticism of the Chinese 
standardisation system. It is argued that the role of private actors and multinational companies 
(MNCs) is as yet insufficiently being taken into account.106 In an attempt to protect and foster 
domestic innovation and domestic companies, the voice of MNC’s has substantially been neglected by 
the Chinese government. The dialogue fostered by the European Commission aims at remedying the 
situation while a further enabling of communication and collaboration between MNCs and Chinese 
stakeholders would be of great benefit to the Chinese standard-setting process.  
In summary, EU-China regulatory cooperation has clearly translated into a variety of achievements in 
international standardisation. At the same time, however, issues remain with Chinese standardisation 
that are primarily grounded in the fact that the Chinese government exerts stronger control over 
standardisation processes and allows for less MNC involvement than its Western counterparts have 
ever done. Furthermore, the Chinese government’s increased emphasis on actively exporting Chinese 
standards has become ever more visible. Thereby, new challenges are being posed to foreign 
governments and stakeholders in facing Chinese standards competition. In sum, EU-China regulatory 
initiatives to cooperate in national and international standard-development and standard setting are 
contributing substantially towards reciprocity and mutual understanding in an era in which standards 
wars are being increasingly transferred to the government level. 
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4. Evaluation of EU-China Regulatory Cooperation on Standards 
The evaluation of EU-China regulatory cooperation on standards in this section will be made not only 
with reference to the range from competition to reciprocity to harmonization but also with reference to 
the EU Better Regulation Strategy, the Europe 2020 Strategy and Europe’s trade policy towards 
China. 
 
4.1. Regulatory Cooperation in the Light of the EU Better Regulation Strategy 
Aligning EU-China regulatory cooperation with the EU Better Regulation Strategy requires an 
evaluation of the extent to which bilateral regulatory strategies contribute to ‘achieving growth and 
jobs, while continuing to take into account the social and environmental objectives and the benefits for 
citizens and national administrations’.107 An important element of the Strategy is the right choice of 
regulatory instruments. This entails a judgment as to the type of legislative action that best fits each 
particular objective and as to whether regulatory action should best be taken in terms of setting 
standards, levying taxes, financing actions, providing information or offering advice. In a 
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions,108 the European Commission has identified a number 
of key messages relating to sound regulation in the whole policy cycle, to the shared responsibility of 
the European institutions and Member States, and to reinforcing a constructive dialogue between 
stakeholders and all regulators at the EU and national levels. 
First, measuring EU-China regulatory cooperation in terms of the quality of regulation throughout the 
policy cycle requires an assessment of the success of the design, implementation, enforcement, 
evaluation and revision of this regulatory cooperation in achieving regulatory objectives. While 
drawing increasingly upon a pool of Commission experts and adopting an ever more proactive 
regulatory approach to standardisation, the EU still relies extensively on the autonomy of industry and 
self-regulation by stakeholders.109Corresponding to the bottom-up structure of the European 
innovation system, EU regulatory approaches have relied primarily on joint initiatives by a variety of 
actors, thus refraining from overregulation. At the same time, European regulatory approaches to 
China are well embedded in the WTO legal framework in general, and the TBT Agreement in 
particular, thereby avoiding duplication of policy initiatives.110 The quality of European regulatory 
approaches is further enhanced by the Commission’s drive towards efficiency and accountability both 
for European and for international standard-setting procedures.111 Constant policy reviews and, in 
particular, the Expert Panel for the Review of the European Standardisation System (EXPRESS)112 
allow for strategic recommendations on how to further improve the quality of standards regulation in 
the EU and in EU-China regulatory cooperation. 
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Second, measuring EU-China regulatory cooperation in terms of the division of responsibilities 
between European institutions and Member States requires an assessment of collective efforts in the 
realm of international standardisation. While the European Commission has taken the lead in EU-
China regulatory cooperation and the SESEC project as such, it has not pre-empted Member States 
and their institutions from enhancing mutual cooperation. Thus, the German Institute for 
Standardisation113 began its own cooperation with the SAC in China in 1979 and reinforced it in 
2006.114 Furthermore, the participation of Member States in European standardisation processes is 
guaranteed through direct membership in CEN and CENELEC, whilst participation is in any case 
open in ETSI. However, at the same time, the European Commission has been ever more visibly 
drawing the regulation of standardisation to the central policy level. Thus, the Commission clearly 
emphasises in recital 6 of the 2012 Regulation on European Standardisation that it is the role of the 
Union to promote ‘bilateral approaches with third countries to coordinate standardisation efforts and to 
promote European standards’.115   
Third, measuring EU-China regulatory cooperation in terms of a constructive dialogue between 
citizens and stakeholders requires an evaluation of the possibilities for feedback from and participation 
by citizens and stakeholders. The European Commission welcomes citizen and stakeholder 
participation both at the policy level and at the implementation level. This approach is also 
implemented in the framework of SESEC, where CEN, CENELEC, ETSI, the CEN-CENELEC 
Management Centre (CCMC), and EFTA are, inter alia, recognised as core stakeholders in 
international standardisation.116 CEN, CENELEC and ETSI – in turn – are extensively based on 
stakeholder participation either directly or through National Mirror Committees, and European 
Standards Organisations are based on openness, transparency and impartiality.117 Even more 
specifically, the activities run under the umbrella of SENEC take place with the extensive participation 
of industry leaders and innovators.118  
In summary, it follows that exhaustive efforts have been made by the European Commission to align 
its EU-China regulatory policy with the EU Better Regulation Strategy in terms of quality of 
regulation. It follows further that the need for a division of responsibilities between European 
institutions and Member States is reflected in EU-China regulatory cooperation, while tendencies to 
centralise such efforts at the initiative of the European Commission are becoming ever stronger. And 
finally, EU-China regulatory cooperation has well implemented the European aspiration of providing 
for a constructive dialogue between stakeholders and citizens. It follows that EU-China regulatory 
cooperation hovers in between fostering competition and promoting reciprocity. Nevertheless, 
responding to Chinese techno-nationalism requires at least some degree of assertiveness and 
centralization on the part of the Commission. Further simplification and efficiency could be achieved 
by transferring regulatory efforts from bilateral relations to the construction of more viable multilateral 
governance structures.  
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4.2. Regulatory Cooperation in the Light of the Europe 2020 Strategy 
Evaluating EU-China regulatory cooperation with regard to the Europe 2020 Strategy demands an 
evaluation of whether and to what extent EU-China regulatory cooperation contributes to the EU’s 
growth strategy for the coming decade. First of all, the Strategy claims as its priority to deliver smart 
sustainable and inclusive growth by 2020. Secondly, the Strategy sets out five key targets for the EU 
to achieve by 2020. These targets relate to employment coverage, R&D investment, climate change 
and energy, education, and poverty and social exclusion.119 Thirdly, the Strategy includes seven so-
called flagship initiatives through which the 2020 targets should be achieved.120 These initiatives are 
known as: the digital agenda for Europe, an Innovation Union, Youth on the Move, a resource 
efficient Europe, an industrial policy for the globalisation era, an agenda for new skills and jobs, and a 
European platform against poverty. Lastly, the EU aims to use the full range of EU policies and 
instruments to effectively achieve the Europe 2020 goals.  
 
First, in terms of the five key targets it should be noted that none of the indicators for these five key 
targets sets any specific target for standardisation.121 It follows that standardisation targets and EU-
China regulatory cooperation must be seen as indirectly fostering the targets.  
Second, and in terms of the flagship initiatives in the realm of smart growth, it is particularly the 
digital agenda for Europe and the Innovation Union that require smart standardisation policies for 
success. The creation of a single market based on interoperable Internet facilities and applications 
requires intelligent standardisation policies. More relevant, however, in the context of EU-China 
regulatory cooperation is the establishment of an Innovation Union. Establishing an Innovation Union 
requires refocusing R&D and innovation policies towards addressing novel social challenges as well 
as strengthening every link in the innovation chain.122 The respective Communication by the 
Commission states explicitly that interoperable standards are required to improve the framework 
conditions for businesses to innovate.123 Likewise, in the realm of sustainable growth the 
Communication states that common standards are of outstanding relevance for building a resource-
efficient Europe through modernising and decarbonising the transport sector.124 In addition, the 
Commission aims at a new industrial policy for the globalisation era that maintains and supports a 
strong, diversified and competitive industrial base for Europe.125 Therein, standard-setting is regarded 
as an essential instrument for a successful horizontal approach to industrial policy. And even more 
importantly in the context of EU-China regulatory cooperation, leveraging European and international 
standards for the long-term competitiveness of European industry is regarded as a key to promoting 
the transition of service and manufacturing sectors to greater resource efficiency.126 
In summary, it follows that the Europe 2020 Strategy does not explicitly provide any standardisation 
targets for EU-China regulatory cooperation to meet. However, it sets out a comprehensive set of key 
targets and flagship initiatives in which standardisation policy and standards cooperation play a 
decisive role. Whilst it is as yet too early to measure the contribution of EU-China regulatory 
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cooperation to the achievement of those targets, it can certainly be claimed that the current design of 
EU-China regulatory cooperation contributes to the achievement of the Europe 2020 Strategy in the 
area of the digital agenda for Europe, the Innovation Union, and the industrial policy for globalization. 
At the same time, its design aims to strike a balance between encouraging reciprocity, on the one hand, 
and harmonising international standards, on the other hand.   
 
4.3. Regulatory Cooperation in the Light of Europe’s Trade Policy towards China 
An assessment of EU-China regulatory cooperation in the light of Europe’s trade policy towards China 
requires, first of all, an assessment of how it fits generally into EU trade policy. Quite distinct from the 
EU Better Regulation Strategy and the Europe 2020 Strategy, this assessment requires a perspective 
on the public policy that governs trade between the EU and other countries. In accordance with Article 
207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),127 the main objectives of EU 
trade policy are the lowering of barriers to EU exports and investments on the one hand, and on the 
other the improvement of conditions for importers from third countries, with the former being of 
paramount importance in the realm of international standardisation policies. 
Thus, in terms of access strategies, it should be noted that China is the second largest EU export 
destination after the US. And it should further be noted that China leads the list of importers into the 
EU.128 It follows that EU-China regulatory cooperation on standards is of paramount importance in 
facilitating trade between the two trading blocks. This fits well in an era of economic regionalism and 
bilateralism.129 At the same time, however, and in terms of instruments, EU-China regulatory 
cooperation is only one of the many pillars of EU trade policy, which also covers multilateral trade 
agreements, bilateral trade agreements and the deepening of relationships with other strategic 
partners.130 In fact, increased emphasis on bilateral relations can even be considered a symptom of the 
failure of multipolar trade policies.131 Yet again, in terms of the substance of trade policy, the EU has 
consistently stressed that the emphasis of trade policy is moving away from tariffs towards other 
relevant areas such as standards. It follows that EU-China regulatory cooperation corresponds well 
with this shift in policy emphasis beyond tariff policies and fits well with a trade policy that aims to 
secure market access for European exporters.  
Turning more specifically to an assessment of EU-China regulatory cooperation in the light of 
Europe’s trade policy towards China, a starting point should be the recognition that recent years have 
seen the rising importance of close China-EU cooperation in S&T.132 This is, in particular, due to the 
fact that China-EU commercial relations are more technology-intensive than other bilateral 
relationships. China’s government is well aware of the EU being the largest source for China’s 
imported technology. In fact, China very deliberately supports the transfer of European technology to 
China. This finding is supported by a statement by Deng Xiaoping that demonstrates the extent to 
which China aims to absorb European technologies: ‘Now, that the West European countries are beset 
with economic difficulties, we should lose no time in seeking their cooperation, so as to speed up our 
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technological transformation’.133 This statement should not be the only reason for worries on the part 
of the European Commission. In fact, complaints on the part of European enterprises are wide-raining 
and they are particularly strong in the realm of standardisation. Ever since 1995 these complaints have 
invariably been addressed by changing policy on the part of the European Commission, with the 
regulatory dialogue on standard setting being one of the cornerstones of EU-China trade policy in the 
21st century.134  
One important point to note in the context of EU-China trade policy, however, is the nature of such 
policies. Ever since 2006, the EU has placed particular emphasis on the amicable resolution of trade 
problems through dialogue rather than a more confrontational approach.135 The reason for this policy 
approach lies in its recognition of China as a partner and a new trading power rather than an 
opponent.136 Retaliatory measures are reserved as a last resort for conflict resolution. This also applies 
to the use of WTO channels of dispute resolution, which are reserved for ultimate stalemates. In 
consequence, the nature of EU-China regulatory cooperation in the area of standardisation corresponds 
well to this amicable policy approach. Rather than relying on hard laws and final dispute resolution 
mechanisms, EU-China regulatory cooperation on standards relies on soft laws, collaborative designs 
and amicable dispute resolution.  Nevertheless, the EU has consistently stressed that – despite an 
amicable approach – it will strongly fight for openness in European trade with China for the benefit of 
European businesses.137 
In summary, until the 1990s EU trade policy could well be characterised as technocratic and rather 
opaque. However, from the mid-1990s there has been a consolidation of decision-making processes 
and a growth in de facto competence for trade in the Commission due to treaty changes. These 
changes have also left their imprint on EU-China regulatory cooperation on standards, an area in 
which the EU has demonstrated increasing activity. Moreover, EU-China regulatory cooperation has 
come to correspond to a growing trend towards economic regionalism, beyond-tariff foreign policy, 
and to increasing perceptions of China as a new and important trading partner. This perception has 
also translated into an approach that could be characterized as one based on the realization of ever 
novel competition. Realizing the growing competition from China, the EU has devoted its foreign 
trade policies towards assisting European enterprises in China, towards overseeing the establishment 
of new commercial resources in China and towards supporting European enterprises in international 
standards wars. 
 
5. Conclusions and Suggestions for New Directions in EU-China Regulatory Cooperation 
on Standards 
This paper’s discussion of regulatory approaches towards standards in the EU and China, its analysis 
of EU-China regulatory cooperation on standards and its evaluation thereof have shown that the global 
landscape of standardisation is shaped by political, professional and citizen interests. With the 
increasing proliferation of standardisation and the ever growing role of standards in global commerce, 
political initiatives that intervene in formerly mostly private standard-setting processes have 
dramatically increased. One of these political initiatives has been EU-China regulatory cooperation 
aiming to soften the standards competition between the two trading blocks. The ever growing interest 
                                                     
133 W. Jiabao, ‘Vigorously Promoting Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between China and the European Union’, 
Speech, by the Chinese Prime Minister at the China-EU Investment and Trade Forum, Brussels, 6 May 2004. 
134 R. Ash, ‘Europe’s Commercial Relations with China’, in D. Shambaugh et al. (eds.), supra note 132, p. 231. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Commission Working Paper Document, ‘Competition and Partnership’, COM(2006) 632 final. 
137 Ibid. 
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of the EU to engage in a constructive dialogue with China reflects not only its interest in harmonious 
trade relationships but also its fears about a rising technological power and fierce competitor.138 This 
cooperation can even be characterized as one of the initiatives to curb Chinese techno-nationalism 
through ever stronger bilateralism. It is grounded in the fact that the Chinese standardisation system 
has matured considerably over the last decade, with the number of Chinese standards now exceeding 
the number of European standards. And it has received further impetus from China’s dedication to 
closing the gaps to international standardisation. At the same time, however, there remains a lack of 
understanding between European and Chinese standardisation cultures, as well as deficiencies in the 
adoption of coherent sets of standards in China and on a global level.  
Turning, then, to suggestions on how to address these deficiencies in EU-China regulatory cooperation 
on standards, the following recommendations are made: 
First of all, standards policy should, together with trade policy, be re-evaluated as ‘high politics’, as 
opposed to remaining classified as ‘low politics’. The reason for this recommendation is the rising 
determination of global players, such as China, to make trade policy an important instrument of its 
international affairs policy. Standard wars are just one – albeit an important – symptom of this 
development, while such wars are increasingly being fought by public authorities as opposed to 
private entities. It follows further from this shift from private to public that European innovation, S&T, 
trade and international affairs policies should be adapted and integrated to better account for the 
flexibility and progress of technological development. Moreover, constant re-evaluation should be 
undertaken as to whether a particular standard-setting problem is best dealt with by compulsive laws 
and regulations or voluntary standards.  
A second recommendation relates to this final point of distinction between regulation and standards. 
Its aim is to encourage the European Commission to refocus attention on raising China’s awareness of 
the danger of controlling standardisation as opposed to facilitating standardisation processes. Past 
initiatives have not only shown China’s serious commitment to technological innovation and standard 
setting but also its potential to distort processes of standards development and setting through 
government intervention. As the international standards landscape is becoming ever more 
controversial and contested, initiatives are required that curb economic nationalism while promoting 
openness and transparency in international standard setting. EU-China regulatory cooperation could be 
an important milestone in reshaping the role of government involvement in the promotion of 
technological development. More specifically, EU-China regulatory cooperation should – in its current 
cooperative spirit – refocus its aim on promoting enabling roles, as opposed to controlling roles, of 
governments in standard-setting.  
To sum up, China-EU regulatory cooperation has become an important bilateral collaborative effort in 
the realm of international standardisation that not only has the potential to determine the trajectory of 
the global standards regime. Rather, it has the responsibility to promote an open, efficient, coherent 
and competitive global standards regime that strikes an appropriate balance between guaranteeing 
market access, benefiting consumers and allowing for the achievement of public policy objectives.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
138 Cf. R. Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (Oxford: OUP 2008).  
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European Union Policy on Foreign Investment: A Missed Opportunity? 
 
Stephen Woolcock  
 
1.  Introduction 
This article seeks to contribute to the broader topic of the EU’s role in shaping international regulatory 
norms or standards.  The EU could be said to possess normative power when the following conditions 
are satisfied: (a) there is an enduring consensus on the overall aims and shape of the EU acquis; (b) 
there is de jure competence under the treaties; and (c) there is also an acceptance of de facto EU 
competence by the Member States. De facto competence exists when there is an agreed, well 
established regime for decision-making and negotiation with respect to international economic 
negotiations.  Normative power is however unlikely to be sufficient as a means of shaping the 
positions of other parties (states) in international negotiations. This is clearly illustrated in the EU’s 
attempts to provide leadership of the multilateral trade negotiations for the decade stretching from the 
mid-1990s until the Global Europe strategy of 2006, when the EU switched (back) to a multi-level 
approach to trade negotiations. Market power is also required in trade and investment negotiations, 
and the EU’s relative market power has been in decline for some time due to: (a) the rise of the 
emerging countries with their market potential and relatively closed markets; (b) the openness of the 
EU market following the de facto unilateral opening of the 1980s, especially in investment; and (c) the 
limited scope for the EU to use ‘negative’ threats of closure to enhance its market power (due to de 
facto consensus based or even QMV decision-making).  
The EU was largely unsuccessful in shaping the multilateral agenda in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Because the comprehensive agenda favoured by the EU was opposed by developing and 
emerging market members of the WTO and gained little support from the United States. Rather than 
negotiate investment in the WTO as favoured by the EU, the US pressed for plurilateral negotiations 
in the OECD. The idea of making progress in the OECD and then widening participation to a 
genuinely multilateral agreement proved to be a false hope and the negotiations on the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) collapsed in 1998.1 The EU preference was to include investment as 
one of the Singapore issues in the multilateral Doha Development Agenda (DDA).2 Although added to 
the WTO work programme agenda in Singapore in 1996 the issue was never really discussed in the 
WTO. The other so-called Singapore issues (public procurement, competition and trade facilitation) 
did not fair much better and all but the last were dropped from the DDA in 2003. 
The failure of the EU to shape norms and standards in FDI is therefore part of a broader picture that 
raises questions about the utility of normative power unless backed or at least accompanied by market 
power. The EU made little headway in persuading others to follow its lead in other policy areas, such 
as competition and public procurement, where the EU possessed a strong acquis as well as de jure and 
de facto EU competence, so areas in which one would expect the EU to have possessed normative 
power. The switch in EU policy in the mid-2000s towards the more active use of preferential trade 
negotiations could therefore be seen as recognition of the limits of normative power. Where the EU 
                                                     
1 Again in 2011/12 the United States was pressing for a plurilateral approach to trade and investment in the wake of the 
deadlock in negotiations in the WTO.  This time the US has included services in its plurilateral agenda and is seeking to 
persuade the EU to follow suit. 
2 A. R. Youngand J. Peterson,‘The EU and the new trade politics’, 13:6 Journal of European Public Policy 2006, pp. 795-
814.  
 
Marise Cremona and Tamara Takács (eds) 
 
110 
possesses normative power this can be brought to bear at either the preferential or multilateral levels of 
negotiation, but relative market power is greater at the preferential (in effect bilateral level). 
 
2.  International Investment Agreements (IIA) 
This section summarises the main elements in any IIA so that an assessment can be made of the 
impact of the EU on the evolution of international norms and standards. Figure 1 provides an 
overview, but requires some elaboration. 
The definition of investment in any agreement can be important, some agreements define investment as 
covering only FDI (a concept that is itself imprecise but generally means control by the foreign legal 
entity) others have a broader definition and can, for example, include all assets including intellectual 
property. The existing European Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by the EU Member 
States, do not generally provide a detailed definition of investment.  
An important distinction between IIAs in the past has been between those that provide for 
liberalisation (i.e., pre-establishment national treatment, or bans on performance requirements 
imposed by governments on investors, such as local value-addition) and investment protection.  Pre-
establishment national treatment means in effect access for FDI and this is granted by listing sectors 
covered in schedules using either positive listing (of sectors covered) or negative listing (of sectors 
excluded). Negative listing is generally considered to be more liberal because new activities are 
covered unless specifically listed and thus excluded. As figure 1 illustrates the US approach is to use 
negative listing, the EU in negotiations such as those on the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) which includes establishment (liberalisation of FDI) in mode 3, generally uses positive listing 
(or a hybrid system of positive and negative listing).  Performance requirements can take a number of 
forms and generally speaking the North American IIAs include more prohibitions than those agreed in 
the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement in the Uruguay Round that banned six.  
In terms of investment protection IIAs have since the last century always included provisions requiring 
compensation and fair and equitable treatment in cases of de jure expropriation (i.e., nationalisation). 
Many agreements, including about half the European BITs, also cover de facto expropriation 
(sometimes called regulatory taking). In such cases IIAs provide for compensation when host state 
regulatory policies negatively affect the value of assets (e.g., through environmental regulations that 
raise the costs for investors). The more ‘developed’ IIAs such as those based on the US or Canadian 
model agreements provide definitions of what can constitute de facto expropriation. For example, they 
specify that non-discriminatory regulation pursuing legitimate social or environmental objectives 
cannot be defined as de facto expropriation. The European BITs leave the determination of what is de 
facto expropriation to arbitral panels and do not seek to define the scope for ‘the right to regulate’. 
Although it is argued that arbitration by complying with international legal practice does in effect 
follow similar norms, this remains an area of controversy. There is also a distinction between the 
North American approach and that of the European (Member State) BITs in that the former provide 
comparators for the general principles of national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and most 
favoured nation (MFN) status. In other words these principles should apply in like circumstances or in 
line with international legal standards. The European BITs simply specify the principles and again 
leave these to be applied on a case by case basis in the case of disputes by an arbitral panel.3   
 
                                                     
3 European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies ‘The EU Approach to International Investment Policy After 
the Lisbon Treaty’, 2010, PE 433.854-855-856. 
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All IIAs generally provide for the protection of capital transfers, in other words repatriation of profits 
or dividends. These are sometimes more specific and include exemptions in cases of balance-of-
payments crisis or other exceptional economic difficulties, as in the case of agreements signed by the 
US and the free trade agreements concluded by the EU. EU Member State BITs tend to include simple 
clauses on freedom of capital movement. As a result some have been inconsistent with EU 
legislation.4 
Some IIAs include requirements on investors to satisfy certain requirements, such as to comply with 
environmental or labour standards. In current EU terminology these are called sustainable 
development provisions. Both the US and Canadian IIAs include such social provisions, although they 
are linked to economic outcomes. In other words under NAFTA host states must not disregard 
environmental standards in order to gain a competitive commercial advantage. The ‘classic’ European 
BITs do not include provisions on sustainable development and only one (concluded by Belgium-
Luxembourg) includes such a provision.   
With regard to dispute settlement the international norm is now clearly one of investor-state dispute 
settlement with recourse to arbitration (such as ICSID, the International Centre on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes). In the past European BITs did not include investor-state dispute settlement, but 
Member States have followed the trend towards investor-state provisions set by the US and the more 
recent agreements include it. Such dispute settlement dates at least from the Canada US FTA of 1988 
and NAFTA, which established this as the norm. Again the North American based IIAs provide for 
much greater detail on how disputes and arbitration should work. Experience with disputes has led the 
US and Canada to include, for example, provision for bi-national reviews of arbitration decisions, 
transparency (to include more stakeholders) and provisions to prevent dual claims and forum shopping 
(i.e., choosing the IIA that offers the best chances of winning a claim for damages) by investors. The 
Member State BITs leave the arbitral process entirely to the existing (private) arbitration systems 
without any scope for consideration of public policy. This was done in the belief that scope for public 
policy in the past meant only scope for host states to frustrate claims by European investors. Retaining 
the Member States’ norms in this and other aspects of investment policy is conservative and may not 
reflect the future in which the EU will become relatively more important as a host state itself.  
One final important distinguishing feature of IIAs is whether they are comprehensive, meaning 
whether they cover both liberalisation and protection. From the 1980s and certainly since NAFTA, the 
US has negotiated comprehensive agreements covering liberalisation and investment protection and 
usually as part of a bilateral preferential trade and investment agreement. The EU did not negotiate 
comprehensive agreements because there has been no EU competence for investment. The EU has 
included some aspects of liberalisation in its trade agreements, such as establishment in services, by 
virtue of the de facto competence of the EU in this field. EU FTAs also included provisions on capital 
flows, because these came under EU competence under Article 63 and 64 TFEU (previously 57 TEC) 
but not investment protection which continued to be covered by the some 1200 Member State BITs. 
The issues for the EU are therefore whether it can successfully negotiate comprehensive provisions on 
investment as part of on-going PTA negotiations (with Canada, Singapore or India) or as BITs outside 
of a free trade agreement (such as with China) and what these comprehensive investment provisions 
should look like. 
 
 
                                                     
4  Ibid., see also OECD (2005)  ‘Novel Features in OECD Countries’ Recent Investment Agreements: An Overview’ (Paris 
2005). 
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Figure 1 
Comparison of the European model BIT with that of North America 
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3.  The Current International Climate for IIAs 
Despite various efforts in the past to negotiate one, there is no common international investment 
agreement. But there is arguably an emerging set of norms in the field of international investment 
based on a patchwork of bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements. 
Historically there have been various efforts to establish international (multilateral) standards for 
investment. These took the form of the debate in the League of Nations in the 1920s and 30s, which 
introduced general norms such as fair and equitable treatment that are still used today and the 
International Trade Organization (ITO). When the ITO failed due to differences between creditor 
states (essentially the USA) and host states (Latin America), efforts shifted to the OEEC/OECD during 
the 1950s. Again differences between creditor and host states prevented agreement, but the draft 
produced at the time, the so-called Abs-Shawcroft draft provided the basis for European (BITs) the 
first of which was the German-Pakistani BIT in 1959. After further US-led efforts during the 1970s to 
create a GATT for investment failed, a plurilateral approach to liberalisation prevailed within the 
OECD together with a partial multilateral approach in the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreements in the Uruguay Round.5 
Investment protection was provided by BITs with the European (Member States) setting the pace until 
the 1980s when the US developed a model BIT in 1982, which became the model for comprehensive 
rules on investment in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
The 1990s saw a surge in BITs and general liberalisation of investment. After the end of the Uruguay 
Round the consensus among developed economies was that investment remained the next key topic 
for international negotiations, but views still differed on how to proceed. The US favoured a return to 
the OECD to negotiate a plurilateral ‘Multilateral Investment Agreement’ (MAI) that would then 
attract other signatories and thus become a high standard international investment agreement. The EU 
favoured inclusion of investment as one of the Singapore issues in the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA), but opposition from developing countries and lack of support from the USA, meant that there 
were no serious negotiations within the WTO. While negotiations in the OECD were taking place EU 
member states continued to conclude BITs and the US pressed ahead with its NAFTA model.  
When the MAI negotiations collapsed in 1998, for a range of reasons, it was seen as confirmation of 
the view that if progress was to be made it would have to come in the form of bilateral agreements. 
The US pressed ahead with its ‘competitive liberalisation strategy’ once the Bush Administration 
obtained Trade Negotiation Authority from Congress in 2001.6 There was diffusion of the NAFTA 
model (see table 1) via countries such as Mexico, Chile and Singapore, which signed NAFTA type 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) with the US that included comprehensive investment 
provisions and then used similar rules in PTAs with third countries.7 
                                                     
5 The so called Mode 3 of GATS covers establishment for service providers, which is equivalent to access or liberalisation 
for foreign service providers subject to a hybrid (mixed positive and negative listing of covered sectors). The TRIMs 
prohibits six performance requirements, such as local content used in the production resulting from FDI.  
6 ‘Competitive liberalisation’ meant using any level or forum for negotiation (multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral) in pursuit 
of US aims and represented a departure from US support from multilateralism see C. F. Bergsten, ‘Competitive 
Liberalization and Global Free Trade: a vision for the early 21st Century’, Working Paper No 96-15 (Washington: Institute 
for International Economics 1996). 
7 J. Reiter, ‘Investment’ in S. Woolcock (ed.), Trade and Investment Rulemaking: the role of regional and bilateral 
agreements (Tokyo: UN University Press 2006). 
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More and more developing countries switched from infant industry-protection-based development 
strategies and, encouraged by UNCTAD and other bodies, signed up to BITs in the belief that these 
would result in increased inward investment. 
In Europe the response was fragmented. Member States continued to conclude BITs based more or 
less on the classic European model established in the 1960s and covering investment protection but 
not liberalisation.8 In the early 2000s the EU negotiated a number of bilateral PTAs that included 
investment provisions, such as EU – Chile, but coverage of investment in these was limited to 
liberalisation of capital flows. There was no coverage of investment protection. There was de facto EU 
competence for services investment in the Uruguay Round so the EU negotiated investment in services 
in the form of establishment under Mode 3. 
In other words a patchwork of investment rules was developing in place of a comprehensive 
international regime. In this the NAFTA model was more comprehensive and developed than the 
European BITs. During the 1990s there was a surge in the number of IIAs resulting in more than 3000 
BITs and numerous PTAs with comprehensive investment provisions. 
But during the 2000s the picture began to change somewhat. While the central role of investment 
came to be recognised by all countries, experience with IIAs led to a shift in opinion on their merits. In 
North America a spate of claims for de facto expropriation by US companies against Canada led to a 
revision of the general wording on de facto expropriation that aimed to define its scope more tightly. 
Experience with arbitration also led to some concern expressed that important public policy issues 
were being decided by arbitral panels that were not always transparent and were not subject to any 
review. A number of claims against new EU member states, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, 
raised awareness that even EU member states could be subject to claims under investment protection 
provisions. 
As outward FDI from the emerging markets began to grow there has been a growing awareness that 
the balance of interest between the creditor nations (hitherto the OECD countries) and the hosts for 
inward FDI (previously the developing economies) is changing. Chinese and Indian acquisitions of 
telecommunications and steel companies in the USA and EU respectively pointed to a trend towards at 
least a partial reversal of FDI flows. Some interests within the EU began to raise the question of 
whether IIAs would restrict the EU’s right to regulate, because EU level regulation could be seen as de 
facto expropriation. The prospects of (state-owned) Chinese companies acquiring ‘strategically’ 
important companies in the EU also raised the question of what sort of exceptions there should be to 
liberalisation under IIAs to defend the EU’s ‘commercially strategic’ interests and who would decide 
on these, the Member State government(s) concerned or the EU. Defence of commercially ‘strategic’ 
firms in the EU would amount to a de facto industrial policy, on which there has never been a 
consensus in the EU. For emerging markets the benefits of IIAs are also now seen in terms of 
protecting their investment in the developed country markets as much as attracting inward FDI. 
Among developing countries (DCs) there has also been a reassessment of the value of IIAs. Many 
smaller developing countries signed BITs in the belief that they would result in increased inward FDI. 
But empirical studies have produced ambiguous results on the impact of BITs on FDI flows. Only in 
the case of comprehensive investment rules as part of a wider free trade agreement does there appear 
to be much clear evidence of increased inward FDI. South Africa announced a shift in policy that 
amounted to a desire to renegotiate the BITs it had concluded in the late 1990s and early 2000s and 
other developing countries have adopted a far more cautious approach. 
This reassessment of IIAs has introduced an element of flexibility in a debate that was previously 
shaped by a clear creditor-host state/North-South divide and could present an opportunity to revive 
                                                     
8 This model is essentially that described in figure 1, although Member State BITs have evolved slightly since the 1960s. 
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efforts to negotiate a genuine multilateral regime for investment. At the very least the former 
entrenched positions of creditor and host states have been eased.  This comes at a time when the EU 
through the TFEU has acquired exclusive competence for foreign direct investment. Thus international 
trends in investment policy and the expansion of competence within the EU provide an opportunity for 
the EU (as opposed to the Member States) to more effectively shape the policy debate on international 
investment rules. Whether it can do so depends on how the EU responds, which will in turn be 
determined by how competence is defined in practice and whether the EU can define a coherent 
comprehensive policy on international investment. 
 
4.  EU Competence for FDI 
Articles 206 and 207 TFEU bring ‘foreign direct investment’ under exclusive EU competence as part 
of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), but does not define FDI leaving somewhat open the actual 
scope of the new EU competence.  
Whilst there is no single definition of FDI there is a broad agreement that FDI must involve a long-
lasting interest of an investor in the enterprise abroad (which does not often apply to portfolio 
investment) and provide the investor with a certain degree of managerial control. The figure of 10% of 
the affiliated company’s shares is often used as a measure of control.9 Within the EU there has been an 
acceptance of this distinction between FDI and portfolio investment, such as in its position papers 
regarding negotiations on investment in the Doha Round of the WTO and indeed in the Commission’s 
Communication on investment.10 The ECJ has also defined FDI along similar lines11 according to 
which FDI should be considered as a long-lasting investment, representing at least 10% of the 
affiliated company’s equity capital/shares and providing the investor with ‘managerial control’ over 
the affiliated company’s operations. If an investor holds less than 10% of shares of an affiliated 
company, it can still qualify as FDI provided the investor has ‘managerial control’ over the affiliated 
company.12 As comprehensive investment agreements and standard BITs normally not only cover 
FDI, but also portfolio investment, payments and legal titles (e.g., intellectual property rights), the 
ECJ’s definition sets limits on the new EU competence. The EU’s definition corresponds with those 
used by the IMF and the OECD, but there is still some scope for differences over competence given 
the growth of global supply chains.13   
The lack of EU competence for investment was an anomaly given the increasingly close links between 
trade and investment. In successive intergovernmental conferences the Commission had pressed for 
exclusive competence to be extended, but Member States resisted. The exact details of how FDI came 
to be accepted as exclusive competence remain to be researched. In the discussions on the 
Constitutional Treaty inclusion of investment was opposed by Germany, France, Britain, Spain and 
The Netherlands (the main users of bilateral Member State BITs). But investment was included in the 
draft constitutional treaty and carried over into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). The factors behind this change were probably the growing acceptance that having EU 
                                                     
9 C. Hermann, ‘Die Zukuenft der mitgliedsstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon’ in 21/6 
Europaeische Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschaftsrecht, pp.207-211. 
10 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Towards a comprehensive European foreign investment policy’, 
COM(2010) 343. 
11 C-446/04 in which the ECJ draws on the definition of direct investment in Directive 88/361/EEC.  
12 European Parliament, supra note 3. 
13C. Tietje, ‘Europa spring ein’ Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 19 January 2009, p. 8. 
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exclusive competence for trade but not investment was indeed an anomaly given the ever greater 
importance of investment in EU external economic relations. There was also pressure from the 
Commission, European Parliament and integrationist Member States in favour of a more active and 
coherent external policy for the EU. Another factor may however have been that the key negotiators of 
the TFEU in the Member States coming from foreign ministries were focused on their role in the new 
External Action Service of the EU that was to be created and that they were willing to make 
concessions on FDI, a policy area shaped by a small group of the specialist investment lawyers. 
However it came about the extension of competence provides an opportunity for the EU to play a 
greater role in international investment policy. The EU will have more leverage in bilateral 
negotiations than individual Member States and the ability to negotiate comprehensive trade and 
investment agreements will also enhance EU leverage. Before the EU can make use of this opportunity 
it has to overcome a number of challenges including: (i) how to manage the transition from Member 
State to EU investment agreements; (ii) what common policy should the EU adopt and (iii) where 
should de facto competence for EU investment policy lie, in the negotiation and application of EU 
IIAs.14 
 
5.  The Challenges   
The EU faces a number of interrelated challenges if it is to promote coherent EU standards or norms in 
international investment. In the short to medium term it must manage the transition from some 1200 
Member State BITs to a common EU regime. In the longer term it must find a consensus on a common 
EU policy on investment.  But at the same time it is working on these ‘domestic’ issues, it must 
negotiate trade and investment agreements with third countries as part of the on-going EU strategy for 
securing EU engagement in growth markets.15 
 
5.1.  Managing the Transition from Member State to EU Investment Agreements 
Managing the transition is important because a degree of legal uncertainty has been introduced with 
the TFEU. If the EU is now competent for FDI what is the status of the existing Member State BITs? 
Under international law the existing BITs will continue to provide protection for investors even after 
they are terminated. So even if all Member State BITs were terminated overnight, there would still be 
a risk of a potential clash between EU and Member State investment agreements. Third countries 
could for example, challenge claims made by EU investors under Member State BITs on the grounds 
that these have been superseded by EU competence. Even before the adoption of the TFEU some 
Member State BITs were found to be in conflict with EU law.16 In this instance the Member State 
BITs provided unqualified protection for capital flows, whereas the EU treaties provide for capital 
controls when necessary to deal with acute difficulties in the functioning of Economic and Monetary 
Union or for trade sanctions (Arts 64(2), 66 and 75 TFEU). There is also an apparent conflict between 
the investment provisions in certain EU bilateral agreements, such as EU Chile from 2000, which 
                                                     
14 There are number of other more specific challenges, such as who should assume responsibility for investment disputes, see 
European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a framework for 
managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements 
to which the European Union is party COM (2012) 335 final 2012/0163 (COD). There is also the question of who would 
decide on the use of any ‘security’ exception to EU liberal investment policy. 
 
15 This has been set out in the Global Europe paper of 2006 and the Trade Growth and World Affairs statement of 2010 and 
includes for example seeking to negotiate FTAs with the major emerging markets. 
16 See the cases against Sweden, Finland and Austria C-206/2006, 269/2006 and C-118/2007 European Court of Justice.  
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provides for capital controls in cases of serious balance of payments problems. This is again at odds 
with Member State BITs that provide unqualified rights to free flow of capital, and the Member States 
concerned have had to rectify their existing BITs. 
The Commission’s approach to dealing with the transition issue was set out in the proposed 
Regulation on transitional arrangements for Member State BITs with third countries of July 2010.17 
After nearly two years of discussions with differences emerging between some Member States and the 
Commission as well as the European Parliament agreement was finally reached in the form of 
Regulation 1219/2012.18 This provides for authorisation of existing Member States by the 
Commission on notification by the Member States (Article 2 of the proposed Regulation). The 
Commission assesses each BIT to ensure that it does not contain provisions that were in conflict with 
EU law, did overlap with EU BITs and (most controversially) does not constitute an obstacle to the 
development and implementation of the Union’s policies relating to investment. For example, Member 
States with existing BITs with China might prefer to keep these rather than engage in a long drawn out 
EU - China negotiation, especially when the content is uncertain due to pressure from interests such as 
those in the European Parliament wanting to add sustainable development conditions. The regulation 
envisages authorisation for Member States to negotiate amendments to existing or new BITs, for 
example with small developing countries Member States argued against the Commission having 
power to authorise Member State BITs on the grounds that this would create legal uncertainty.  Issues 
of competence and control also resulted in a drawn out negotiation. Decisions on the sensitive issue of 
authorisation of Member State BITs will be taken by the advisory procedure in accordance with the 
new comitology rules set out in Regulation 182/2011 and a Committee for Investment Agreements is 
established 'to assist' the Commission in its decisions.19   
 
5.2.  Defining a Common EU Policy on Investment 
The more challenging but medium to long term challenge is to reach a consensus on a common EU 
policy on investment. For some years the Commission and Member States have been working on a 
‘common investment platform’, but the TFEU adds the need to reach agreement with the European 
Parliament, which has complicated and arguably politicised the debate. 
Broadly speaking it is in the interest of investors (i.e., EU companies or legal persons) in third 
countries, to maximise access for FDI and the post establishment protection for their invested assets. 
Investors generally seek unqualified protection for their investment, in other words national treatment, 
fair and equitable treatment and freedom to repatriate earnings and capital. Business interests tend to 
stress the need for legal certainty and are concerned that a long drawn out debate within the EU on 
what EU investment policy should be would result in competitive disadvantages for EU business as 
the EU’s main competitors press ahead with comprehensive investment agreements. The policy 
community that has worked on investment agreements over the years has been fairly small and made 
up of specialist investment lawyers. This policy community tends to favour conserving the existing, 
                                                     
17 European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council for the introduction of a 
transitional regulation for bilateral investment treaties between Member States and third countries, COM(2010) 344, 7 July 
2010. 
 
18  Regulation (EU) 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries OJ [2012] L 351/40, 
20.12.2012. 
19 Under the advisory procedure the Commission is not bound by the Committee's decision but must take 'utmost account' of 
them. This approach was facilitated by the inclusion of criteria for the authorisation decisions that, together with the 
comitology process, have the effect of limiting Commission discretion. 
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classic Member State model BIT and resists what is called ‘NAFTA contamination’ or following the 
evolution of IIAs that include new, more extensive wording that seeks to define rights and obligations 
more exactly. 
On the other hand, not all interest groups in the EU favour extensive liberalisation of investment or at 
least support certain sectoral exceptions from liberalisation. Although the 1980s saw the general shift 
towards liberalisation of investment in the EU which has arguably weakened the EU’s market power, 
some sensitive sectors remain such as health, education and audio-visual. Some development NGOs 
oppose extensive liberalisation on the grounds that it undermines the ability of developing countries to 
develop their own industries or works against sustainable development. There is also the question of 
whether EU level investment agreements will undermine the EU’s ability to regulate in the field of the 
environment or social policies. This ‘right to regulate’ is important for environmental interests in the 
EU, whether in the shape of NGOs, in some Commission services or the European Parliament. There 
is also pressure to include sustainable development clauses in EU trade and investment agreements. 
With the European Parliament having the power of consent covering any trade or investment 
agreements, this provides the Green parties and the Socialists and Democratic group with leverage in 
pushing for sustainable development clauses. 
In between these two broad ends of the spectrum there is a case for using the opportunity offered by 
the extension of EU competence to modernise Europe’s existing investment agreements to ensure that 
they will remain viable in an international economy in which the balance of FDI flows seems certain 
to change with an increase in FDI flowing into the EU from emerging markets. There is also a case for 
addressing the risks inherent in a system of dispute settlement that relies on private arbitration without 
any public review of arbitral decisions.  
To these interests one must add those of the various EU institutions. As noted above the European 
Parliament is determined to ensure that it has an effective say in such a new area of EU competence. 
The Council and within it a number of Member State governments such as Germany, The Netherlands 
and Britain are equally determined to limit the role of the European Parliament for fear that it will lead 
to an excessive politicisation of EU investment policy. Some Member States have a strong interest in 
the status quo, because with established networks of high standard BITs (i.e., those offering 
unqualified protection for investors) they can offer benefits for their own investors and attract 
investors from other Member States seeking to benefit from the investment protection offered by such 
BITs. The interest of the Commission is in implementing the treaty, but also ensuring that the EU 
negotiates comprehensive trade and investments agreements as this would confirm EU de facto 
competence in the field of investment. 
This then brings us to the third challenge facing the EU, namely to negotiate such comprehensive trade 
and investment agreements at a time when there is no explicit consensus on EU investment policy. 
Following the Global Europe strategy of 2006, as confirmed by the policy on Trade, Growth and 
World Affairs, of October 2010, the EU is currently negotiating preferential agreements with Canada, 
Singapore and India that include investment.20 Canada has an interest in comprehensive investment 
provisions in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) it is negotiating, because it 
has important investment interests in some of the new member states in particular.  Canada’s 
experience with NAFTA has meant that it is seeking wording in the agreement with the EU that 
includes clearer definitions of standards and rights, obligations as well as rules on transparency and 
review for arbitral procedures. In other words it is seeking NAFTA type wording. India is interested in 
an EU investment agreement to replace the network of Member State BITs, but opposes sustainable 
                                                     
20S. Evenett, ‘‘‘Global Europe’’ An initial assessment of the European Commission’s New Trade Policy’, available at 
<http://www.evenett.com/articles.htm>. 
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development clauses as does Singapore which is keen to include investment in the PTA it is 
negotiating with the EU. The EU is also preparing to negotiate with China, in order to match the IIAs 
concluded by EU competitors and has included investment in its negotiating mandate for the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. In a negotiation with 
China can the EU place the clear commercial interest in FDI in China above the sustainable 
development clause the European Parliament will surely seek but which China will surely reject? 
More tricky still is however, the issue of a ‘security exemption’ in other words the ability to control 
inward FDI on the grounds of ‘national’ security. This might be seen as analogous to the CIFIUS 
(Committee on International Foreign Investment in the United States). The EU has long argued against 
any broad interpretation of ‘national security’ that would enable commercial investments to be 
blocked. But with the expected increase in outward FDI from China what should the EU policy be and 
who (EU, Commission or Member States) should decide what is in the ‘national’ (or EU) interest? In 
the case of the TTIP the US has stated it wants the highest standards possible in order to set the bar for 
IIAs in general, but how far will the EU go in pressing the US to open up sub-central level investment 
and in how far should the EU converge towards the US/NAFTA model? 
 
6.  The EU and International Investment Standards 
The EU approach to IIAs has differed from the other dominant models such as that of NAFTA. With 
regards to the definition of investment, EU policy will cover FDI only and not portfolio investment, 
but beyond that it seems likely that the EU will avoid detailed definitions of investment in any 
agreement. This is the approach used by the Member States in their BITs and it is likely to be 
supported by the Commission if only because it leaves scope for the evolution of EU level policy. Less 
explicit definitions provide scope for increases in de facto competence and flexibility, which is in line 
with the EU’s past approach on trade in general.21 
On liberalisation the expectation must be that the EU will continue to adopt a relatively flexible 
approach to coverage based on a hybrid listing approach for liberalisation. This is the approach the EU 
has used for establishment in its services negotiations and one it has used in recent PTAs that have 
covered both trade and investment, such as the EU Colombia-Peru FTA and EU Central America 
Trade Agreement. This compares with the negative list approach of the US/NAFTA model. Both of 
course provide scope to exclude sensitive sectors, but most developing countries favour hybrid 
approaches. On performance requirements the EU has established a practice of included a more 
limited number of bans than in the case of the US/NAFTA model, so one can expect this distinction to 
continue. On capital flows the EU policy, also established in various FTAs, is to include scope for 
capital controls in cases of balance of payments or currency crises. This may be at odds with other 
approaches to IIAs, as it has been with the BITs of some Member States.  
On investment protection it remains unclear whether the EU will opt for the Member State BIT model 
of simply requiring national and fair and equitable treatment without any comparator. As figure 2 
shows practice across the Member States varies. The largest users of BITs (Germany, the UK and The 
Netherlands) tend not to include reference to any comparator (whether this is the prevailing 
international standard or national treatment in ‘like circumstances’). Smaller Member States and the 
new Member States that have been on the receiving end of claims, tend to favour the use of a reference 
to international law. See figure 2. The exclusion of any specific reference to comparators leaves more 
scope for arbitral tribunals to determine what is fair and equitable treatment.  
 
                                                     
21 S. Woolcock, European Union Economic Diplomacy: the role of the EU in external economic policy (Ashgate 2012), 
especially chapter 3. 
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Figure 2 EU Member State BIT Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) provisions and customary 
international law 
 
 
Source: European Parliament, 2010 
Any EU IIA would have to include provisions on classic expropriation (i.e., to ensure fair and prompt 
compensation). On this point as well as on investor-state dispute settlement there can be no EU level 
agreement that offers worse protection than the existing Member State BITs, as this would surely 
mean a continued use of Member State BITs and an inability on the part of the Commission to make 
the case for progressively replacing these with EU wide agreements. On de facto expropriation the 
picture is less clear cut, see figure 3. As study of 50 recent Member State BITs shows that indirect 
expropriation has not been firmly established as the norm.  But offering no provisions on de facto 
expropriation in EU level agreements would put EU investors (and inward investors into the EU) on a 
worse footing than for example US investors, or for that matter Chinese investors.22 The expectation 
must therefore be that the EU IIAs will include provisions on de facto expropriation. 
Figure 3 EU countries’ inclusion of indirect expropriation provisions in recent BITs 
 
 
                                                     
22 China appears to wish to see indirect expropriation in its comprehensive trade and investment agreements, such as that 
negotiated recently with Peru. 
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Source European Parliament (2010). Based on a study of 51 recent EU Member State BITs. 
Probably more uncertain still is what sort of limits or qualifications the EU will include on rights in 
cases of de facto expropriation or, to put it another way, what provisions will it want to include on the 
‘right to regulate’. The main advocates of the status quo will wish to avoid any qualification of 
investor rights, with the arguments that this would be used against EU investors overseas and that the 
EU’s respect for the rule of law means it is very unlikely to lose any claims. On the other hand, it is 
unclear that an EU comprehensive trade and investment agreement or EU BIT will gain consent from 
the European Parliament without some provision on the right to regulate. Here some ‘NAFTA 
contamination’ seems likely, for example, a provision to the effect that non-discriminatory regulations 
aimed at genuine social or environmental objectives would not be considered to be de facto 
expropriation. 
On the social issue or the inclusion of human rights clauses and sustainable development provisions in 
agreements the model that is emerging in the EU is for the inclusion of both in any comprehensive 
trade and investment agreement. The Commission and supporters of these provisions argue that the 
TFEU requires this in the sense that trade and investment policy (as well as other elements of external 
relations) must be consistent with the EU’s general normative position as expressed in Article 21, 
Chapter 1 Title V of the Treaty on European Union, which can be interpreted as requiring the 
promotion of sustainable development. The EU now insists on the inclusion of the human rights clause 
in all FTAs, even in the case of the negotiations with Canada. The test case will of course be an EU – 
China agreement. The EU has also sought provisions requiring compliance with a number of the main 
multilateral environment agreements (MEAs) and the core ILO (International Labour Organization) 
labour standards. But the issue is how effectively these would be monitored and what sort of sanctions 
would be taken in cases of questionable compliance. Recent preferential agreements (EU Colombia is 
a case in point) do not provide a specific monitoring and enforcement mechanism for human rights, 
but do for sustainable development (although the latter can to some degree be used to monitor the 
former). General sanctions exist if a party does not comply with the provisions of the agreement, but 
the question is whether the EU would use these. 
Then there is the issue of a ‘security’ exemption in IIAs and if so should this enable foreign 
acquisitions of commercially sensitive companies to be blocked, and by whom.  The EU and US 
recently agreed to guidelines on investment policy that call for a narrow definition of security in such 
cases.23 Indeed, the EU has in the past opposed the use of security exceptions by the US to limit 
investment. But with the growth of acquisitions by state-owned Chinese companies there will be calls 
for an ability to block such acquisitions as long as China effectively controls EU investments. But the 
positions of Member States differ; some (such as Britain) are less concerned about reciprocity than 
attracting inward FDI, while others (such as France) insist upon it. Devolving powers to Member 
States to decide on such cases would undermine any common EU policy, but decisions to block 
acquisitions or FDI on anything but narrowly defined (i.e., defence equipment) security grounds would 
be equivalent to an EU level industrial strategy, on which there is unlikely to be agreement.  
The method of dispute settlement in IIAs is of equal important to the standards, if only because under 
the current system of arbitration, the interpretation of the scope of any investment agreement lies 
largely in the hands of the private arbitrators. As noted above any EU IIA would have to include 
                                                     
23  See Statement of the European Union and the United States on 
Shared Principles for International Investment, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149331.pdf>. 
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investor-state dispute settlement. The opposition of civil society NGOs is unlikely to have much effect 
here. The issue is more how much discretion should be left in the hands of the arbitrators and how 
much the state (i.e., the EU) should set the parameters for arbitration. Member States that have faced 
claims for damages will tend to favour limiting discretion. As figure 4 shows these are mostly the new 
Member States. Member States such as Germany or Britain that have had cases brought against them 
under investment agreements (but not lost) cases do not recognise the problem of arbitral discretion, 
nor does The Netherlands, which does not appear to have faced any cases. 
 
Figure 4 Known* International Arbitration Cases Against EU Member States 
 
Czech Republic 16 
Poland 10 
Romania 7 
Hungary 6 
Slovakia 5 
Estonia 3 
Germany 2 
Latvia  2 
Lithuania 2 
Slovenia 2 
France 1 
Portugal 1 
Bulgaria 1 
Spain 1 
United Kingdom 1 
Total 60 
COMPARISON:   
United States 14 
Canada 14 
Source: UNCTAD   
  
 
*There are cases that go to arbitration but are not made public. 
Source: European Parliament 2010 
 
Figure 5 shows how the Member States BITs compare to the North American model on dispute 
settlement. The Member State BITs include no provision on any of the issues discussed above that 
could open-up the arbitral processes to closer public scrutiny. The Member State models in this area 
appear to be at odds with the emerging international consensus that favours greater transparency. 
Again it seems unlikely that the European Parliament will give its consent to any agreement that does 
not require transparency in some form. So the expectation must be that the EU will have to include 
these in any agreement it negotiates.  
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Table 5 Detail on EU and North American model agreements’ provisions on investor-state 
dispute settlement and arbitration 
 
 Participation 
of non-
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Model 
+ + + + + 
US Model + + + + + 
 
Source European Parliament, 2010 
Based on 2005 OECD Report entitled ‘Novel Features in OECD Countries’ Recent Investment 
Agreements: An Overview 
 
Conclusions 
This article has argued that for the EU to have normative power in shaping international standards in 
investment policy it needs: (a) consensus on the core aims of EU policy or an acquis; (b) de facto as 
well as de jure competence, by which it is meant that there is agreement among the EU institutions on 
how decisions in the field of foreign investment are taken; (c) market power and (d) arguably a 
distinctive set of EU norms. The conditions (a) to (c) should need no further elaboration. The need for 
distinctive norms is debatable since, by virtue of the scale of EU FDI, the EU would have influence 
even if it were to emulate standards shaped elsewhere. If normative power is however defined as 
influencing others to change their policies to adopt EU norms then distinctive norms would seem to be 
a precondition. 
Until the adoption of the TFEU the EU had full de jure competence only for capital flows (under 
Article 57 TEC) and de facto competence only with regard to the negotiations on investment in 
services under mode 3 of the GATS. This meant the EU was not recognised as the sole actor in 
investment negotiations. The Member States shaped investment policy on liberalisation through their 
role in OECD level negotiations and investment protection through their BITs.24 There was no 
distinctive EU policy. When the US moved to liberalise investment policy in the late 1970s, the 
response came from individual Member States rather than from the EC/EU. Britain moved early to 
liberalise investment and was followed by the other Member States at varying speeds and with varying 
conviction. While Europe as a whole had considerable potential market power this was never 
exercised collectively so that policy on investment tended to be shaped by US initiatives.  
                                                     
24 The Commission participated in OECD negotiations, such as on the Multilateral Investment Agreement negotiations in the 
1990s, and sought to coordinate Member State positions in the talks. But Member States retained a determining influence in 
the OECD. 
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How do things stand with the adoption of the TFEU? There is now exclusive EU competence for FDI. 
Subject to issues of definition of FDI this should facilitate a greater role for the EU in shaping 
international investment standards. But the EU is still some way from establishing de facto 
competence in the shape of a consensus among the EU institutions and key interests on how decisions 
in international investment policy should be taken. This lack of consensus was shown in the long 
debates concerning the arrangements for transition from Member State BITs to EU level BITs, who 
should assume responsibility in investment dispute settlement cases and what ‘security’ exception 
there should be to the EU’s liberal policy on investment. 
Nor is there a firm acquis on EU international investment policy that encompasses at least the major 
institutional actors of the Commission, Council, European Parliament and the Member State 
governments. The domestic acquis is one of liberal investment, but there are still issues to be decided 
on what investment protection standards should be included in EU investment agreements. There is a 
question concerning what standards the EU will seek on sustainable development as well as what 
safeguards the EU should incorporate on dispute settlement in the form of reviews or transparency 
provisions.  So it cannot be said that the EU has an acquis on IIAs. 
On market power little has changed in the recent past. The EU is the source and destination of more 
than half of world FDI. As such it continues to possess considerable market power, even with the 
bourgeoning growth of the emerging powers and the negative economic consequences of the financial 
crisis. But this market power has to date not been harnessed to EU policies. With the TFEU Member 
States are no longer free to negotiate bilateral investment agreements, so EU market power should be 
enhanced, especially now that the EU can negotiate comprehensive trade and investment agreements 
covering all key issues.  
The lack of an acquis means however, that the default mandate in bilateral FTA negotiations has been 
to follow the established Member State model for investment protection. In terms of coverage of 
liberalisation commitments there is a broad consensus on a limited number of key exclusions, such as 
air transport, audio visual etc. This default mandate is strongly influenced by the conservative forces 
in the investment policy community of the Member States with most existing BITs. It may well be 
enough to satisfy the Commission’s desire to ensure that bilateral FTA negotiations are comprehensive 
and include trade and investment. This will firmly establish the EU as competent for investment as 
well as trade. It will also enable the Commission/EU to make use of its collective market power. But it 
is not clear that this default mandate constitutes a distinctive EU norm or set of standards on 
international investment policy in the coming years that would provide the EU with significant 
normative power. Nor is it clear that there is consensus on how the EU should use its enhanced market 
power that would constitute clear de facto EU competence for investment equivalent to what it has in 
trade policy. Agreement on these questions would be needed if the EU is to make the most of the 
opportunity offered by the current juncture in international policy, the pattern of FDI flows and the 
addition of extension of exclusive competence to include FDI with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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European Investment Treaty-making: Status Quo and the Way Forward 
 (A Sustainable Development Perspective) 
 
Sergey Ripinsky and Diana Rosert∗ 
 
Introduction 
The 2009 European Union’s (EU) Lisbon Treaty1 took the competence over foreign direct investment 
(FDI) away from Member States and placed it under the umbrella of the EU’s Common Commercial 
Policy. Even before this competence shift, the EU had been signing treaties that could be categorised 
as international investment agreements (IIAs) since they included certain substantive provisions on 
investment. In parallel, individual EU member states have been concluding their own bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) with third countries. The Lisbon Treaty’s wholesale transfer of FDI 
competence means that the European Commission will become the sole negotiator of EU’s investment 
agreements.2 It is expected, that the latter will gradually replace Member States’ existing BITs and 
lead to major changes to the global IIA landscape. 
These developments have taken place against the background of increased attention to, and criticism 
of certain aspects of IIAs, triggered primarily by the numerous arbitration cases initiated by foreign 
investors against host governments around the globe. Some of these investor-state arbitrations have 
been particularly controversial due to their salient public policy dimension, and have given rise to 
questions about the overall design of IIAs and their compatibility with sustainable development values 
and principles. The reorientation of IIAs away from the interest of investor protection as the sole treaty 
objective has become the subject of a growing discourse. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it compares the existing EU IIAs with member states’ (MS) 
BITs (at the time of writing, 27 Member States) in order to present a clear picture of investment treaty-
making practices in the EU to date. In particular, we look at treaty numbers and the number of country 
relationships that they create, examine typical treaty content and review dispute settlement activity 
under both types of agreements.   
Secondly, the paper looks at the possible directions of future EU investment policies. The European 
Union, a bloc of countries with a long-standing commitment to human rights, environmental 
protection and sustainable development, is well equipped to become a global leader in guaranteeing a 
harmonious relationship between the goals of investment protection and sustainable development. The 
FDI competence shift offers an opportunity to take a fresh look at the design and features of the EU’s 
future IIAs. To suggest the way forward in more practical terms, we formulate a list of desirable IIA 
features and compare it against the record of existing EU IIAs and MS BITs. We then review current 
discussions within the EU about the content of its future investment treaties, putting them into the 
broader context of the bloc’s external relations, and conclude with some final observations. 
                                                     
∗ Sergey Ripinsky is legal affairs officer at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Diana 
Rosert worked as a consultant with UNCTAD. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the UNCTAD secretariat or its member states. The authors can be reached at 
sergey.ripinsky@unctad.org and diana.rosert@gmail.com. 
1 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at 
Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306. 
2 In areas of the EU’s exclusive competence, to which the Common Commercial Policy belongs, the European Commission 
develops the policy direction and represents the EU in negotiations with third countries, while the EU Council, consisting 
of heads of state and governments, authorizes the Commission’s proposals and recommendations, and the European 
Parliament has an oversight role and ratifies agreements with third countries. 
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1.  EU’s and Member States’ Investment Treaty-making Practice to Date 
This section compares the EU agreements that have provisions on foreign investment with bilateral 
investment treaties concluded in the past 50-plus years by individual EU member states.3 Before 
proceeding to a statistical and substantive comparison of these agreements, in order to provide some 
economic background, we briefly summarise the position of the EU as investment actor vis-à-vis 
developing countries. 
EU member states together account for a quarter of global GDP and are an important source of FDI. 
EU’s accumulated FDI stocks in developing countries approach 40% of its overall FDI stocks, and 
yearly FDI flows to developing countries are around 50% of its overall FDI outflows (see figure 1). 
The share of developing countries’ FDI stocks in the EU is not nearly as significant (17%) but the 
share of investment flowing into the EU from developing countries has been increasing in the past few 
years and reached 44% in 2010 (share of developing countries in the overall EU inward FDI flows, see 
figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. EU outward FDI flows (destination), 2007-2010 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 The data in this section is provided as of 1 July 2012 (EU IIAs statistics), 1 May 2012 (MS BIT statistics) and 1 January 
2012 (dispute settlement statistics).  
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Figure 2. EU inward FDI flows (origin), 2006-2010 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD estimates. 
 
1.1.  EU IIAs and MS BITs: Treaty Numbers and Country Coverage  
To date, the EU and its member states have followed a two-track approach to investment treaty 
making with third countries: (1) as a collective entity, the EU has been concluding trade and 
investment agreements; and (2) member states, individually, have been concluding BITs with third 
countries.4  
Even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was concluding treaties that qualify as 
‘IIAs’. These are usually multi-component treaties, traditionally focussing on trade in goods and 
services, of which investment was one among other aspects. These agreements bear a variety of 
names, such as free trade agreements, economic partnership agreements, partnership and cooperation 
agreements, stability and association agreements and others.5 They were negotiated by the 
Commission, and also signed by member states (so-called ‘mixed’ agreements) as the treaties covered 
some subject matters that belonged to the shared competence of the EU and member states.  
Over time, the EU has concluded around 60 multi-component treaties with non-EU countries (see 
annex 1). Not all of these agreements are on an equal footing in terms of their investment provisions. 
In fact, around half of them are ‘framework’ agreements that contain clauses related to investment 
(e.g., on investment promotion), but do not have any legally binding obligations in that respect. The 
other half (31 agreements, to be precise) does include substantive investment provisions. However, 
                                                     
4 There is also a third, multilateral track where both the EU and member states become parties to certain multilateral 
agreements with provisions on investment (e.g., the Energy Charter Treaty or the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures). These agreements are not considered in this paper. 
5 E.g., the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and Their Member States and 
Ukraine (1994), the Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Community and the Republic of Chile 
(2002), the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States and the European Community (2008). 
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even agreements of the latter type do not include most of the provisions that are common to member 
states’ BITs (see section 1.3 below).  
As regards country coverage, these 31 substantive treaties create EU relationships with 139 non-EU 
countries. This is due to the fact that some of the EU agreements are with groups of countries, e.g., the 
agreements with CARIFORUM (15) or the Central American region (6). The EU-ACP (Cotonou) 
Agreement is the one with the greatest number of signatories covering 78 non-EU countries of the 
African, the Caribbean and the Pacific Group of States (ACP). As shown further below, the multi-
party participation produces a great effect on the number of country relationships created and the 
volume of FDI covered. 
On a parallel track, individual member states have been signing BITs with third countries that deal 
with investment only (i.e., not with trade or other matters), even though their provisions on investment 
differ from those found in EU IIAs (see section 1.3 below). Germany signed the first ever BIT in 1959 
and is still a leader among the EU countries by the number of BITs concluded (see table 1), accounting 
for 123 of the overall 1,318 extra-EU BITs.6 Some member states, however, have signed few or no 
BITs (see table 2).  
 
Table 1. Top five EU member states by number of BITs concluded 
 
  Extra-EU BITs Intra-EU BITs Total BITs 
Germany 123 13 136 
United Kingdom 93 11 104 
France 90 11 101 
Netherlands 87 11 98 
Belgium and 
Luxembourg 81 12 93 
Source: Based on UNCTAD data (as of 1 May 2012). 
 
Table 2. Bottom five EU member states by number of BITs concluded 
 
  Extra-EU BITs Intra-EU BITs Total BITs 
Slovenia 19 19 38 
Cyprus 18 9 27 
Estonia 12 15 27 
Malta 10 12 22 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Source: Based on UNCTAD data (as of 1 May 2012). 
 
In practice, member states’ uneven BIT activity translates into differing levels of legal protection that 
EU investors from different member states enjoy abroad. German and Dutch investors, for instance, 
enjoy BIT treatment in 123 and 87 non-EU countries respectively. Investors from Malta and Estonia 
have similar protection in 12 and 10 countries respectively, while investors from Ireland do not benefit 
from BIT coverage in any country. Moreover, provisions in MS BITs, although similar, are not the 
                                                     
6 To access country lists of BITs and specific BIT texts, see the ‘IIA Databases’ available at <http://www.unctad.org/iia>.  
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same, which adds to the distortions and results in different rights even between those investors covered 
by BITs. The transfer of FDI competence from member states to the EU level should gradually 
eliminate this legal inequality, since the EU’s future comprehensive IIAs will provide all EU investors 
abroad with the same protections in partner countries.7 
The stark difference in territorial reach between EU IIAs and MS BITs becomes apparent if one 
compares the number of country relationships they each create. Despite the much lower number of 
EU IIAs as compared to MS BITs – 31 versus 1,318 – the EU agreements far outplay MS BITs in 
terms of the number of country relationships created (see figure 3).  
As mentioned above, the EU’s 31 existing treaties with substantive investment provisions reach 139 
non-EU countries. Given that from the EU side, 27 member states participate in each treaty, these 31 
agreements cover 3,753 bilateral relationships (27 x 139). In other words, the 31 EU agreements are 
statistically equivalent to 3,753 bilateral treaties. These 31 agreements create two and a half times 
more country relationships than all existing MS BITs taken together. The case for collective EU 
negotiations is obvious not only because this eliminates differences in treatment of investors from 
different countries but also because of the lower transaction costs of treaty making, not to mention the 
EU’s greater negotiating power as compared to individual member states.  
  
                                                     
7 Aside from extra-EU BITs, there exist 177 intra-EU BITs. These are typically agreements concluded by ‘old’ member 
states with ‘new’ ones prior to their accession but which remained in force after the accession. They create the second 
type of discrimination between EU investors – this time not abroad but at home. For example, German investors in the 
Czech Republic (and Czech investors in Germany) benefit from BIT protections including access to international arbitral 
fora for resolution of disputes because there is a BIT between the two countries, while French investors in Greece (and 
Greek ones in France) do not have similar rights as there is no BIT in place. The existing 177 intra-EU treaties cover 
approximately half of country relationships within the EU, while the other half is not covered, and this clearly distorts the 
level-playing field on the European market. The fate of intra-EU BITs is currently being debated within the EU; the 
Commission is of the view that ‘intra-EU BITs are not compatible with the EU single market’. See European 
Commission, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties between EU Member States (intra-EU BITs)’, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/analysis/monitoring_activities_and_analysis_en.htm>. For the academic 
discussion of this issue, see M. Potesta, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and the European Union: Recent Developments in 
Arbitration and Before the ECJ’, 8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 2009, pp. 225–245; T. 
Eilmansberger, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law’, 46 Common Market Law Review 2009, pp. 398 et seq. 
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Figure 3. Country relationships created by MS BITs and EU IIAs8  
 
 
Source: Based on own data and UNCTAD data (as of 1 May 2012 for MS BITs and 1 July 2012 for 
EU IIAs). 
 
A review of the treaty partners reveals that both EU IIAs and MS BITs are oriented towards 
developing countries. Rarely have the EU or its member states negotiated IIAs with other developed 
countries. Only some Eastern European transition economies, prior to joining the EU in 2004 and 
2007, had concluded BITs with countries like Australia, Canada, Norway, Switzerland or the United 
States. In the EU’s case, its agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (includes 
Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) is an exception.9  
Given that all major developed countries have adopted an open-door foreign investment policy 
complemented by a relatively strong record of good governance, institutions and judiciary, there 
appears to be less of a need for additional protection by means of international investment agreements. 
However, the example of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between Canada, Mexico and the United States shows that investors from developed countries will 
readily take advantage of international arbitration mechanisms against their developed hosts too, if 
such mechanisms are available.10  
 
                                                     
8 One BIT governs one country relationship (e.g., France-Nigeria or Spain-Argentina). The only exception are BITs 
concluded by the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, where one BIT covers two country relationships (e.g., the BIT 
between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and Tajikistan applies to Belgium-Tajikistan and Luxembourg-
Tajikistan relationships). In total, 1,318 extra-EU MS BITs cover 1,399 country relationships. 
9 This trend may be changing, with the free trade agreement between the EU and Canada currently under negotiation, and the 
EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership planned. Both agreements will most likely contain an investment 
chapter. 
10 Out of the total of 47 known NAFTA investment disputes, 13 claims have been brought by US investors against Canada 
and 17 cases have been initiated by Canadian investors against the United States. See U.S. Department of State, NAFTA 
Investor-State Arbitrations, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3740.htm>. 
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1.2.  EU IIAs and MS BITs: Treaty Content 
In terms of their content, existing substantive EU investment treaties cover somewhat different ground 
to MS BITs (see annex 2). EU IIAs are limited to providing for national treatment (NT) and most-
favoured-nation treatment (MFN) with respect to the establishment and operations of investments and 
also contain provisions regarding free capital movements and employment of key personnel. In most 
treaties, the NT and MFN provisions extend to both services and non-service sectors (on the basis of a 
positive or negative list of industries). Within committed sectors, each contracting party can inscribe 
limitations and reservations in a schedule. 
The EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (2008) may serve as an example. Its chapter 
on ‘Investment, Trade in Services and E-Commerce’ contains the following main obligations:  
‘Article 67 
Market access 
1. With respect to market access through commercial presence, the EC Party and the Signatory 
CARIFORUM States shall accord to commercial presences and investors of the other Party a 
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the specific commitments contained in 
Annex IV [Annex IV contains a positive list of committed industries, including limitations and 
reservations in these industries]. 
[…] 
Article 68 
National treatment 
1. In the sectors where market access commitments are inscribed in Annex IV and subject to any 
conditions and qualifications set out therein, with respect to all measures affecting commercial 
presence, the EC Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States shall grant to commercial 
presences and investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that they accord to 
their own like commercial presences and investors. 
[…] 
Article 70 
Most-favoured-nation treatment 
1. With respect to any measures affecting commercial presence covered by this Chapter: 
(a) the EC Party shall accord to commercial presences and investors of the Signatory 
CARIFORUM States a treatment no less favourable than the most favourable treatment 
applicable to like commercial presences and investors of any third country with whom it 
concludes an economic integration agreement after the signature of this Agreement; 
(b) the Signatory CARIFORUM States shall accord to the commercial presences and investors of 
the EC Party a treatment no less favourable than the most favourable treatment applicable to like 
commercial presences and investors of any major trading economy with whom they conclude an 
economic integration agreement after the signature of this Agreement.’ 
[…] 
Commercial presence, a key term in these provisions, is defined as the ‘constitution, acquisition or 
maintenance of a juridical person’ and ‘the creation or maintenance of a branch or representative 
office […] for the purpose of performing an economic activity’ (Article 65(a)). The words 
‘constitution’, ‘acquisition’ and ‘creation’ point to establishment of investments, i.e. market access. 
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However, an additional reference to ‘maintenance’ of a juridical person, branch or representative 
office suggests that the treaty goes beyond the pre-establishment phase. The term ‘maintenance’ can 
be read in different ways, and it is not yet clear how far-reaching it is – for example, whether it relates 
only to organisational issues or also covers substantive business activities of the entity concerned.11 In 
many other EU IIAs, the NT/MFN provisions apply, in addition to ‘establishment’ of subsidiaries and 
branches, to their ‘operation’, the latter term being defined as ‘pursuit of economic activities’,12 which 
clearly points to the post-establishment phase. More detailed information on the EU IIAs’ content is 
provided in Annex 2. 
Neither the EU-CARIFORUM treaty, nor other EU IIAs, provide for additional standards of treatment 
commonly found in MS BITs. The latter typically also include absolute standards of protection such as 
fair and equitable treatment of investors and their investments, full protection and security, prohibition 
of arbitrary and discriminatory measures, guarantees in case of expropriation and provision for 
compensation of losses incurred during armed conflict or civil strife. However, MS BITs are of the 
‘post-establishment’ type, i.e., all these protections, including NT and MFN, become operational only 
after an investment is established in the host state.  
Thus, the two types of agreements – EU IIAs and MS BITs – are to a large extent complementary: EU 
IIAs open up opportunities for market access (pre-establishment) while MS BITs protect investments 
from the moment of their establishment onwards (post-establishment).  
Another important distinction is the scope of the investment provisions. EU IIAs typically only 
concern investments in the form of subsidiaries and branches (more recent agreements use the term 
‘commercial presence’, which also implies, most commonly, holding equity capital in legal entities).13 
EU agreements therefore do not cover portfolio investments. By contrast, the definition of 
‘investment’ in MS BITs is much broader and covers an open-ended list of assets such as movable and 
immovable property, shareholdings (including portfolio investments), any loans and bonds, claims to 
money or performance under contracts and intellectual property rights.14 
Provisions of EU IIAs and MS BITs are further discussed in section 2.3 from the sustainable-
development angle.  
 
1.3.  EU IIAs and MS BITs: Dispute Settlement  
The mechanism of enforcement is key in any treaty. EU IIAs and MS BITs take a radically different 
approach to this issue. EU IIAs provide for political settlement of any disputes through consultations 
or negotiations between the state parties (often through the inter-state council created by the treaty), or 
in some more recent treaties (e.g., with Mexico, Chile, Republic of Korea or CARIFORUM) for state-
state arbitration. EU IIAs do not mention possible remedies, but presumably a dispute would involve a 
request to the state party which allegedly is breaching treaty provisions to withdraw or modify the 
measure that violates the treaty (similar to WTO dispute settlement). To the authors’ knowledge, so far 
there have been no reported arbitration cases related to investment provisions under these treaties. 
                                                     
11 Some fully-fledged IIAs contain a much broader list of post-establishment investment activities to which the NT or MFN 
obligation apply, in which ‘maintenance’ is only one aspect, for instance ‘management, conduct, operation, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment and sale or other disposition of investments’. See for example, Brunei-Japan Free Trade Agreement 
(2009), Art. 56(1) (definition of ‘investment activities’). 
12 See, e.g., the EC-Georgia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1996), Arts. 23, 25. 
13 A ‘subsidiary’ of a company is defined as a company which is ‘effectively controlled’ by the first company. The EU-
CARIFORUM EPA specifies that only capital participation which entails ‘lasting economic links’ is recognised as 
‘commercial presence’. The treaty clarifies that certain long-term loans are also included (Art. 65(a)). 
14 On definitions of the terms ‘investment’ and ‘investor’ in BITs, see UNCTAD, Scope and Definition: A Sequel (United 
Nations: New York and Geneva 2011), available at <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20102_en.pdf>. 
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By contrast, the great majority of MS BITs provide for direct investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). 
An aggrieved investor can initiate arbitration proceedings against the host state, claiming that the state 
has breached a BIT obligation or obligations, and request financial compensation for the losses 
suffered as a result of the breach. From the individual investor’s perspective, BITs provide a more 
immediate way to enforce treaty provisions when compared to the political settlement or state-state 
arbitration of EU IIAs where individual companies or industries have to convince their home 
governments to prosecute host countries’ treaty violations.  
European investors have been using the ISDS system actively. Out of the 451 publicly known 
arbitration cases filed around the world by the end of 2011, 219 (or 48%) were initiated by EU 
investors.15 Out of these 219 known cases, 168 cases were brought against developing countries,16 and 
51 cases were launched by EU investors against other EU member states (figure 4).17  
 
Figure 4. Known ISDS Cases Filed by EU Investors 
 
Source: Based on UNCTAD data (as of 1 January 2012). 
 
Non-EU investors have been significantly less active in suing the EU member states – only 21 such 
claims are known (4% of the total of 451 cases).18 EU member states have been more frequently sued 
by investors from other EU members (51 cases); many of such claims have been based on intra-EU 
BITs. 
In sum, dispute settlement is much more common under BITs compared to EU IIAs. This must be 
largely the result of the BITs’ direct investor-state arbitration system that is better suited to investors’ 
                                                     
15 Where the claimant is a company (not an individual), it should be borne in mind that the ultimate investor/beneficiary 
might be from a non-EU country, even though the company is established in one of the EU member states. 
16 Countries most frequently sued by EU investors by means of ISDS are Argentina (30 cases), Venezuela (12), Russia (9), 
India (7), Ukraine (7), Albania (4), Georgia (4) and Kazakhstan (3). 
17 The most popular respondents in these cases have been the Czech Republic (13 cases), Poland (9), Hungary (6), Slovakia 
(6) and Romania (5). 
18 5 such cases have been initiated against Poland, 4 against the Czech Republic, 3 against Romania and 3 against Slovakia. 
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needs than the state-state mechanism enshrined in EU IIAs. Furthermore, MS BITs contain more 
obligations that can be used to support a claim (the obligation to treat investors fairly and equitably is 
probably the most important among these). Finally, the EU IIAs’ primary focus on pre-establishment 
means that even if such obligations are breached, the losses to investors can be only of the ‘foregone 
business opportunities’ type, and do not involve the destruction or impairment of an established 
investment, which is a usual grievance in ISDS proceedings under BITs. 
Statistics show that currently, EU investors’ BIT claims against developing countries by far outnumber 
claims in the opposite direction. The main reasons for this appear to be better governance practices in 
Europe and relatively low FDI stocks held in the EU by developing-country investors. However, this 
trend may be expected to change, at least to a degree, with the continuous growth of developing 
countries' share in FDI flows to the EU. The significant number of intra-EU BIT claims and the 
NAFTA experience both suggest that business environments in developed countries generally, and EU 
member states in particular, are not flawless and that their governments are not immune to investor 
claims. 
 
2.  The Way Forward: European Investment Agreements and Sustainable Development 
This part looks into the possible future directions of the European investment treaty making. Section 
2.1 briefly discusses what the FDI competence shift entails in practice and suggests that the current 
juncture presents a propitious moment for a reassessment of how EU investment treaties should look. 
Section 2.2 deals with the emergence of sustainable development as the overarching guiding principle 
for investment treaties and explains what this means for their design and content. Section 2.3 assesses 
the EU’s and member states’ record in terms of compatibility of their treaties with sustainable 
development objectives. Finally, section 2.4 briefly reviews the current discussion and developments 
within the EU with respect to future IIAs.ù 
 
2.1.  Imminent Changes in European Investment Policy-making 
Post-Lisbon Treaty statements from the European Commission indicate that the EU will start 
introducing BIT-like provisions in its future agreements with third countries, thus combining the 
earlier investment liberalisation approach with investment protection.19 These provisions can be 
included in the broad trade and cooperation pacts (presumably, inter alia, by amending existing 
treaties) or stand-alone investment agreements (e.g., with China).20 
In September 2011, the EU Council issued the first three mandates to the EU Commission to conduct 
negotiations on investment in FTAs with Canada, India and Singapore.21 The leaked negotiating 
directives suggest that the Council foresees the inclusion of those BIT elements previously absent in 
EU IIAs such as the fair and equitable treatment, expropriation and investor-State dispute settlement 
and aims for the ‘highest possible level of legal protection and certainty for European investors in 
Canada/India/Singapore’.22 The Council also instructs the Commission to include portfolio 
investment and intellectual property rights in the definition of covered investment. In December 2011, 
                                                     
19 See European Commission, Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, COM(2010) 343, 7 July 
2010. 
20 Ibid., p. 7. 
21 EU Council, official press release of the 3109th Council meeting, 13587/11, 12 September 2011, p. 13, available at 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/genaff/124579.pdf>. 
22 ‘EU negotiating mandates on investment (EU-Canada/India/Singapore FTAs)’, 15 September 2011, available at 
<http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article20272>. 
Trade Liberalisation and Standardisation – New Directions in the ‘Low Politics’ of EU Foreign Policy 
 
135 
the EU Council adopted negotiating directives for deep and comprehensive free trade areas, including 
provisions on investment, with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.23 Finally, in February 2012, the 
EU and China discussed the possibility of an EU-China investment agreement and agreed ‘to work 
towards the start of the negotiations as soon as possible’.24 In May 2013, the negotiating directives 
for the EU-China investment agreement were submitted by the Commission to the Council.25   
In the long-term, the EU’s comprehensive investment treaty making will entail systemic changes to 
the international investment regime. The implementation of the EU’s new exclusive competence over 
FDI impairs the ability of member states to continue concluding BITs. New EU-wide investment 
treaties are expected to gradually replace existing BITs between the EU’s future treaty partners and 
individual EU member states.26 For instance, once concluded, the EU-India FTA may be expected to 
replace 21 BITs previously signed with India by individual EU members. Given that existing MS BITs 
(1,318 extra-EU and 177 intra-EU BITs) account for more than half of the world’s BITs, the changes 
will indeed be dramatic, even if gradual. By reducing the overall number of treaties and creating more 
uniform rules, the EU’s new agreements should lead to a considerable consolidation and 
harmonisation of the international investment regime.27  
Investment treaty making under the umbrella of the EU may be expected to be based on a broader 
spectrum of opinions, take into account various political interests and involve greater democratic 
scrutiny. This is due to the co-decision powers of the European Parliament in the Common 
Commercial Policy, a new feature introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and described as an ‘important step 
forward in combating the democratic deficit in trade policy-making’.28 The Parliament’s strengthened 
role will naturally lead to deliberations between its different political groups and, assuming that a great 
                                                     
23 European Commission, ‘EU agrees to start trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia’, Press Release, 
IP/11/1545, 14 December 2011, available 
at  <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1545&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en>. 
24 Joint Press Communiqué of the 14th EU-China Summit, MEMO 12/103, 14 February 2012, para. 11, available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/103>. 
25 European Commission, ‘Commission proposes to open negotiations for an investment agreement with China’, Press 
Release, 23 May 2013, available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=900>. 
26 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries, COM(2010) 344, 7 July 
2010. See also Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries, 
OJ L 351/40. 
27 It must be noted that some EU member states have continued concluding BITs with third countries after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2009). 45 such agreements were signed, including ten in 2011. The Czech 
Republic has signed the highest number of agreements (10), followed by Romania (5) and Portugal (4). The most 
frequent treaty partner for post-Lisbon BITs has been India (4 treaties), which is surprising given that the EU is 
negotiating an FTA with India that will have an investment chapter. According to the recently adopted EU Regulation 
1219/2012, member states retain the right to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of new BITs or amendments to 
their existing BITs subject to receiving the Commission’s authorisation. The latter should be granted if the proposed talks 
and, thereafter, the negotiated text of the treaty satisfy the conditions set out in Article 9 of the Regulation, including 
consistency with EU law, principles and objectives of the EU external action and the Union’s investment policy. See 
Articles 7-11 of the Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries, 
Official Journal of the European Union L 351/40. 
28 R. Leal-Arcas, ‘The European Union’s Trade and Investment Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon’, 11/4 The Journal of World 
Investment & Trade, pp. 463-514 (p. 476). See also M. Bungenberg, ‘Going Global? The EU Common Commercial 
Policy After Lisbon’, in C. Herrman and J. Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2010 
(Springer: Berlin and Heidelberg 2010), pp. 123-151 (pp. 129-130). 
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part of such deliberations will be public, this will contribute to a more transparent and democratic 
process. 
In sum, the shift of the FDI competence and the resultant institutional changes create an opportunity 
for EU bodies and stakeholders to review and analyse existing treaty practices and take them forward. 
From our perspective, such reassessment should start from the fundamentals and take into account the 
dynamic experiences of the past 15 years. The next section shows how the concept of sustainable 
development can help to identify positive avenues for change. 
 
2.2.  International Investment Agreements and Sustainable Development 
The rationale underlying the rapid proliferation of BITs over the past 20-30 years has been two-sided: 
capital-exporting countries have sought to protect their investments abroad, while capital-importing 
countries have sought to use IIAs as a means to attract FDI. The investment-attraction line of thinking 
was based on a simple syllogism: ‘(1) Investments are good for economic development; (2) IIAs 
attract investment by giving guarantees of protection; and therefore, (3) IIAs are good for economic 
development’.  
The reality has turned out to be more complex. First, increasing doubt has been cast on the premise 
that IIAs help to attract FDI. Econometric studies have not found a clear statistical link between the 
conclusion of IIAs and growth in FDI flows.29 A meta-analysis by UNCTAD has suggested that IIAs 
can be one among several factors with a positive influence on FDI, although by no means a crucial 
one.30 
Second, and more importantly, there has been increased recognition of the fact that investment is not 
the only ingredient in the development process, and that investment protection serves a good cause so 
long as it does not interfere with, or trump other development values such as environmental welfare or 
public health. Increasing FDI inflows is not an ultimate goal but the means to economic growth and 
job creation, which must go hand in hand with improved standards of living, maintenance of labour 
and human rights standards and preservation of the environment. When seeking to boost development, 
it may be a fallacy to strive for economic growth at all costs. IIAs and increased investment must co-
exist harmoniously with public policies and especially those ensuring the sustainability of economic 
development. IIAs should find a proper balance between interests of private investors and important 
public interests.   
An additional point is that the division between capital exporters and importers is becoming blurred as 
more and more countries import and export capital at the same time. This also changes the dynamics 
of investment treaty negotiations and eventually impacts treaty content. More countries, both 
developing and developed, now must satisfy opposing interests by looking at the relevant issues from 
both perspectives, capital-exporting and -importing. Canada and the United States are good examples 
in this respect. After reviewing their model BITs in light of their experience as respondents in NAFTA 
arbitrations, both countries came up with significantly modified treaty models that seek to balance 
offensive and defensive interests.31 
                                                     
29 UNCTAD, The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing 
Countries, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development (United Nations: New York and 
Geneva 2009), pp. xiii, 33-50, 55. 
30 Ibid., pp. xii, 14-26, 54-56 and 109-112. It was also noted that treaties which provide for both free trade and 
investment protection provisions tend to have more pronounced FDI-attraction effects (Ibid., pp. xii, 64-106 and 110-
111).  
31 See Canada’s Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (2004) available at 
<http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf> and the United States’ Model Bilateral Investment 
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IIAs have demonstrated ample potential to expose countries to international legal proceedings, which 
come with significant monetary and reputational costs. To date, a total of 89 countries have appeared 
as respondents in known investment treaty proceedings, often prolonged and expensive. No doubt, 
many investors’ claims are aimed at remedying abusive or arbitrary state conduct, fighting corrupt 
practices and cronyism. However, there have also been a considerable number of investor claims 
challenging government policies adopted in the public interest but which had a negative effect on 
investors. Such cases have concerned, for example, environmental regulations,32 public health and 
safety issues,33 sovereign debt restructuring,34 ‘affirmative action’ policies aimed at improving the 
status of previously disadvantaged groups,35 and others.36 In light of these developments, some 
countries have reviewed their model BITs and started to renegotiate their treaties introducing 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Treaty (2004; the most recent version is from 2012) available at 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf>. 
32 Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 3 August 2005 (Methanex, a Canadian methanol producer, 
initiated arbitrations against the United States’ ban of MTBE gasoline additives); Chemtura v. Canada, UNCITRAL, 
Award of 2 August 2010 (Chemtura, a US agricultural chemicals manufacturer, challenged a pesticide regulation by a 
Canadian agency); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Awards of 13 November 2000, 21 October 
2002 and 30 December 2002 (SD Myers, a United States hazardous waste management company, submitted a claim 
against Canada’s export ban on PCB, a toxic chemical); Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6 (Vattenfall, a Swedish energy company, filed a complaint against restrictions on the use of 
river water and delays in the issuance of related permits imposed by a German local authority on a coal-fired power plant 
under construction near a river). 
33 FTR Holding S.A. (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/, and Philip Morris v. Australia, UNCITRAL (Philip Morris, a 
tobacco giant, started arbitrations against Uruguay and Australia, challenging the countries’ toughened regulations on 
tobacco packaging and labeling); Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 
(Vattenfall challenged Germany’s decision to shut down the oldest nuclear power plants and to phase out nuclear energy 
production). 
34 Abaclat et al., v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 4 August 
2011 (A mass claim, brought by Italian bondholders, challenges the conditions of the sovereign debt restructuring after 
Argentina’s default on its public debt in the early 2000s). 
35 Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/07/1, Award of 4 
August 2010 (Foresti and others, a group of European investors, challenged a new regulation of mineral rights enacted by 
the South African government in the context of black economic empowerment legislation). 
36 On investor-state dispute cases related to environmental and social issues, see M. E. Footer, ‘Bits and Pieces: Social and 
Environmental Protection in the Regulation of Foreign Investment’, 18/1 Michigan State Journal of International Law 
2009, pp. 28-58. For a comprehensive analysis of human rights issues in international investment law, see P.-M. Dupuy, 
F. Francioni, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford 2010). 
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necessary safeguards,37 other countries have even terminated some BITs.38 Still others have withdrawn 
from the ICSID Convention.39 
Cases like the ones mentioned above demonstrate that traditional BITs, by focusing solely on 
investment protection, have neglected other important societal values, thus opening the way for 
frivolous claims and one-sided interpretations. The logic followed by some arbitrators is well-
illustrated by the following statement: ‘The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection 
of investments. […] It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the 
protection of covered investments.’40 Thus, orthodox BITs can be read as intentionally leaving out 
sustainable-development considerations as irrelevant in the investment protection context. While not 
all arbitrators have followed this line of thinking, the wide scope for interpretation creates 
unpredictability and cultivates subjective judgement. When rules are vague, the true power is in the 
hands of the interpreter.  
In the past few years, the relationship between IIAs and sustainable development has received a good 
deal of attention from policy-makers, academics, international organisations and other stakeholders.41 
We will highlight a few examples. In 2004 both Canada and the United States issued their updated 
model BITs, which, among other things, clarified concepts of fair and equitable treatment and indirect 
expropriation to allow for non-discriminatory public-interest policies, included general exceptions 
from investor protections (Canada only), added new language on environmental protection and labour 
rights, a mechanism for expeditious discharge of frivolous claims (US only) and incorporated some 
other innovative features. In 2005, the International Institute for Sustainable Development issued its 
Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development which goes even further 
in this rebalancing effort and includes, for example, a right of states to bring counterclaims against 
investors who have breached the provisions of the treaty or its domestic law.42 The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) has been working on a model BIT template for its member states. 
The current draft includes provisions on environmental and social impact assessments, measures 
                                                     
37 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a low-carbon economy (United Nations: New York and 
Geneva 2010), pp. 85-88. 
38 The most recent example is South Africa’s termination of its BIT with Belgium and Luxembourg. According to South 
Africa’s Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies, the Cabinet intends to terminate other BITs as they come up for 
renewal, and possibly renegotiate them on the basis of South Africa’s new model BIT that is yet to be developed (see 
<http://www.dti.gov.za/editspeeches.jsp?id=2506>). In 2009, South Africa started a review of its BITs, stating that the 
first post-apartheid government entered into ‘agreements that were heavily stacked in favour of investors without the 
necessary safeguards to preserve flexibility in a number of critical policy areas’ (see Government Position Paper, 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, p. 5, available at 
<http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=103768>). Earlier instances of treaty terminations include 
Ecuador’s termination of nine BITs, Venezuela’s termination of its BIT with the Netherlands and Bolivia’s termination of 
its BIT with the United States. 
39 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID, which was established by the Convention, is the 
most frequently used venue for IIA arbitrations. In the last few years, three states denounced their membership: Bolivia in 
2007, Ecuador in 2009 and Venezuela in 2012. For a discussion of the related legal issues, see UNCTAD, Denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims, IIA Issues Note, No. 2, 2010, available at 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf>. 
40 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004, para. 116. 
41 For academic sources, see, for example, M-C. Cordonier Segger, M. Gehring, and A. Newcombe (eds.), Sustainable 
Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer Law International: Alphen aan den Rijn 2011); A. van Aaken and T.A. 
Lehmann, ‘International Investment Law and Sustainable Development: Developing a New Conceptual Framework’, 
University of St. Gallen Law School, Working Paper No. 2011-10, July 2011. 
42 H. Mann, K. von Moltke, L. E. Peterson, A. Cosbey, IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable 
Development: A Negotiator’s Handbook, 2005, available at <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=686>.  
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against corruption, minimum standards for human rights, environment and labour, corporate 
governance, and the right of states to regulate and pursue their development goals.43  
The Secretariat of the Commonwealth, an association of 54 countries from different regions (including 
Africa, Asia, the Americas, the Caribbean, Europe and the South Pacific), in collaboration with the 
University of Ottawa, have put together a handbook entitled Integrating Sustainable Development into 
International Investment Agreements.44 Among other things, it suggests IIA provisions to strengthen 
investment promotion, provide more flexibility for host countries to pursue legitimate public policies, 
oblige investors to adhere to minimum standards respecting the environment, human and labour rights 
and require environmental, social and human rights impact assessments. The Guide also recommends 
options to reduce the costs of the ISDS mechanism, to require exhaustion of local remedies allowing 
counterclaims against investors which violate domestic or international law. 
 
In July 2012, drawing on many years of experience in research and technical assistance, UNCTAD 
launched its own Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD).45 In its 
international section, the IPFSD compiles policy options available to IIA negotiators and includes both 
mainstream treaty approaches and less common language used by some countries along with 
UNCTAD’s own suggestions to foster sustainable development. Each section is accompanied by a 
brief commentary on the various drafting possibilities which highlights – where appropriate – the 
implications for sustainable development. 
Based on the IPFSD, we suggest that a sustainable development-friendly IIA should give expression to 
the following main elements: 
(i) offering protection solely to those investments that contribute to the host country’s 
sustainable development such as greenfield investments, or, at a minimum, excluding 
those investments that should not be subject to investor-state arbitration (such as 
countries’ sovereign debt);46  
(ii) providing treatment and protection guarantees to investors without impinging on the 
government’s right to regulate in the public interest, e.g., in the areas of environment or 
public health and safety; 
(iii) defining as precisely as possible standards of treatment and protection (most notably, the 
‘fair and equitable’ standard as the one most frequently invoked in ISDS)47 and listing 
specific policy areas where they do not apply; 
(iv)  avoiding over-exposure of states to costly litigation and lowering the risk of exorbitant 
financial liabilities (e.g., if a threshold of liability for finding a violation of the fair and 
equitable treatment obligation is low, a country may be showered by claims, and litigation 
                                                     
43 SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary, July 2012, available at 
<http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf>. 
44 J. Van Duzer, P. Simons and G. Mayeda, Integrating Sustainable Development into International Investment Agreements: 
A Guide for Developing Country Negotiators (The Commonwealth, forthcoming), available for purchase at 
<https://publications.thecommonwealth.org/integrating-sustainable-development-into-international-investment-agreements-
955-p.aspx> (pre-publication version on file with the authors). 
45 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 2012, available at 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2012d5_en.pdf>. 
46 See UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Investment Agreements, IIA Issues Note, No. 2, July 2011, 
available at <http://unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaepcb2011d3_en.pdf>. 
47 On this issue, see also UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel (United Nations: New York and Geneva 2012), 
available at <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf>. 
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expenses alone, often amounting to several million US dollars per case, will divert scarce 
funds away from development causes); 
(v) stimulating responsible business practices by investors, e.g., by incorporating ILO labour 
standards and other universally accepted principles of business conduct and ensuring 
procedural means for enforcing them; and 
(vi) accounting for differences in the level of development in cases where the economic gap 
between the treaty partners is significant (e.g., by using asymmetrical obligations, 
technical assistance to a less developed treaty partner) and fostering the investment 
promotion effects of IIAs (e.g., by providing for exchange of information between the 
parties, joint activities and/or committees, investment guarantees). 
 
2.3.  EU IIAs and MS BITs from a Sustainable-development Perspective 
It is useful to look at the EU IIAs and MS BITs from the perspective of the sustainable-development 
features set out in the previous section. From the outset, it should be said that the 1,318 extra-EU MS 
BITs, while having many common characteristics, are not identical and sometimes display significant 
differences. The great majority of MS BITs, however, are based on the OECD Draft Convention on 
the Protection of Foreign Property of 1967, with the addition of investor-state arbitration as a means of 
treaty enforcement. The 31 EU IIAs are not identical either but, again, they display certain general 
features which form the basis for this discussion. While recognising the limitations of such an 
analysis, we believe that its value lies in identifying general treaty trends and approaches.   
MS BITs focus solely on investor protection and generally fail to take into account other objectives. 
As mentioned, this may result in the interpretation of the (commonly vague) treaty standards in a one-
sided, investor-friendly way. With reference to the criteria set out in the previous section: 
• MS BITs adopt an open-ended definition of investment which typically covers any assets of 
economic value. There is no requirement for investments to be in productive assets, to 
establish a lasting economic relationship or to contribute to the host state’s economic 
development. Portfolio investments, government bonds, assets for non-business purposes, 
short-term loans and claims arising of out contracts (even if the contracts are purely one-off 
commercial deals) are not excluded. 
• MS BITs do not include provisions that would safeguard a government’s right to regulate in 
the public interest, either in the form of a general reference in the treaty preamble, or as 
general exceptions or as clarifications to specific provisions. The matter is thus wholly left to 
arbitrators who may or may not justify certain measures depending on their interpretation of 
the terms ‘fair and equitable’, ‘discrimination’, ‘full protection and security’, ‘indirect 
expropriation’, etc. 
• Principal standards of treatment of protection are formulated broadly and imprecisely leaving 
it to the interpreter (i.e., arbitral tribunals) to establish their meaning. 
• MS BITs do not employ any techniques to limit state exposure to investor claims such as 
exclusion of certain classes of sensitive disputes from ISDS, a requirement to exhaust local 
remedies, alternative dispute resolution (mediation and conciliation), limitation on 
recoverable damages or the introduction of ’limitation periods’ within which a claim must be 
brought, etc. 
• MS BITs do not impose any obligations on investors aside from the requirement for an 
investment to be made in accordance with the local law (e.g., such as a requirement to comply 
with host State laws at the post-entry stage, incentives to comply with universally recognised 
standards such as the ILO Tripartite MNE Declaration and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, or with applicable standards of corporate social responsibility). 
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• MS BITs do not have special and differential treatment provisions for the benefit of countries 
with a low level of development, including technical assistance, and do not provide for 
specific investment-promotion activities. 
As mentioned earlier, among MS BITs there are some outliers, especially among the more recent 
treaties. For example, the 2009 BIT between Belgium/Luxembourg and Colombia contains a number 
of features not common to traditional MS BITs. In particular this treaty: 
• excludes from the definition of investment sovereign debt obligations and commercial 
contracts for the sale of goods and services; 
• excludes certain sensitive policies from the scope of treaty application (tax measures, 
prudential regulation in the financial sector); 
• links the fair and equitable treatment obligation to the minimum standard of treatment under 
customary international law, thereby preventing extensive interpretation, increasing the 
threshold of state liability and thus limiting exposure to investor claims; 
• sets out exceptions from the free-transfer-of-funds obligation, including in the event of the 
serious balance-of-payments difficulties or threat thereof; 
• contains special obligations relating to the protection of the environment and labour rights; 
• clarifies that measures adopted for public purposes such as protection of public health, safety 
and environment protection do not constitute indirect expropriation, and thus need not be 
accompanied by compensation to affected investors; 
• omits the so-called ‘umbrella’ clause (a clause that makes contractual and other specific 
obligations granted to investors enforceable through the IIA’s ISDS mechanism, which 
expands the scope of arbitrable disputes); 
• generally, contains more precise and specific formulations, thereby reducing the discretion left 
to arbitrators. 
EU IIAs contain a number of provisions that can be of interest from a sustainable-development 
perspective (statistical analysis of the relevant treaty features is provided in annex 2). For example, the 
general treaty exceptions – routinely found in EU IIAs – allow governments to implement certain 
public-interest policies that could otherwise be in breach of the treaty’s substantive disciplines. These 
general exceptions sometimes resemble Article XX of the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and, among others, include measures necessary to protect public security, safety and morals, 
maintain public order, protect the environment as well as national treasures of artistic, historic or 
archaeological value.48 Older EU IIAs typically subject treaty provisions to the broadly-formulated 
‘limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health’.49 National security 
exceptions, which may also have a public-interest dimension, are also a regular feature of EU IIAs and 
are usually found in a separate article.50  
A treaty preamble is another place to look. By contrast to a typical MS BIT, whose preamble normally 
refer only to the desire to create favourable conditions for investors and to promote and protect 
investments, the majority of EU IIAs mention additional principles, including sustainable 
development. For instance, the preamble to the EU-Korea FTA (2010) names the following: 
• ‘commitment to sustainable development […] in its economic, social and environmental 
dimensions, including economic development, poverty reduction, full and productive 
                                                     
48 EU-CARIFORUM EPA (2008), Art. 224. 
49 E.g., EU-Algeria Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (2002), Art. 35(2). 
50 E.g., EU-Moldova Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1994), Art. 91. 
Marise Cremona and Tamara Takács (eds) 
 
142 
employment and decent work for all as well as the protection and preservation of the 
environment and natural resources’; 
• ‘the right of the Parties to take measures necessary to achieve legitimate public policy 
objectives’; 
• desire ‘to raise living standards, promote economic growth and stability, create new 
employment opportunities and improve the general welfare’; and 
• desire ‘to strengthen the development and enforcement of labour and environmental laws and 
policies, promote basic workers’ rights and sustainable development’. 
Preambles play an important role in interpreting substantive IIA provisions. Going beyond the narrow 
investment-protection statements is likely to lead to more balanced interpretations and foster 
coherence between different policy objectives and bodies of law. 
The EPA with CARIFORUM members, the FTA with the Republic of Korea and some other recent 
treaties concluded by the EU include innovative provisions on investor behaviour and maintenance of 
standards – they oblige the contracting parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure that foreign 
investment activity conforms to a number of standards, in particular each Party must: 
• ensure that bribery of officials by foreign investors is forbidden; 
• ensure investor compliance with core labour standards as required by the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work (1998); and  
• ensure fulfilment of international environmental or labour obligations arising from agreements 
signed by the parties. 
These agreements provide further that the Parties shall not encourage FDI by lowering domestic 
environmental and labour standards or laws. 
Inclusion of provisions on investment promotion and technical assistance presents an important 
innovation in comparison to most MS BITs. Cooperation aims at making the institutional regime and 
policy environment in target countries more conducive to investment, improving access to information 
on investment opportunities and facilitating and incentivising investment flows. The EU-ACP 
Partnership Agreement (2000), applicable to 78 ACP countries, is an example of a treaty with detailed 
stipulations on this matter – it lists relevant cooperation activities in Articles 75 (‘Investment 
promotion’), 76 (‘Investment finance and support’) and 77 (‘Investment guarantees’). In particular, 
this agreement envisages: 
• specific assistance to encourage the EU private sector to invest in ACP countries; 
• facilitation of partnerships and joint ventures; 
• measures to attract financing for infrastructure investments; 
• institutional capacity building, including for investment promotion agencies; 
• dissemination of information on investment opportunities; 
• establishment and support of the ACP-EU private sector business forum; 
• provision of long-term financial resources, including risk capital, grants for technical 
assistance and policy reforms, for advisory and consulting services and for measures to 
increase the competitiveness of enterprises; 
• guarantees in support of private investment; 
• loans or lines of credit on the conditions attached to the Agreement; and  
• insurance schemes against political risks. 
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Some of such activities are implemented through special programmes such as the Facility for Euro-
Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). Implemented by the European Investment Bank, 
this programme is aimed at stimulating private sector development in the Mediterranean region and 
facilitating a higher level of economic growth, by granting loans and technical assistance for 
investment projects in the region.51 
The above remarks on the content of MS BITs and EU IIAs are not comprehensive but sufficient to 
create a general impression. The two types of agreements are not fully comparable given their 
differences in scope – EU IIAs do not include some key investment protections such as the fair and 
equitable treatment standard and do not provide for investor-state arbitration. However, on the whole, 
compared to the majority of MS BITs, EU IIAs appear to be more balanced and display more features 
that can be characterised as conducive to sustainable development in light of the criteria discussed in 
section 2.2.  
 
2.4.  Way Forward and Challenges 
As mentioned in section 2.1 above, the European Commission has already received the first mandates 
to negotiate comprehensive investment treaty provisions with several third countries. It appears, 
however, (at least to an outside observer) that the mandates were issued by the EU Council without 
arriving at a consensus with the other two EU bodies – the Parliament and the Commission – on how 
future EU agreements should look. Prior to the mandates, each of the three institutions, who all have 
an important role to play in the treaty making process, issued a statement with their respective visions 
of the policy development, which revealed several important areas of disagreement. First, the EU 
Commission set out the basic parameters of the EU investment policy which proposes to retain the 
core of existing approaches but indicates that investment agreements should be consistent with other 
policies ‘including policies on the protection of the environment, decent work, health and safety at 
work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, development policy and competition policy’.52 It also 
made some suggestions for reform of investor-state arbitration: in particular, it acknowledged the 
problem of atomization of disputes and treaty interpretations, supported measures that would make 
arbitration proceedings more transparent and suggested to consider the use of quasi-permanent 
arbitrators and the creation of an appellate mechanism.53 The EU Council’s position, which followed 
several months later, can be summarized as expressing satisfaction with traditional MS BITs and 
suggesting that the same treaties should be signed by the EU.54 The EU Parliament was the last of the 
three bodies to speak, and its resolution was the most critical of existing MS BITs. It made some 
specific suggestions, for example it proposed to exclude speculative forms of investment from 
protection, to exclude sensitive sectors such as culture and education, to find a fairer balance between 
private and public interests in formulating treaty obligations, to clarify standards of investment 
protection, and to include social and environmental standards.55 Reportedly, a series of ‘trilogues’ took 
                                                     
51 See EIB, ‘Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP)’, available at  
<http://www.eib.europa.eu/projects/regions/med/index.htm>. 
52 European Commission, supra note 19, p. 9. 
53 Ibid., p. 10. 
54 EU Council, Conclusions on a comprehensive European international investment policy, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council 
meeting, 25 October 2010. 
55 European Parliament, Resolution on the future European international investment policy, (2010/2203(INI)), 6 April 2011, 
paras. 11-35. 
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place between the representatives of the three EU institutions in late 2011 and 2012 but it is unclear 
whether a consensus was reached.56 
In summary, while the Lisbon Treaty enables and mandates the EU to speak with a single voice on 
international investment issues there appears to be lack of agreement about the fundamental features of 
investment chapters and the detailed formulations of provisions. A sudden side-step in this search for 
consensus was made by the EU (represented by EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht) by adopting 
a joint statement with the United States (Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States 
Michael Froman) on the ‘Shared Principles for International Investment’ in the context of the EU-US 
Transatlantic Economic Council (April 2012).57 This document, slightly longer than one page, sets out 
a number of ‘essential elements of open investment policies worldwide’ including broad market access 
for foreign investors, non-discrimination, a high level of legal certainty and protection against unfair 
or harmful treatment, and effective and transparent dispute settlement procedures. It is noteworthy that 
the joint statement also made references to the need to preserve government authority to regulate in the 
public interest, promote responsible business conduct and avoid attracting foreign investment by 
weakening or failing to apply regulatory measures. The Joint Statement can be seen as a signal that the 
EU recognises the need to reconcile strong investment protections with policies of the sustainable-
development part of the spectrum.  
Indeed, there is a strong case for the EU, with its mature and well-considered development policy, to 
give serious weight to sustainable-development considerations in the context of IIAs. The EU has 
identified sustainable development as its overarching long-term goal in which ‘economic growth, 
social cohesion and environmental protection go hand in hand and are mutually supporting’.58 The 
EU has pledged to ‘promote this approach globally’.59 The 2005 ‘European Consensus on 
Development’, a joint declaration by the Council, the Commission and the Parliament enshrining their 
common vision in development cooperation, states that all three institutions see ‘development is a 
central goal by itself; […] sustainable development includes good governance, human rights and 
political, economic, social and environmental aspects’ (para. 7).  One of the general principles of the 
EU’s external action is ‘to foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty’ (Article 21.2(d) of the Treaty on 
European Union). Since its collective economic and political power will give it greater negotiating 
leverage with third countries, to maintain its reputation as a global economic and political leader and a 
benign international actor, this power needs to be balanced by even more responsibility towards its 
negotiating partners. 
 
Conclusions 
The transfer of FDI competence to the EU level has many positive implications. As shown, the EU 
offers a more efficient way to conclude investment treaties, with lower transaction costs, greater 
country coverage and increased bargaining power. With time, the new treaties will eradicate unequal 
                                                     
56 F. Hoffmeister and G. Ünüvar, ‘From BITS and Pieces to European Investment Agreements’, in M. Bungenberg, A. 
Reinisch, C. Tietje (eds.), EU and Investment Agreements, Open questions and Remaining Challenges (Nomos 2013). 
57 Statement of the European Union and the United States on Shared Principles for International Investment, April 2012, 
available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149331.pdf>. European Commission, ‘EU and US 
adopt blueprint for open and stable investment climates’, Press Release, 10 April 2012, available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/356&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLang
uage=en>. 
58 European Commission, Mainstreaming Sustainable Development into EU policies: 2009 Review of the European Union 
Strategy for Sustainable Development, 24 July 2009, COM(2009) 400 final, p. 2. 
59 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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treatment of investors from various EU countries abroad as well as provide third-party investors with 
equal treatment everywhere in the EU. The transparency of treaty making will be enhanced, thanks 
also to the involvement of the EU Parliament. The global network of IIAs will move towards 
consolidation and a higher degree of consistency. If the EU uses its power wisely, it can help creating 
better, more balanced investment treaties that advance on difficult substantive and procedural issues 
and avoid one-sidedness by giving due consideration to factors beyond investment protection.  
Yet, the EU has been entrusted with an immense task. It has to untangle the investment policies of its 
member states, solving some of the thorny issues along the way (e.g., involving investor-state dispute 
settlement, the definition of investment and fair and equitable treatment). Both a blessing and a 
burden, the EU has a great deal of experience to draw upon – from its member states and third 
countries, arbitration cases and, not least, the latest international efforts to guide the reform of 
investment treaty practice. Despite the complexity of the task, the deliberations on EU level are 
advancing quickly and create high expectations. There are positive signs that the EU is willing to 
weigh investor protection against public interests. However, how far these balancing efforts will go, 
what treaty elements they will affect and what methods they will employ remains unclear. Whether the 
EU can set a new gold standard in global investment treaty making will largely depend on its ability to 
ensure that its new investment agreements enhance, and do not inhibit, sustainable development in 
member states and third countries alike. 
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Annex 1. EU investment treaties (agreements with provisions on investment) 
 
No. Short title Full title 
Year of 
signature 
Substantive 
or framework 
1 EU-ACP Partnership Agreement between the Members of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the 
One Part, and the European Community and Its Member 
States, of the Other Part (Cotonou Agreement)  
2000 Substantive 
2 EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
European Communities and Their Member States, of the 
One Part, and the Republic of Albania, of the Other Part 
2006 Framework 
3 EU-Algeria Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an 
Association between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and Algeria, of 
the Other Part 
2002 Substantive 
4 EU-Andean 
Community 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between 
the European Community and Its Member States, of the 
One Part, and the Andean Community and Its Member 
Countries, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela, of the Other Part 
2003 Framework 
5 EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Communities and Their Member States, of the 
One Part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the Other 
Part 
1996 Substantive 
6 EU-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and Its Member States and the Member 
Countries of ASEAN  
1980 Framework 
7 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Community and Their Members States, of the 
One Part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the Other 
Part 
1996 Substantive 
8 EU-Bangladesh Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on 
Partnership and Development  
2000 Framework 
9 EU-Belarus Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a 
Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and Belarus, of 
the Other Part 
1995 Text not 
available 
10 EU-Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
European Communities and Their Member States, of the 
One Part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the Other Part 
2008 Substantive 
11 EU-Brazil Framework Agreement for Cooperation between the 
European Economic Community and the Federative 
Republic of Brazil 
1992 Framework 
12 EU-Cambodia Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the Kingdom of Cambodia 
1997 Framework 
13 EU-
CARIFORUM 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
CARIFORUM States, of the One Part, and the European 
Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part 
2008 Substantive 
14 EU-Central 
America 
Agreement Establishing an Association Between Central 
America, on the One Hand, and the European Union and 
Its Member States, on the Other 
2012 Substantive 
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No. Short title Full title 
Year of 
signature 
Substantive 
or framework 
15 EU-Chile Agreement Establishing an Association between the 
European Community and Its Member States, of the One 
Part, and the Republic of Chile, of the Other Part  
2002 Substantive 
16 EU-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
between the European Economic Community and the 
People's Republic of China 
1985 Framework 
17 EU-Colombia-
Peru 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and Its 
Member States, of the One Part, and Colombia and Peru, 
of the Other Part 
2012 Substantive 
18 EU-Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Stepping Stone Economic Partnership Agreement 
between Côte d'Ivoire, of the One Part, and the 
European Community and Ist Member States, of the 
Other Part 
2008 Framework 
19 EU-Croatia Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
European Communities and Their Member States, of the 
One Part, and the Republic of the Republic of Croatia, 
of the Other Part  
2001 Substantive 
20 EU-EFTA Agreement on the European Economic Area 1992 Substantive 
21 EU-Egypt Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an 
Association between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, of the Other Part 
2001 Substantive* 
22 EU-ESA Interim Agreement Establishing a Framework for an 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the Eastern 
and Southern Africa States, on the One Part, and the 
European Community and Its Member States, on the 
Other Part 
2009 Framework 
23 EU-Georgia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a 
Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and Georgia, of 
the Other Part 
1996 Substantive 
24 EU-Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council 
Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Economic Community, of the One Part, and the 
Countries Parties to the Charter of the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (the State of the 
United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the 
State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait), of the Other Part 
1988 Framework 
25 EU-India Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the Republic of India on Partnership 
and Development 
1993 Framework 
26 EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an 
Association between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and the State of 
Israel, of the Other Part 
1995 Substantive* 
27 EU-Jordan Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing a 
Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the Other Part 
1997 Substantive 
28 EU-Kazakhstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Communities and Their Member States and 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the Other Part 
1995 Substantive 
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No. Short title Full title 
Year of 
signature 
Substantive 
or framework 
29 EU-Kyrgyz Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a 
Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic, of the Other Part 
1995 Substantive 
30 EU-Lao Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the Lao People's Democratic Republic  
1997 Framework 
31 EU-Lebanon Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement 
between the European Community and Its Members, of 
the One Part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the Other 
Part 
2002 Substantive* 
32 EU-Macao Agreement for Trade and Cooperation between the 
European Economic Community and Macao  
1992 Framework 
33 EU-Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
European Community, of the One Part, and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the Other Part 
2001 Substantive 
34 EU-
MERCOSUR 
Inter-regional Framework Cooperation Agreement 
between the European Community and Its Member 
States, of the One Part, and the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) and Its Member States, of the 
Other Part 
1995 Framework 
35 EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and Its Member States, of the One Part, and 
the United Mexican States, of the Other Part 
1997 Framework 
36 EU-Moldova Cooperation Agreement Establishing a Partnership 
between the European Communities and Their Member 
States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Moldova, of 
the Other Part 
1994 Substantive 
37 EU-Mongolia Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
between the European Economic Community and 
Mongolia 
1992 Framework 
38 EU-
Montenegro 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
European Communities and Their Member States, of the 
One Part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the Other 
Part 
2007 Substantive 
39 EU-Morocco Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an 
Association between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Kingdom 
of Morocco, of the Other Part 
1996 Substantive* 
40 EU-Nepal Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a 
Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and Nepal, of the 
Other Part 
1995 Framework 
41 EU-OCT Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories 
with the European Community 
2001 Substantive 
42 EU-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on 
Partnership and Development  
2001 Framework 
43 EU-Palestine Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on 
Trade and Cooperation between the European 
Community, of the One Part, and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) for the Benefit of the 
Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza 
1997 Substantive* 
Trade Liberalisation and Standardisation – New Directions in the ‘Low Politics’ of EU Foreign Policy 
 
149 
No. Short title Full title 
Year of 
signature 
Substantive 
or framework 
Strip, of the Other Part 
44 EU-Paraguay Framework Agreement for cooperation between the 
European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Paraguay 
1992 Framework 
45 EU-Republic of 
Korea 
Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and 
Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of 
Korea, of the Other Part 
2010 Substantive 
46 EU-Russian 
Federation 
Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establishing 
a Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of One Part, and the Russian 
Federation, of the Other Part 
1994 Substantive 
47 EU-SADC Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the European 
Community and Its Member States, of the One Part, and 
the SADC EPA States, of the Other Part 
2009 Framework 
48 EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
European Communities and Their Member States, of the 
One Part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the Other Part  
2001 Substantive 
49 EU-South 
Africa 
Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation 
between the European Community and Its Member 
States, of the One Part, and the Republic of South 
Africa, of the Other Part  
1999 Framework 
50 EU-Sri Lanka Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka on Partnership and Development  
1994 Framework 
51 EU-Tajikistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a 
Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic 
of Tajikistan, of the Other Part 
2004 Substantive 
52 EU-Tunisia Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an 
Association between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic 
of Tunisia, of the Other Part 
1995 Substantive* 
53 EU-Turkey Agreement Establishing an Association Between the 
European Economic Community and Turkey 
1963 Framework 
54 EU-
Turkmenistan 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Community and Its Member States, of the One 
Part, and Turkmenistan, of the Other Part  
1998 Text not 
available 
55 EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a 
Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and Ukraine, of 
the Other Part 
1994 Substantive 
56 EU-Uruguay Framework Agreement for Cooperation between the 
European Economic Community and the Eastern 
Republic of Uruguay 
1991 Framework 
57 EU-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a 
Partnership between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic 
of Uzbekistan, of the Other Part 
1996 Substantive 
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58 EU-Vietnam Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam  
1995 Framework 
59 EU-Yemen Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the Republic of Yemen 
1997 Framework 
 
*Agreement with limited provisions on establishment (e.g., only re-affirming the parties GATS 
commitments) but with other substantive obligations such as free transfer of capital. 
Source: Based on own data and UNCTAD data (as of 1 July 2012). 
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Annex 2. Investment-related obligations and other relevant features in substantive EU 
investment treaties 
 
Type of provision Frequency 
 
National Treatment (NT): pre- or 
post-establishment 
 
Pre-establishment only: 1 
Post-establishment only: 2 
Pre- and post-establishment: 11  
Mixed/asymmetrical: 11* 
None: 6 
 
NT: scope  Only services covered: 2 
Not limited to services: 23 
N/A: 6 
 
NT: industries covered Negative list: 19 
Positive list: 6 
N/A: 6 
 
Most-favoured-nation treatment 
(MFN): pre- or post-
establishment 
 
Pre- and post-establishment: 21 
None: 9 
Unclear: 1 
MFN: scope Only services covered: 1 
Not limited to services: 20 
N/A: 9 
Unclear: 1 
MFN: industries covered Negative list: 20 
Positive list: 0 
Mixed/asymmetrical: 2* 
N/A: 9 
 
Free transfers Yes: 30 
No: 1 
 
Other substantive obligations on 
investment: employment of key 
personnel by subsidiaries and 
branches 
 
Yes: 21  
No: 10 
Preamble: reference to 
sustainable development or 
similar objectives 
 
Yes: 28 
No: 3 
General public policy exceptions Yes: 24 
No: 7 
 
National security exceptions Yes: 29 
No: 2 
 
Environmental protection 
provision(s) 
Yes: 31 
No: 0 
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Parties’ obligation to ensure 
investor compliance with ILO 
labour conventions/core labour 
standards 
 
Yes: 5 
No: 26 
Not-lowering-standards clause 
(environment and/or labour) 
Yes: 4 
No: 27 
 
Investment promotion  Yes: 28 
No: 3 
 
Technical cooperation/ 
capacity building  
Yes: 29 
No: 2 
 
State-State Dispute Settlement Yes: 29 
No: 2 
 
 
* Refers to a situation where the contracting parties undertake differing levels of obligations. 
For example, the EU/MS party may agree to grant only post-establishment NT/MFN, while 
the other party agrees to grant both pre- and post-establishment NT/MFN. 
 
Source: Based on own data. 
 
  
 
